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Abstract
On-orbit servicing is the process of improving a space-based capability through a combination of
in-orbit activities which may include inspection; rendezvous and docking; and value-added
modifications to a satellite's position, orientation, and operational status. As a means to extend
the useful life or operational flexibility of spacecraft, on-orbit servicing constitutes one pathway
to a responsive space enterprise. Following launch, traditional satellite operations are tightly
constrained by an inability to access the orbiting vehicle. With the exception of software
upgrades from ground controllers, operators are wedded to supporting payload technologies that
become rapidly obsolete and to bus structures that deform during the stress of launch and
degrade in the harsh environment of space. On-orbit servicing offers satellite operators an option
for maintaining or improving space-based capabilities without launching a new spacecraft.
Numerous studies have been performed on on-orbit servicing, particularly regarding the
architecture of the servicing provider. Several customer valuation case studies have also been
performed to identify the economic case (or lack thereof) for different categories of servicing
missions. Little work, however, has been done to analyze the tradespace of potential on-orbit
servicing customers-a global analysis of operational satellites currently orbiting the Earth. The
goal of this research is to develop and test a methodology to assess the physical amenability of
satellites currently in operation to on-orbit servicing. As defined here, physical amenability of a
target satellite, or "serviceability," refers to the relative complexity required of a teleoperated or
autonomously controlled robotic vehicle to accomplish on-orbit servicing.
A three-step process is followed to perform serviceability assessments. First, a taxonomy of
space systems is constructed to add structure to the problem and to identify satellite attributes
that drive servicing mission complexity. Second, a methodology is proposed to assess
serviceability across the four servicing activities of rendezvous, acquire, access, and service.
This includes development of an agent-based model based on orbital transfers as well as a
generalized framework in which serviceability is decomposed into four elements: (1) knowledge,
(2) scale, (3) precision, and (4) timing. Third, the value of architecture frameworks and systems
engineering modeling languages for conducting serviceability assessments is explored through
the development of a discrete event simulation of the Hubble Space Telescope. The thesis
concludes with prescriptive technical considerations for designing serviceable satellites and a
discussion of the political, legal, and financial challenges facing servicing providers.
Thesis Supervisors:
Daniel E. Hastings, Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Engineering Systems
Donna H. Rhodes, Senior Lecturer of Engineering Systems
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Tracking Data Relay Satellite System
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technology readiness level
Union of Concerned Scientists
United States Air Force
United States Munitions List
Wide Field Planetary Camera
Wideband Gapfiller Satellites
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1 Introduction
Since the dawn of the space age with the launch of the Soviet Union's Sputnik satellite on
October 4, 1957, the human footprint in space has grown from fleeting missions by two
superpowers into a global enterprise. Early space system development was driven primarily by
the Cold War-era objectives of the United States and Soviet Union: delivery vehicles for nuclear
war (ballistic missiles), target detection (strategic reconnaissance), and international prestige
(space race). Nearly a half-century separated from those formative years, a global space industry
has emerged in which approximately 800 active satellites are operated by 38 countries (Union of
Concerned Scientists, 2005). Applications today include communications, navigation,
environmental monitoring, remote-sensing, and scientific research. Satellites have become
indispensable tools for maintaining international security, enabling global communications, and
providing early warning of natural disasters.
Produced by the "flagship" aerospace industry, the goal of space systems has traditionally been
high technical performance. This legacy-embodied by the Apollo program-was ill-equipped
to respond to global economic competition which has commoditized many of the services
offered by the space industry.
As in so many industries, infrastructure, institutions, and even mindsets have become misaligned with the
environment and are now "monuments" blocking forward progress. Attempts to address these barriers
through downsizing, outsourcing, mergers, acquisitions, and regulatory reform all fail to engage the root
cause of the challenge. What's needed is a fundamentally different orientation to creating value for the
many stakeholders in this industry, other sectors, and society at large-over the lifecycle of a wide range of
aerospace systems (Murman et al., 2002).
Additional features of the space industry, including low-volume production and highly complex
products, further challenge efforts to implement efficient business processes. Perhaps the
greatest barriers to a space industry better aligned to delivering stakeholder value are the
significant sources of market instability. The past decade has been characterized by changing
tactical and strategic threats, funding instability, transient acquisition practices, and a collapse in
the projected demand for satellite communications due to an extraordinary installation of fiber
optics cables and proliferation of cell phone service during the late 1990's.
The current paradigm for designing, acquiring, and operating space systems is underperforming
within this highly uncertain environment. Traditional "divide and conquer" systems engineering
processes are not well-suited to the conceptual design of system-of-systems into which satellites
are increasingly integrated. Space system acquisitions are often characterized by tremendous
cost overruns and schedule slips. In particular, acquisition of government space systems in the
U.S. is in turmoil (Table 1.1) as reduced government oversight in the 1990's resulted in high-
risk, underfunded programs (Caceres, 2006). Flaws exist across civil, military, and intelligence
acquisition efforts as evident in the National Polar Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS), Space-Based Infrared System High (SBIRS High - Figure 1.1), and Future Imagery
Architecture (Defense Science Board, 2003). Finally, satellite operations are tightly constrained
by the physical inability to access systems following launch. The cumulative weight of these
problems and limitations is significant for the U.S. given that most government mission areas in
space (including early warning, weather, communications, navigation) are currently in transition
(Defense Science Board, 2003).
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Table 1.1 Troubled Government Space System Acquisitions
Original Projection Best Estimate(as of January 2006)
AEHF
Name: Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites Attributes: five satellites, including one Attributes: three satellites
Contractor: Lockheed Martin Cost: $5.3 billion, expected to reach $6Cost: $2.5 billion billion
Description: constellation of secure, survivable, and jam- Schedule: first launch by 2004 Schedule: first launch no earlier than
resistant GEO communications satellites; follow-on to 2008Air Force's MILSTAR
GPS IH
Name: Global Positioning System Attributes: initial procurement plans Attributes: 24-36 satellites
called for a block upgrade of 51
Contractor: TBD satellites Cost: $2.5-5 billion
Description: fifth-generation series of replenishment Cost: not reported Schedule: first launch by 2012; a launch
satellites with higher power levels, increased anti- as late as 2015 has been proposed by the
jamming capabilities, a more precise civil signal, and Schedule: first launch by 2009 Air Force because of a SBIRS-High
additional military signals funding crunch
MUOS
Name: Mobile User Objective System Attributes: ten satellites Attributes: six satellites
Contractor: Lockheed Martin Cost: $6 billion Cost: expected to grow with increaseddevelopment time
Description: constellation of narrowband mobile Schedule: first launch by 2007 with a
communications satellites; follow-on to Navy's UHF full operational capability by 2010 Schedule: first launch by 2013 with 
a
Follow-On satellite system full operational capability by 2020
NPOESS
Name: National Polar Orbiting Operational Attributes: six satellite constellation and Attributes: restructuring; may eliminate
Environmental Satellite System a technology demonstration satellite instruments and technologydemonstration
Contractor: Northrop Grumman Cost: $6.9 billion Cost: $8.1-9.1 billion
Description: Air Force-NOAA collaboration to develop Schedule: first launch by 2008
joint meteorological satellites, follow-on to DMSP and
POES
SBIRS High
Name: Space-Based Infrared System High Attributes: five satellites Attributes: five satellites
Contractor: Lockheed Martin Cost: $3.9 billion Cost: $10-12 billion
Description: GEO component of a two-tiered ballistic Schedule: first launch by 2002 Schedule: first launch by 2007
missile early warning satellite system, DSP follow-on
WGS
Name: Wideband Gapfiller Satellites Attributes: five satellites Attributes: five satellites
Contractor: Boeing Cost: $1.5 billion Cost: $2 billion
Description: high-capacity communication satellites to Schedule: first two launches in 2004 Schedule: first two launches in 
2006
augment Air Force and Navy systems
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SBIRS High Quantitative Framework Cost
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Note: Cost estimates as of 2/06 exceed $ 1OB
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Figure 1.1 Cost overruns of Space-Based Infrared System High (Defense Science Board, 2003)
The Space Systems, Policy, and Architecture Research Group was formed at MIT to tackle these
issues with interdisciplinary research that touches upon space systems architecture and design,
systems engineering, and economics. In particular, a theory of flexibility is being applied to
space system design to provide a better understanding of cost, schedule, and performance risk.
The general goal of this research is to address the problems and limitations associated with
traditional design, acquisition, and operation of space systems by proposing and demonstrating
the value of a more flexible approach.
1.1 Background
This section begins by highlighting the importance of front-end conceptual design and back-end
maintenance for complex systems and identifies limitations in traditional spacecraft design and
operation. Next, on-orbit servicing (OOS) is presented as a paradigm shift that addresses many
of these limitations. This section concludes by decomposing OOS mission areas and mapping
OOS applications to physical forms of servicing.
1.1.1 Complex Systems Problems
Empirical data indicates a relationship between product quality metrics and systems engineering
effort. Figure 1.1 displays the results of an internal study by NASA which compared program
cost overruns with the percentage of the budget dedicated to preliminary design and
requirements definition. The impact of "upfront" systems engineering was tremendous.
Although the majority of costs are committed during these early phases, it was found that most
programs allocated less than 10% and went over budget by more than 40%. Furthermore, no
NASA program in the study that invested less than 5% in preliminary design and requirements
definition overran by less than 80% (Gruhl, 1992). In exploring the value of systems
engineering, Honour (2004) synthesized the results of six studies, including the NASA study,
and found that an optimum systems engineering effort will typically be 15-20% of total
development cost.
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Figure 1.2 Importance of 'Upfront' Systems Engineering (Gruhl, 1992)
Just as the ease of change in early system design leads to fluid requirements and system
uncertainty in early lifecycle phases, component wear-out and degradation during operations
leads to high-variability in the distribution of system states towards end-of-life (EOL). Figure
1.3 notionally depicts the uncertainty in the state of complex systems that are hard to access as a
function of lifecycle phase.' For systems which are deployed in harsh environments or for
extremely long operational lives (e.g., satellites, nuclear weapons), this problem is further
exacerbated.
High variability in High variability in
distribution of possible distribution of possible
system configurations in system states toward
early conceptual design End-of-Life
C Operational
Deployment
E
Advanced Studies Concept Definition Operations Maintenance
Preliminary Analysis Design Support Disposal
System Lifecycle
Figure 1.3 Lifecycle Uncertainty for Inaccessible Systems
'A surge in system uncertainty might also occur at beginning-of-life if the system is one of the first units produced
or if operational deployment is risky (e.g., spacecraft).
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1.1.2 Limitations of Traditional Spacecraft Design
Consider a national transportation system in which cars and trucks are unique. Forget about
automobiles with standard mechanical designs and exchangeable parts. Drivers have their own
custom vehicle built with unique tires, steering wheels, and other parts. Cars and trucks are
designed to last for a decade without any maintenance or refueling. Rather than visiting repair
shops when something breaks, cars carry their customized parts in a large trunk. This trunk
would contain spare batteries, extra steering wheels, and a complete set of new tires. Of course,
without access to service stations, cars would need to carry fuel as well. This would be
accomplished by every vehicle towing its own oil tank. When the car runs dry, its owner pushes
it off the road. To take its place, an entirely new custom-made vehicle is purchased by the
driver. This would be a poor way to build a transportation system (Hastings et al., 2001). Made-
from-scratch vehicles are extremely expensive. Hauling a lifetime of fuel and spare parts is
inefficient. Dumping vehicles because the fuel tank is empty is a waste. Yet this transportation
scenario is representative of how most space systems are designed and how virtually all are
operated.2
Following launch, traditional satellite operations are tightly constrained by an inability to access
the orbiting vehicle. With the exception of software upgrades from ground controllers, operators
are wedded to supporting payload technologies that become rapidly obsolete, and to bus
structures that deform during the stress of launch and degrade in the harsh environment of space.
The inaccessibility of satellites following launch makes them vulnerable to failures before
reaching EOL. Historical analysis indicates that the combination of the 9% failure rate of
satellites during their operational lives with the 4-5% failure rate of launch vehicles will cause
approximately one out of seven satellites to fail before EOL (Sullivan, 2001). This is
particularly unfortunate given that a typical geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) satellite costs
around $125 million for the satellite and launch (Pratt et al., 2003).
The critical mission areas fulfilled by government space programs and the drive for investor
return in the commercial space industry combined with the high cost of space systems has led to
an extremely risk-averse industry. Long (2005) notes that this environment has driven satellite
designers toward three common elements of design: redundancy, proven technology, and long
operational lives.
* Redundancy - Space systems incorporate massive redundancy to mitigate the risk of
component failure. Components may fail due to design flaws, emergent interaction
effects with other spacecraft systems, exposure to the harsh environment of space, or
other random events. Incorporating redundancy leads to very complex systems,
increasing spacecraft mass and cost. The value of redundant systems is only delivered in
the event of component failure.
* Proven technology - Designers are pressured to incorporated legacy hardware on space
systems. Technology readiness level (TRL) is metric developed by NASA to label
2 While the GEO communications industry has converged to some extent on a small number of standard buses as a
result of orbit geometries and payloads that are similar across most missions, satellites certainly lack the repair and
refuel architecture of the automobile industry.
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technological maturity. Classified on a scale of one through nine, most designs
incorporate a TRL of at least eight to insure "flight qualified" hardware. While use of
proven technology mitigates mission risks, it also limits potential satellite performance
and industry innovation.
Long operational lifetimes - Given that break-even points of modem GEO
communications satellites do not occur until around the 6th operational year and that
communications satellites are commonly referred to as 'cash cows' in later years of
operation (due to low recurring costs), satellites typically are designed for long lives. The
high costs associated with increasingly complex payloads and improvements in
supporting bus subsystems (e.g., ion propulsion) has lead to increases in satellite design
lifetimes (Figure 1.4).
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1-
Figure 1.4 Average Design Life of Active GEO Satellites (Sullivan, 2005)
One downside of long design lifetimes is the inability to update space-based capabilities with
modem avionics in a timely manner during an era dictated by "Moore's Law" (i.e., the doubling
of processing speed of new computer chips every 18-24 months). This slowdown of the space
industry's "clockspeed" also limits the agility of satellite operators in capturing emergent
terrestrial markets.
1.1.3 What is On-Orbit Servicing?
On-orbit servicing is the process of improving a space-based capability through a combination of
in-orbit activities which may include inspection; rendezvous and docking; and value-added
modifications to a satellite's position, orientation, and operational status. OOS activities include
remote-sensing, orbital modification, satellite rescue, refueling, upgrading, assembly, and repair
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operations. Five high-level functions of OOS are defined here: (1) inspect, (2) relocate, (3)
restore, (4) augment, and (5) assemble.3 These functions are not mutually exclusive. For
example, inspection may be required to support the docking activity of relocation missions.
1) Inspect - Observation of a space object from an attached position or a remote
surveillance vehicle provides space situational awareness and may be a necessary
precursor for other OOS activities. This includes proximity operations to assess a space
object's physical state (i.e., position, orientation, and operational status). In the case of a
satellite, inspection may include characterization of the spacecraft payload and
assessment of the bus exterior for damage. For example, on the Space Shuttle's return to
flight mission (STS- 114), Discovery's robotic arm incorporated an Orbiter Boom Sensor
System with a camera and laser to inspect for tile damage on Shuttle's protective skin
(Heiney, 2005).
2) Relocate - Modification of the orbit of a space object may be desired to support
constellation reconfiguration, tactical maneuvering, boosting of GEO satellites to higher
orbits for EOL retirement, controlled reentry of low Earth orbit (LEO) spacecraft, debris
cleanup, and rescuing satellites that became stranded from a maneuver or launch vehicle
failure. A rescue capability could have saved $1.2 billion of taxpayer dollars in April
1999 when the Milstar 3 satellite failed to reach its operational slot in GEO due to an
upper stage failure. Although stranded in a useless orbit without enough fuel to do orbit-
raising on its own, two years could have elapsed before the spacecraft would have
sufficiently degraded to rule out a rescue mission (McVey, 2004).
3) Restore - Returning a satellite to a previous state (or intended state) enables a wide range
of capabilities. Restoration activities include refueling for lifetime extension and
maneuverable spacecraft, docking and providing stationkeeping to extend mission life,
fixing or replacing faulty hardware, and deploying appendages which fail to reach
operational orientations at beginning-of-life (BOL). In October 1984, the crew of
Challenger on STS-41 G demonstrated the feasibility of on-orbit refueling by transferring
60 kg of hydrazine to a typical satellite. A three-hour extravehicular activity (EVA)
consisting of two astronauts was used to complete the operation (NASA, 1984).
4) Augment - Increasing the capability of a satellite consists of replacing or adding
hardware which improves spacecraft performance. The Hubble Space Telescope's
modular design has allowed NASA to equip it with state-of-the-art instruments every few
years. Joppin (2004) developed a utility metric for Hubble instrumentation called
"discovery efficiency" which is defined as the product of the field of view and the
throughput of the instrument. Applying this metric, it was found that the third-generation
Wide Field Planetary Camera (WFPC) envisioned for the fourth servicing mission has a
discovery efficiency 180 times greater than the first-generation WFPC.
5) Assemble - Mating modules to construct space systems enables the construction of large
space platforms which could not be transported by existing launch vehicles. For
3 The uplink of software updates does constitute improving a space-based capability but is excluded from this
definition of in-orbit servicing activities. This function is considered outside the scope of this thesis.
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example, the International Space Station (ISS), which is still being built, has a mass of
nearly 200,000 kg while Space Shuttle and planned heavy-lift variants of the Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program cap out at approximately 25,000 kg of
payload to LEO (Isakowitz, et al., 2004).
A variety of physical architectures have been proposed and developed to provide on-orbit
servicing capabilities. In general, four broad categories of servicing forms exist: (1) proximity
inspector, (2) space tug, (3) pre-planned servicer, and (4) all-purpose servicer. A comprehensive
analysis of past, present, and future servicing provider architectures is included in Chapter 2.
1) Proximity inspector - A proximity inspector is a free-floating vehicle or attached
surveillance instrument which characterizes a space object without physical contact. For
example, NASA Johnson Space Center is currently developing a free-floating
nanosatellite for external inspection and remote viewing of human space flight activities
called the Miniature Autonomous Extravehicular Robotic Camera (Mini AERCam)
(Fredrickson et al., 2002).
2) Space tug - A space tug is a vehicle designed to rendezvous and dock with a space
object; make an assessment of its current position, orientation, and operational status; and
then either stabilize the object in its current orbit or move the object to a new location
with subsequent release. Space tug missions include applications of the relocation
servicing activity: stationkeeping maneuvers to maintain the orbit of target satellites and
reposition spacecraft, including the rescue of satellites launched into incorrect orbits, the
retirement of satellites into 'graveyard' orbits, and on-demand maneuvers to meet
changing mission requirements. Orbital Recovery Corporation is currently developing an
"orbital tugboat" called the Spacecraft Life Extension System (SLES) to supply
propulsion, navigation, and guidance to target satellites in their orbital slots for 10+ years
(Wingo, 2004).
Figure 1.5 Artistic representation of a space tug
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3) Pre-planned servicer - A pre-planned servicer is a vehicle that is able to improve the
state of target satellites that have been designed for servicing. Pre-planned servicers
incorporate most of the functionality of space tugs (with arbitrary docking capability
being a key exception) in a vehicle that is also capable of fluid transfer and change-out of
spacecraft components termed orbital replacement units (ORU). The Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is currently developing an autonomous servicing
system known as Orbital Express (OE) for target satellites with standardized interfaces
(Potter, 2003).
4) All-purpose servicer - An all-purpose servicer is a vehicle that is able to improve the
state of target satellites, regardless of whether that target satellite has been designed for
servicing. All-purpose servicers incorporate the functionality of space tugs and pre-
planned servicers in a vehicle that also is able to repair faulty spacecraft components and
conduct assembly operations.
1.1.4 Why Service Satellites?
The only existing operational satellites that are serviced are the Hubble Space Telescope and the
ISS. These space systems are maintained by humans in expensive servicing operations carried
out by the Space Shuttle and Russian spacecraft. In the case of Hubble, the initial $1 billion cost
of deploying the Orbiting Observatory has been exceeded by four servicing missions estimated
to cost $500 million apiece (Hastings et al., 2001). Given these costs, the human servicing
model is clearly not applicable to the majority of commercial space systems. On-orbit servicing
will not occur if the perceived costs outweigh the perceived benefits. However, developments in
autonomous and teleoperated vehicle technology as well as the potential for sharing the cost of
an on-orbit servicing infrastructure across multiple target satellites enable a business case to be
made for robotic servicing in certain markets.
Servicing provides options for space missions traditionally constrained by inaccessible satellites,
mitigates vulnerabilities to monolithic spacecraft, and generally enables a more robust space
enterprise. Benefits of servicing can be divided into five broad categories: reduce risk of mission
failure, reduce mission cost, increase mission performance, improve mission flexibility, and
enable new missions.
0 Reduce risk of mission failure - A space-based servicing infrastructure reduces the risk
of satellite failure across the entire lifecycle. The failure of Milstar 3's upper stage would
not have compromised its mission had a space tug been available for a rescue mission.
Faulty spacecraft systems discovered at BOL can be fixed (e.g., science-critical
aberrations in Hubble's optical assembly were fixed in the first servicing mission).
Servicing vehicles may be employed to mitigate the risk posed by orbital debris through
cleanup operations. 4 Brown (2004) has also explored the possibility of replacing the
4 Using ground-based optical and radar telescopes, U.S. Space Command tracks more than 9,000 space objects with
major axes in excess of ten centimeters. An additional 100,000 objects ranging from one to ten centimeters is
estimated to be in Earth orbit. Debris consists primarily of dead satellites, spent upper stages, separation devices,
bolts, and paint chips. It is estimated that the debris population continues to grow by more than 175 metric tons per
year (Futron Corporation, 2002).
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paradigm of launching monolithic systems on a single heavy lift vehicle (single-point
failures) with the launch of redundant spacecraft components separately on small launch
vehicles followed by on-orbit assembly.
Table 1.2 Recent Satellite Failures
Russian Telecom Satellite Fails After
Sudden Impact
Space Daily
30 March 2006
The Russian Satellite Communications
Company's Express AMI 1
telecommunications satellite suffered a sudden
failure on Wednesday. "At present, providing
services via the Express-AM 11 satellite is
impossible," the company said in a statement.
Telemetry showed the failure, which occurred
at 6:55 a.m. Moscow Time, was caused by "a
sudden external impact on the spacecraft,"
RSCC said in a statement. The cause most
probably was space garbage of unknown
origin. The result was instantaneous
depressurization of the satellite's thermal
control system fluid circuit, followed by "a
sudden outburst of the heat-carrying agent."
The spacecraft subsequently lost its
geostationary orientation and proper rotation.
Although ground engineers were able to
maintain marginal control, RSCC said the
AM 11 "started approaching the crucial values
that can result in the total loss of the satellite."
Along with the effective loss of the satellite,
the company said the presence of space
garbage most likely also renders its orbital slot
unusable. Therefore engineers have engaged
"organizational and technical measures aimed
at removing the Express-AM 11 from 96.5 East
into space disposal orbit."
RSCC has downloaded the satellite's backup
capacities on the east orbital arc and as a result
all Russian commercial TV and radio
broadcasting has been restored. In addition,
engineers have transferred all official
communications channels to the Express-A2
(103 East), Express-AM2 (80 East) and
Express-AM3 (140 East) satellites.
Sky TV Knocked Off Air as Satellite Goes
'Missing'
The National Business Review
31 March 2006
Sky Television's [NZSX:SKT] satellite may be
missing without hope of recovery. Subscribers
around the country lost their signals Thursday
evening from about 7pm in an outage that was
initially described as being due to weather conditions.
That automated announcement included an invitation
to click through and check the satellite feed strength -
- but that screen revealed there was no feed at all.
Inundated with telephone calls, the operator
eventually put up a new front page on its website
advising that the problem was based in an outage
on Sky's Singtel-owned Optus B 1 satellite. That web
page said Sky Sport 1 was free-to-air on UHF for fans
trying to tune into the Live Cricket Awards, but gave
no indication of when the problem might be resolved.
According to Newswire, the outage affected all
customers in both New Zealand and Australia. Sky
TV has about 550,000 subscribers in New Zealand
alone. Newswire reported that the outage followed a
routine repositioning maneuver and that the company
expected to resume normal operations within hours.
In a later report, it quoted a Sky spokesman* who
said the satellite was communicating but out of
position and that Optus was undertaking a "re-
pointing" maneuver.
But unconfirmed reports received by The National
Business Review suggest that the satellite has gone
'missing' entirely and communications with it may not
be recovered at all. Those reports did not specify the
nature of the problem or whether it was limited to loss
of telemetry.
Two replacement satellites are in construction but are
not likely to be launched for months. The Optus B 1
satellite is about 14 years old and, according to
industry sources, has been in urgent need of a
replacement for almost a year after losing its primary
satellite control processor.
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* Reduce mission cost - Given the Hubble and Shuttle experience, on-orbit servicing is
typically associated with higher mission costs. The servicing provider requires an
additional fee and the target satellite may pay a mass penalty for incorporating a modular
bus structure with docking and refueling ports.5 However, servicing does offer several
pathways to reduced mission cost. First, operators may choose to incorporate less
redundancy into spacecraft. Second, operators may choose to design satellites for a
shorter life, reducing upfront costs while delaying the decision either to allocate funds for
servicing or to abandon at a later date. Third, the high-value components of a satellite
(i.e. payload, bus structure) might be separated from low-value components (i.e.,
propellant) during the launch phase. Traditional, expensive launch vehicles might be
used for high-level components while emerging, low-cost launch vehicles (e.g.,
DARPA's RASCAL, DARPA/USAF's Falcon) are used to launch propellant to servicers
that refuel the satellite at BOL.
* Increase mission performance - Servicing activities may improve spacecraft
performance in terms of mission life and payload utility. Servicing tasks may be
performed to extend spacecraft life (e.g., refuel, dock and provide stationkeeping, repair
faulty components.). More notably, servicing may be employed to increase the payload
capabilities. Operators may choose to upgrade to maximize revenue generation, science
returns, and/or to prevent technological obsolescence, particularly in the later years of a
satellite's operation.
* Improve mission flexibility - An on-orbit servicing infrastructure also offers satellite
operators an option to modify space system requirements following launch. New
payloads may be incorporated for new missions. Emergent terrestrial markets might be
captured more efficiently, and spiral deployment of fleets of satellites might be enabled
with the benefits of constellation reconfiguration. Relocating satellites with space tugs
might be particularly valuable in the development of a wartime surge capability over
theaters of operation.
* Enable new missions - Perhaps the strongest case for emerging technologies (e.g.,
robotic on-orbit servicing) can be made when identifying capabilities of such technology
that cannot be offered by existing systems. The refueling servicing activity enables new
missions in the areas of tactical maneuvering for unpredictable orbits and extremely low
altitude, high-drag orbits for Earth observation satellites. While low altitude orbits are
important for imaging satellites, they would be particularly valuable for space-based
synthetic aperture radar systems in which the power of the radar signal decreases as the
inverse of the altitude to the fourth power (Roberts, 2003).
5 Target satellite mass penalties for docking and refueling interfaces are relatively low. The redundant docking
mechanism and refueling mechanism associated with DARPA's Orbital Express program have masses of 32 kg and
50 kg, respectively (McVey, 2002). GEO communications spacecraft currently weigh upwards of 6000 kg (Pratt et
al., 2003).
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Figure 1.6 Decomposition of On-Orbit Servicing Mission Areas
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1.2 Problem Statement
Numerous studies have been completed on OOS. While most studies have converged on point
designs for the servicing provider architecture, a few have dealt with servicing customer
valuation, estimating the price the market might bear for various forms of servicing (see Section
2.4). The work that does exist on customer satellite architecture (i.e., serviceable satellites)
focuses on implementing design changes in future satellites (e.g., Orbital Express). Little work,
however, has been done on assessing the amenability of satellites already in orbit to OOS (see
Section 2.5). The central aim of this research is to fill this void by surveying the serviceability of
space system architectures currently in Earth orbit. 6
If a decision on whether to service a satellite is to be made, evaluating the perceived value
received by the customer needs to be combined with an analysis of the system to be serviced.
This requires an understanding of the amenability of different orbits to OOS as well as the degree
of complexity associated with servicing various satellite bus designs. Serviceability assessments
also require simulations of satellite behavior and operation. An implicit assumption in the
research questions outlined below is that static models are not sufficient for deriving meaningful
results for the question of serviceability. Given the evolution of satellite health (e.g., failing
gyroscopes) and servicer availability (e.g., limited AV budget) over time, the question of
serviceability is inherently a dynamic one necessitating executable models.
Before multi-purpose servicing vehicles are stationed on-orbit, a host of issues need to be
resolved in the areas of national policy, export control, and international law to inform concepts
of operation and potential financing arrangements. However, little previous work exists on OOS
that couples qualitative analysis in the political, legal, and financial domains with quantitative
analysis in the technical domain. As such, an opportunity exists to contribute to provider
architecture research by treating OOS as an "engineering system," a technologically-enabled
system characterized by non-trivial feedback from a heterogeneous set of stakeholders.
1.2.1 Research Questions
1) In what areas might original contributions be made to the study of OOS?
a. What is the state of on-orbit servicing?
b. What OOS programs have been executed and what programs have been
proposed?
c. What are the findings of key OOS studies?
2) How might a taxonomy of space systems for serviceability be constructed?
a. What activities comprise a servicing mission?
b. What are the attributes for categorizing the active population of Earth orbiting
satellites?
c. Which satellite attributes drive serviceability assessments?
3) What is the amenability of existing satellites to OOS?
6 In this thesis, serviceability is defined as the cooperativeness of a technical system to in-situ, value-added
modifications.
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a. Given deployment of a limited OOS capability, in what orbits would a servicing
capability most likely be available?
b. How might relative serviceability assessments be made across various satellite
bus designs?
4) How can architecture frameworks inform dynamic serviceability assessments?
a. What forms of architecture description exist to expand the scope of OOS
understanding to both the physical and functional domains?
b. Can static representations of space systems in the Department of Defense
Architecture Framework be extended to incorporate time as a dimension in
serviceability assessments?
5) What are the "architectural principles" for developing serviceable spacecraft?
a. What are the technical challenges facing servicing providers?
b. What are prescriptive technical considerations for enabling serviceability?
6) What are the non-technical challenges facing OOS implementation?
a. What are the political issues and legal constraints for OOS?
b. What economic themes characterize OOS? What financial models make sense for
servicing providers?
1.2.2 Potential Contributions
The goal of this research is to improve the state of knowledge regarding on-orbit servicing and
the practice of systems engineering as it relates to system architecture and design. Potential
contributions include a comprehensive survey of past, present, and future OOS studies and
programs; a structured framework for classifying space systems; a generalized process for
assessing system serviceability; a framework for the ordering of space systems according to on-
orbit serviceability; prescriptive technical considerations for designing serviceable spacecraft;
and strategies for overcoming hurdles to OOS implementation.
1.3 Methodology
Figure 1.7 depicts the general research methodology and potential contributions of this thesis.
Inputs to each step are listed on the left. Although each step roughly maps to a chapter, this
figure is best interpreted as the general process that was followed to conduct the research. In
some cases, steps span multiple chapters (e.g., theoretical development of serviceability
framework includes the decomposition of servicing activities in Chapter Two, lessons learned
from servicing offshore oil platforms in Chapter Three, and application of architecture
frameworks in Chapter Six).
First, an extensive literature review of existing OOS programs and studies is conducted to assess
the state of on-orbit servicing. Emphasis is placed on servicing programs that have actually
flown or for which hardware has been developed. Second, structure is added to the problem of
conducting serviceability assessments through the development of a taxonomy of servicing
activities and space systems (with a focus on satellite attributes that might inform later
serviceability assessments). Third, a general theory of serviceability is developed. This step
begins with extracting lessons learned from servicing offshore oil platforms. Satellite databases
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provide a context for understanding what information is widely available for developing an
"actionable" serviceability framework. Fourth, the serviceability framework is implemented in
two models. One model analyzes serviceability as a function of orbital location and is applied to
the GEO satellites. The other model analyzes serviceability as a function of all four servicing
activities and is applied to the Hubble space telescope. Fifth, lessons learned from the previous
four steps are synthesized to derive architectural characteristics of "serviceable" spacecraft.
Sixth, structured interviews
examine the political, legal,
OOS infrastructure.
Existing 00S programs
Provider architecture studies
Customer valuation studies
and further qualitative and quantitative analyses were performed to
operational, and financial challenges facing implementation of an
Step One:
Review liter~uediistry
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[
Astrodynamics [
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Interpret results
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Figure 1.7 Research Methodology and Contributions
1.4 Thesis Outline
The thesis is composed of nine chapters Each of the next six chapters seeks to answer one of the
six research questions asked in Section 1.2.1. Having introduced the general issue of OOS in
Chapter 1, Chapter 2 explores existing OOS literature and focuses the thesis on areas rich for
further inquiry. Chapter 3 adds structure to the largely technical analysis performed in Chapters
4 and 5 regarding the serviceability of potential target satellites for OOS across both static and
dynamic contexts. Chapter 6 synthesizes the technical results with prescriptive statements for
the design of future serviceable spacecraft. Chapter 7 broadens the discussion to include the
servicing provider with a GEO space tug serving as an illustration of the larger political, legal,
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and financial issues facing OOS implementation. Chapter 8 discusses the implications of the
thesis, how it relates to ongoing research at MIT, and discusses potential extensions of the work.
Finally, Chapter 9 offers general conclusions regarding the state of OOS.
" Chapter 2, On-Orbit Servicing Overview, surveys historical milestones, current
programs, ongoing technology development efforts, and contemporary studies on OOS.
Key findings include a summary of on-going programs and research opportunities to
contribute to existing work.
" Chapter 3, Development of an Ordered Taxonomy for Space Systems, adds structure
to the problem of performing serviceability assessments. Initially, four unique activities
are found to compose a servicing mission: rendezvous, acquire, access, and service.
Next, universal satellite attributes such as mission area, attitude control system, and
payload configuration are enumerated as means to standardize the description of space
systems. Finally, an open-source satellite database is used to survey operational satellites
currently in orbit around the Earth.
* Chapter 4, Methodology to Assess Amenability of Satellites to On-Orbit Servicing,
builds on the taxonomy of space systems with a two-tiered approach: (1) assessment of
rendezvous amenability by inputting satellite data into an agent model based on orbital
transfers and (2) development of a framework for comparing the relative amenability of
various satellite bus designs to the full set of OOS activities including acquire, access,
and service.
" Chapter 5, Development of a Dynamic Servicing Architecture Model, explores the
value of architecture frameworks for conducting serviceability assessments. Having
investigated the temporal dimension of servicing in Chapter 4 for only the rendezvous
OOS activity with a servicing simulation based on orbital transfers, this simulation
incorporates all four OOS activities-rendezvous, acquire, access, and service-in a
single executable model. In particular, a multi-year servicing campaign is modeled for
the Hubble Space Telescope.
. Chapter 6, Architecting for Satellite Servicing: Prescriptive Technical
Considerations, synthesizes the lessons learned from Space Shuttle servicing missions,
previous studies, and Chapters 2 through 5 to determine how the design of future
satellites may be affected by an OOS requirement.
* Chapter 7, On-Orbit Servicing Implementation, addresses OOS issues located at the
interface of technology and policy. In particular, the chapter surveys political, legal, and
financial challenges facing OOS and proposes implementation strategies for the
realization of a satellite servicing infrastructure.
" Chapter 8, Discussion, discusses the applicability and implications of the thesis, surveys
related ongoing research at MIT, and proposes extensions for future work.
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e Chapter 9, Conclusions, discusses the performance of the thesis across the objectives
identified in the introduction and draws general conclusions regarding the future of OOS.
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2 On-Orbit Servicing Overview
This chapter surveys historical milestones, current programs, ongoing technology development
efforts, and contemporary studies on on-orbit servicing. Approximately 200 journal articles,
conference papers, and technical and media reports were reviewed for a comprehensive OOS
literature review (see References). Although numerous servicing provider architectures have
been proposed, the focus here is on servicing programs and missions that have actually flown or
for which hardware has been developed. The following questions are addressed in this chapter:
e In what areas might original contributions be made to the study of OOS?
o What is the state of on-orbit servicing?
o What OOS programs have been executed and what programs have been proposed?
o What are the findings of key OOS studies?
2.1 Historical Milestones
The ability to service satellites has evolved from a series of growing on-orbit capabilities over
nearly five decades of human experience in space. The legacy of attempts to service spacecraft
in the early U.S. and Soviet manned space programs (e.g., Skylab and Salyut space stations) to
recent tests of autonomous servicing technology (e.g., Japanese ETS-VII, Air Force XSS-10)
provides a foundation for understanding future OOS capabilities. Figure 2.1 depicts a timeline of
historical milestones in the evolution of OOS technology.
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Figure 2.1 Timeline of Historical Milestones
2.1.1 Project Gemini
The follow-on to Project Mercury, Project Gemini was the second U.S. human spaceflight
program. Gemini missions were designed to test advanced space travel techniques for Project
Apollo. Key advances in the Gemini spacecraft from Mercury included a modular architecture,
an orbital modification capability, and an onboard computer (Hacker and Grimwood, 1977).
Satellite servicing capabilities demonstrated include the first American EVA (Gemini 4), the
feasibility of on-orbit rendezvous (Gemini 6/7), rendezvous and docking with a target vehicle
(Gemini 8), hardware retrieval (Gemini 10), and long-duration EVAs (Gemini 12) (NASA Office
of Space Flight, 1988). Gemini 8 and Gemini 10 were deemed most relevant to the development
of fundamental servicing capabilities (e.g., accomplished specific OOS activities as opposed to
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EVA demonstrations which are only applicable to an inhabited servicing architecture).
Therefore Gemini 8 and Gemini 10 are highlighted in this section.
2.1.1.1 Gemini 8 - Rendezvous and Docking (1966)
Gemini 8 was the first mission ever to accomplish one of the most fundamental activities of
OOS: rendezvous and docking. With a series of burns, Neil Armstrong maneuvered the Gemini
capsule into the orbital plane of the Agena target vehicle which was designed to test in-orbit
rendezvous and docking. Radar picked up the Agena at approximately 300 km. Inside 50 km,
Armstrong and David Scott inspected Agena for damage and then, upon finding none, initiated
an automated docking procedure with a velocity of 8 centimeters per second (Hacker and
Grimwood, 1977).
2.1.1.2 Gemini 10 - Hardware Retrieval (1966)
Gemini 10 demonstrated the ability to retrieve hardware from the exterior of a spacecraft. On
the second of two EVAs, Michael Collins retrieved a micrometeorite collector attached to the
Agena target vehicle from Gemini 8. Collins used a gas gun to maneuver between the undocked
Gemini capsule and Agena target vehicle. He remained connected to Gemini throughout the
EVA through a 15 m umbilical cord (Hacker and Grimwood, 1977).
2.1.2 Project Apollo
Satellite servicing capabilities continued to evolve through the demonstration of live television
broadcast (an essential element for future telerobotic servicing) on Apollo 7. Apollo 13 is
especially important for understanding the value of servicing for extensive onboard problem
solving, mission modification, and resource management (NASA Office of Space Flight, 1988).
2.1.2.1 Apollo 13 - Onboard Problem Solving (1970)
Apollo 13 was aborted after 56 hours of flight due to a loss of service module cryogenic oxygen
and consequent loss of capability to generate electrical power in the command module. The
astronauts onboard responded by powering down the command module and configuring the lunar
module to supply the necessary power and consumables for the trip back to Earth (Apollo 13
Review Board, 1970).
2.1.3 Skylab Space Station
America's first space station, Skylab, sustained severe damage during launch when the
meteoroid shield accidentally deployed and subsequently tore off due to atmospheric drag. One
of Skylab's main solar panels was also torn off and another solar panel failed to deploy because
debris from the meteoroid shield pinned it to the side of the station. This accident precipitated
the need for various unplanned repair activities by future crews. The problematic experience
with Skylab had one positive consequence: proof that major elements of satellite servicing were
technically feasible (NASA Office of Space Flight, 1988).
2.1.3.1 Skylab 2 - Sunshield and Solar Array Deployment (1973)
The launch damage sustained by Skylab was first dealt with on Skylab 2 with astronaut EVAs.
First, a makeshift replacement sunshield was installed to deal with high temperatures inside the
space station. Initial attempts failed to deploy the jammed solar panel. Two weeks into the 27
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day mission, Pete Conrad and Joseph Kerwin were able to deploy the pinned solar panel after a
struggle (Belew, 1977).
2.1.3.2 Skylab 3 - Sunshield and Rate Gyro Replacement (1973)
Skylab 3 extended the crew's stay on the space station from one month to two months to study
human physiological adaptation to space. Repairs continued from the unmanned launch failure
on Skylab 1. During the first EVA, a twin-pole sunshade was installed to supplement the
makeshift replacement. The crew also replaced Skylab's rate gyros (Belew, 1977).
2.1.3.3 Skylab 4 - Coolant Replenishment and Antenna Repair (1974)
Skylab 4, the last of the three manned Skylab missions, included the first demonstration of fluid
replenishment (laboratory coolant). The mission lasted almost three months and set a record of
seven hours for a single EVA which involved replacing film in the solar observatory and repair
of an external antenna (Belew, 1977).
2.1.4 Salyut Space Stations
The Soviet Salyut program included seven space station launches between 1971 and 1982. It
consisted of many firsts for human spaceflight, including the first space station ever orbited
(Bluth and Helppie, 1986). The Salyut program provided the technological basis for the Mir
space station.
2.1.4.1 Soviet Salyut 6 - Replenishment with Uninhabited Vehicle (1977)
Salyut 6 constituted the second generation of Salyut stations with a docking port for an
uninhabited Progress cargo ship for refueling the station. Progress would dock automatically
before being opened and unlocked by cosmonauts on Salyut (Bluth and Helppie, 1986).
2.1.5 Space Shuttle Program
At the outset, the Space Shuttle program promised to be an integral part of an on-orbit servicing
infrastructure given its unique remote manipulation capabilities, flexibility, and planned
frequency of flights (NASA Office of Space Flight, 1988). The Space Shuttle program's official
name is Space Transportation System (STS) as it was originally designed to lower the cost of
placing mass in space through a reusable design. During the 1980's, several satellites were
serviced with successful results. Although Shuttle was designed to retrieve satellites in-orbit and
return them to the Earth, this capability has not been used often. The Space Shuttle program
failed to deliver on its promises of lowering the cost of space access given its final design that
was only partially reusable, a flight frequency that was an order of magnitude below original
estimates, and a safety record plagued by the Challenger and Columbia accidents.
Section 2.1.5 surveys the history of the Space Shuttle's OOS accomplishments including the
Solar Maximum satellite repair on STS-41C, the de-orbiting of the Palapa B-2 and Westar VI
satellites on STS-5 1 A, the SYNCOM IV-3 satellite repair on STS-5 11, and the rescue of Intelsat
603 on STS-49.
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2.1.5.1 STS-3 - Hardware Retrieval with Robotic Arm (1982)
OOS capabilities were flight-qualified early in Shuttle's test flights. On STS-3, the capability of
the Remote Manipulator System (RMS) was demonstrated for the first time when a sampling
device was lifted into space for measurements. The RMS then swung the device back into its
mount in the Shuttle cargo bay (NASA Office of Space Flight, 1988).
2.1.5.2 STS-41C - Solar Maximum Satellite Repair Mission (1984)
NASA conducted its first formal servicing and repair of a satellite on STS-41C (Figure 2.2). The
target satellite, Solar Maximum, had a failed attitude control module. Docking with Solar Max
proved difficult as attempts to manually attach with the Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU)
failed. According to former Astronaut Jeffrey Hoffman, the crew of STS-41C encountered
difficulties due to the placement of thermal insulation on the exterior of Solar Max that was not
captured in design documents. Eventually, the RMS succeeded in grasping the satellite and
moving it into Shuttle's cargo bay. Inside the bay, astronauts replaced the attitude control
module and performed minor repairs on the science instruments (NASA Office of Space Flight,
1988). The operational life of Solar Max was successfully extended, enabling it to continue its
long-term study of solar activity.
Figure 2.2 Solar Maximum Satellite Repair Mission (Photo Credit: NASA)
2.1.5.3 STS-41D - Shuttle Surface Maintenance (1984)
The next Shuttle flight successfully completed maintenance on the exterior of a spacecraft when
the RMS removed a waste-water icicle from Discovery's exterior surface (NASA Office of
Space Flight, 1988).
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2.1.5.4 STS-41G - On-Orbit Refueling (1984)
The STS-41G mission demonstrated the feasibility of on-orbit refueling system for satellites. An
EVA was conducted to attach a hose from a supply of hydrazine to a typical satellite valve in the
payload hardware. Six fluid transfers were conducted with no reported anomalies, transferring
130 pounds of hydrazine (NASA, 1984).
2.1.5.5 STS-51A - De-Orbiting of Palapa B-2 and Westar VI Satellites (1984)
Shuttle mission STS-51A was the first to retrieve satellites from orbit and return them to the
Earth. After deploying two communications satellites, the crew went about capturing two
satellites that had been deployed by Shuttle earlier in the year on STS-41B. Borth Palapa B-2
and Westar VI had been placed in improper orbits due to failures in their kick motors. STS-5 1A
was successful in demonstrating NASA's ability to recover LEO spacecraft (NASA Office of
Space Flight, 1988).
2.1.5.6 STS-51I - SYNCOMIV-3 Satellite Repair Mission (1985)
Mission STS-511 included two EVAs to repair the SYNCOM IV-4 satellite which was
unsuccessfully deployed on STS-5 1 D (Lethbridge, 1998).
2.1.5.7 STS-61B - On-Orbit Assembly (1985)
The ability of Shuttle to support space station assembly operations was demonstrated on STS-
61B. Two sample truss structures for the International Space Station (ISS) were repeatedly
erected, manipulated, and disassembled to gather data on assembly time. Simulated utility lines
and repair operations were also performed (NASA Office of Space Flight, 1988).
2.1.5.8 STS-49 - Intelsat 603 Rescue (1992)
STS-49 demonstrated the ability to rescue satellites stranded in useless orbits (Figure 2.3). In
1992, Space Shuttle Endeavor captured Intelsat 603, a GEO communications satellite, which had
been in an unusable orbit (200 mile perigee) since its launch aboard a Titan in 1990. (Ground
controllers used much of the satellite's limited supply of propellant to maintain this low orbit
while the rescue mission was planned.) Initial captured attempts failed as Astronaut Pierre
Thuot, maneuvering on the RMS, was unable to attach the grapple arm. Among the problems
encountered were poor visibility on the Earth's dark side, insufficient positioning of the end of
the RMS, and an unexpected susceptibility of the satellite to wobbling. The following day, five
more attempts failed as well due to a faulty capture bar. Eventually, a plan was devised where
three astronauts would grab and stabilize the satellite for attachment to Endeavor's RMS for
transfer to the cargo bay. The three-astronaut EVA succeeded in manually capturing the
satellite. As a result, Intelsat 603 was fitted with a new apogee kick motor and successfully
transferred to GEO (NASA, 1992).
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Figure 2.3 Intelsat 603 Rescue (Photo Credit: NASA)
2.1.6 Recent Demonstrations
The technology for using robotic vehicles for on-orbit servicing of satellites is in development
with key stakeholders, including the U.S., Canadian, German, Japanese governments as well as
commercial enterprises. In order to assess operational feasibility, several areas need to be
investigated. For satellite servicing, these technologies include autonomy, rendezvous and
docking, ORU exchange, and fluid transfer. Autonomous robotic operations are possible in
space due to the well-structured environment (minimum clutter), potential for a well understood
servicer and target satellite, and potential for a limited set of decision points if the target satellite
incorporates a modular architecture and standardized interfaces (Cuplin and Chun, 2000).
2.1.6.1 Japanese ETS- VII - Autonomous Rendezvous and Docking (1997)
The Engineering Test Satellite (ETS) VII mission of Japan's National Space Development
Agency (NASDA) consisted of a variety of on-orbit, robotic tasks. Equipped with a 2 meter
long, six-degree-of-freedom manipulator arm, ETS-VII successfully demonstrated teleoperation
from the ground with a large time delay, ORU exchange, space structure deployment, dynamic
coordination control between a manipulator and a target satellite, and autonomous capture and
berthing of a target satellite (Yoshida, 2003). It is important to note that the target satellite
launched on the ETS-VII was designed for autonomous rendezvous and docking with a built-in
interface.
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2.1.6.2 XSS-10 Microsatellite - Free-Floating Proximity Inspection (2003)
Launched as a secondary payload aboard a Delta II, AFRL's 31 kg microsatellite performed a
24-hour mission to demonstrate autonomous operations. In particular, the XSS-10 navigated
around its Delta II second stage, taking photographs at preplanned positions and relaying them to
Earth in real time (Davis, 2003). The mission was a milestone in the development of responsive
space systems for enhancing space situational awareness-a critical element of any on-orbit
servicing infrastructure.
2.2 Current Programs
Over the last decade, the only space systems benefiting from on-orbit servicing were the Hubble
Space Telescope (Space Shuttle) and International Space Station (primarily Space Shuttle,
Soyuz, and Progress). With the high-cost associated with these human servicing architectures
(even Progress requires human interaction for unloading operations), on-orbit servicing was not
economically viable for the vast majority of spacecraft. The emergence of robotic servicing
architectures may change this. The autonomous ConeXpress Spacecraft Life Extension System
(SLES), a space tug intended for communications satellites, is scheduled for on-orbit testing in
2007 with initial operational missions in 2009 (Orbital Recovery Corporation, 2005).
2.2.1 Hubble Space Telescope
The Hubble Space Telescope was the first uninhabited space system designed for on-orbit
servicing (Welch and Brown, 1987). On-orbit servicing is not only possible on Hubble; it is an
integral part of its operation. Scheduled servicing missions have occurred approximately every
three years to upgrade Hubble's scientific payload and replenish supporting subsystems. To
date, four servicing missions have occurred (SM-1, SM-2, SM-3A, SM-3B). A fifth servicing
mission is currently on hold pending Shuttle's return to flight following the Columbia tragedy.
The servicing model of Hubble represents a paradigm from earlier spacecraft in which servicing
was undertaken only to deal with unexpected failures (e.g., Skylab sun shield).
The Hubble Space Telescope is a joint venture of NASA and the European Space Agency.
Launched into low Earth orbit in April 1990 by the Space Shuttle Discovery on STS-3 1,
Hubble's location above the Earth's atmosphere enables high resolution imaging of astronomical
objects. Its main scientific objectives are to determine the constitution, physical characteristics,
and dynamics of celestial bodies; the nature of processes which occur in the extreme physical
conditions existing in and between astronomical objects; the history and evolution of the
universe; and whether the laws of nature are universal in the space-time continuum. Hubble
features a 2.4 meter primary mirror, is comprised on more than 400,000 parts, and contains
26,000 miles of electrical wiring. The orbiting observatory weighs 11,110 kg and has
dimensions of 13.3 meters in length and 4.3 meters in diameter (Baker, 2005). The Hubble
Space Telescope program includes the orbiting observatory, the Space Telescope Science
Institute, and the Space Telescope Operations Control Center. The system is supported by the
Space Shuttle, the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System, and the NASA Communications
Network (Clubb and Ingels, 1987).
38
Figure 2.4 Second Hubble Servicing on STS-82 (Photo Credit: NASA)
The 15-year design lifetime of Hubble was without precedent and would require the replacement
of failed components. An initial maintenance concept of returning the orbiting observatory to
the ground for maintenance every five years (via Shuttle) augmented by some on-orbit servicing
was abandoned following cost studies which indicated a doubling in program lifecycle cost due
to the ground infrastructure required to support such operations. With the selection of an on-
orbit servicing architecture, Hubble designers increased the number of ORU types from 8 to a
total of 29 (Welch and Brown, 1987). This modular architecture has allowed Hubble to exceed
its 15-year design lifetime. The Compton Gamma Ray Observatory, the second of NASA's
"Great Observatories," did not incorporate a serviceable architecture and was de-orbited during
its 10th year of operation after one of its gyroscopes failed.
In addition to enabling a 15-year design lifetime, a modular architecture allows Hubble to be
equipped with a state-of-the art set of science instruments every time it is serviced. The latest
servicing mission occurred in March 2002 (SM-3B) and included the installation of a new
camera for visible and ultraviolet light, repair of the cooling system for the infrared imager, and
installation of new solar arrays that produce 30% more power (Nelson, 2002). Table 2.1 outlines
the four servicing missions carried out by Space Shuttle and the proposed fifth servicing mission.
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Table 2.1 Hubble Servicing History
Servicing Mission 1 (STS-61)
- Corrective Optics Space Telescope Axial
Replacement (COSTAR)
- Wide Field Planetary Camera 2 (WFPC2)
* Solar Arrays
. Solar Array Drve Electronics (SADE)
- Magnetometers
- Coprocessors for the flight computer
- Two Rate Sensor Units
- Two Gyroscope Electronic Control Units
Servicing Mission 2 (STS-82)
- Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph
(STIS)
- Near Infrared Camera and Multi-Object
Spectrometer (NICMOS)
- Refurbished Fine Guidance Sensor (FGS)
- Optical Control Electronics Enhancement Kit
(OCE-EK)
- Solid State Recorder (SSR)
- Reaction Wheel Assemblies (RWA)
Servicing Missions 3A and 3B
(STS-103, STS-1 09)
- SM3A call-up mission approved, developed,
and executed in 7 months after 3" of Hubble's
six gyros failed
* SM3B accomplishments:
- Advanced Camera for Surveys (ACS)
- Solar Array 3 (SA3)
- Power Control unit (PCU)
- NICMOS Cryocooler (NCC)
Possible Future Servicing
- Servicing Mission 4 cancelled in January 2004
due to concems of astronaut safety
- Michael Griffin will reconsider use of Shuttle if it
successfully completes return to flight
- Primary Servicing Mission 4 goals:
- Six fresh gyros
- Six new batteries
- Fine Guidance Sensor
- Cosmic Origins Spectrograph (COS)
- Wide Field Camera 3 (WFC3)
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Following the loss of Columbia in February 2003, NASA suspended all Space Shuttle flights. In
January 2004, NASA announced that the fifth servicing mission to Hubble would not be pursued
based upon risk to the crew. This cancellation led to strong objections in the scientific
community and prompted NASA to explore the robotic servicing option. A National Research
Council study, "Assessment of Options for Extending the Life of the Hubble Space Telescope,"
found that the chance of achieving three or more years of post-servicing science operations to be
70% for a Shuttle servicing mission and 20% for a robotic mission. The primary problem with
the robotic servicing option for Hubble is the schedule risk. With subsystems critical to science
operations expected to fail in 2007 (see Figure 2.5), the TRLs of the sensors, software and
control algorithms, and machine vision required for robotic operations are inconsistent with the
need to service Hubble as soon as possible.
2.2.2 International Space Station
The International Space Station, a joint venture of 14 nations that provides a sustained human
presence in LEO, is the second space system currently serviced in space. Servicing is conducted
primarily by the Space Shuttle, Soyuz, and Progress spacecraft (O'Keefe et al., 1998).
Construction activities are on-going albeit behind schedule due to the grounding of the Space
Shuttle Fleet. Currently, the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency is developing an
uninhabited spacecraft intended as a replacement for the Russian Progress vehicle. The European
Space Agency is also developing a Progress replacement called the Automated Transfer Vehicle
(ATV) for ISS cargo delivery, refueling, and orbit restoration. Potential on-orbit servicing
missions being explored for ATV-derived vehicles include ferrying cargo between a future
reusable launch vehicle and the ISS and servicing other spacecraft in LEO (Perroton and Busson,
1999).
Figure 2.6 ISS Photo Taken by Discovery on STS-114 (Photo Credit: NASA)
2.2.3 ConeXpress Spacecraft Life Extension System
The ConeXpress SLES is a space tug designed to mate with existing communications spacecraft
in GEO and provide stationkeeping as well as attitude control. SLES plans to utilize the apogee
kick stage nozzle as the docking interface on target spacecraft and stationary plasma thrusters for
propulsion. SLES will be light enough for launch as a secondary payload on EELVs or as the
primary payload on emerging low-cost launch vehicles (Wingo, 2004). ConeXpress SLES is
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being developed by Orbital Recovery Corporation, a public-private partnership of the European
Space Agency that includes Dutch Space, Kayser-Threde, the DLR German Space Agency, and
Arianespace. In 2005, the company entered into a Memorandum of Agreement for a
telecommunications satellite life extension mission. Approximately 130 operational
communications satellites have been identified as candidates for SLES based upon the revenue-
generating potential of the customer (Orbital Recovery Corporation, 2005). The SLES has been
proposed for government space missions in LEO and discussions have been held with potential
customers operating Boeing 702 spacecraft that are experiencing solar array degradation
problems. Orbital Recovery Corporation plans to evolve the initial SLES "space tug" design into
that of a "preplanned servicer" capable of component replacement (Wingo, 2004).
Figure 2.7 ConeXpress Spacecraft Life Extension System (Image Credit: Orbital Recovery Corporation)
2.3 U.S. Technology Demonstrations
The U.S. Space Transportation Policy directs a sustained research and development effort that
includes "automated rendezvous and docking, and the ability to deploy, service, and retrieve
payloads or spacecraft in Earth orbit" (White House Office of Science and Technology Policy,
2005). To accomplish this objective, a broad portfolio of OOS technology development is being
conducted by organizations including the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and NASA.
2.3.1 AFRL - XSS-1 I Microsatellite
Following the successful XSS-10, AFRL designed the advanced XSS-l 1, a three-axis stabilized
microsatellite with a hydrazine-based propulsion system. One of the major challenges in
designing spacecraft for proximity operations is the method by which relative position and
velocity is determined as differential GPS, radar corridors, ground-tracking updates, and visual
pattern recognition are not useful around space debris or damaged spacecraft. XSS-11
accomplishes relative navigation using a combination of a visible imager, star tracker, and active
radar and laser imaging (Partch et al., 2004). Launched in April 2005, XSS-1 1 has repeatedly
conducted rendezvous maneuvers along "passively safe trajectories" with the Minotaur upper
stage that placed it in orbit. Total cost of the XSS-1 1 was $82 million including launch,
spacecraft, operations, and ground control hardware. Requirements for a XSS-12 mission are
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currently being defined (David, 2005). In conducting responsive space missions, the Air Force
envisions a future capability of being able to deploy a low-cost satellite for proximity operations
around a space object without months of planning, intersatellite communication, or a large
mission operations center (Partch et al., 2004).
2.3.2 DARPA - Orbital Express
Orbital Express (OE) is a DARPA technology development program designed to validate
autonomous on-orbit refueling and reconfiguration of satellites. In the 2006, DARPA plans to
launch a prototype servicing vehicle, Autonomous Space Transfer and Robotic Orbiter
(ASTRO), to service a next-generation serviceable satellite (NEXTSat) (Potter, 2003). Within
the OE context, a serviceable satellite is one that incorporates a non-proprietary docking
interface, electrical coupler interfaces, modular storage bays for component swapping, and a
fluid transfer system. As a pre-planned servicer, the two missions of OE are refueling and
component change-out. From DARPA's perspective, "...refueling satellites will enable frequent
maneuvers to improve coverage, change arrival times to counter denial and deception, and
improve survivability, as well as extend satellite lifetime. Electronics upgrades on-orbit can
provide performance improvements and dramatically reduce the time to deploy new technology"
(Shoemaker and Wright, 2004). If future government and commercial satellite designs
incorporate OE's docking interface, DARPA may facilitate the creation of an on-orbit servicing
industry (Stamm and Motaghedi, 2004).
Figure 2.8 Orbital Express (Image Credit: DARPA)
2.3.3 DARPA - Spacecraft for the Universal Modification of Orbits
In contrast to its Orbital Express program which only may "add value" to target satellites
designed for servicing, DARPA's Spacecraft for the Universal Modification of Orbits (SUMO)
is intended to stabilize or relocate all satellites, including those already in orbit (Figure 2.9). As
currently structured, SUMO is a risk reduction program being carried out by the Naval Research
Laboratory (NRL) for advanced servicing technology. In particular, SUMO has demonstrated
the integration of machine vision, robotics, mechanisms, and control algorithms for autonomous
rendezvous and docking/grappling (Bosse et al., 2004). Following a series of successful
demonstrations at NRL in April 2005 which included six degree freedom motion control for both
the servicer and target satellite, the Pentagon has included $12.6 million for SUMO in its FY06
budget request to begin work on a flight test (lannotta, 2005).
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Figure 2.9 Spacecraft for the Universal Modification of Orbits (Image Credit: DARPA)
2.3.4 NASA - Autonomous Extravehicular Robotic Camera
NASA Johnson Space Center has designed, developed, and tested a Miniature Autonomous
Extravehicular Robotic Camera (Mini AERCam). As an externally-based, free-flying, 5 kg
spacecraft with a recharge capability, Mini AERCam is envisioned to operate from a larger
spacecraft. At just 7.5 inches in diameter, potential applications include close-up inspection of
external surfaces, routine autonomous scanning, anomaly detection and reporting, chemical leak
detection, and thermal mapping (Fredrickson, 2002). The Mini AERCam is derived from the
larger AERCam Sprint which was flight-tested on STS-87 (Figure 2.10).
Figure 2.10 AERCam Sprint Retrieval on STS-87 (Photo Credit: NASA)
2.3.5 NASA - Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology
In April 2005, NASA's Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART) failed
to repeat the success of Japan's ETS-VII when the $110 million DART spacecraft bumped into
its target satellite and also ran out of fuel faster than expected. DART was designed to approach
within 5 meters of the target satellite and perform a series of maneuvers over the course of 24
hours. Instead, telemetry shows that the two spacecraft collided. Although no damage was
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detected to either DART or the target satellite, the mission was terminated early because of a
shortage of onboard propellant due to excessive thrusting caused by noisy GPS inputs (Berger,
2005).
2.3.6 NASA - Robonaut
The Robonaut program is a collaboration between NASA and DARPA to demonstrate a
teleoperated robotic system that can function as an astronaut on an EVA (Figure 2.11).
Robonaut is controlled by a human operator and moves via the Shuttle/ISS robotic arms or a
"space leg" adapter that allows it to plug into the ISS ports used by astronauts as foot restraints.
The first Robonaut developed, Robonaut A, is a stationary test platform at Johnson Space Flight
Center. Robonaut B is a smaller, portable version featuring wireless control. Future versions
may be developed for flight testing, either aboard the Space Shuttle or ISS (Malik, 2004). The
Robonaut program aims to leverage the lessons learned by previous servicing operations given
that all past servicing activities involving operational spacecraft and physical contact have been
conducted by humans.
Figure 2.11 Robonaut (Photo Credit: NASA)
2.3.7 University of Maryland - Ranger Telerobotic Shuttle Experiment
The Ranger Telerobotic Shuttle Experiment was designed to test dexterous robotics for EVA
operations. It was developed by the University of Maryland's Space System Laboratory where a
neutrally buoyant environment is available for integrated testing of humans and robots working
together in a simulated space environment (Akin et al., 2001). Ranger was intended for a Shuttle
test flight in 2004 until the Columbia accident brought about programmatic cutbacks. In
analyzing the EVA operations during the first Hubble servicing mission, the developers of
Ranger at the University of Maryland estimate that a single robotic assistant would have
increased productivity by 60% and that up to 80% of the EVA tasks could have been reassigned
to a robot with Ranger capabilities (Akin et al., 2003).
2.4 Contemporary Studies
A variety of studies have addressed various aspects of OOS. The majority of these studies have
been conducted by industry and constitute point designs of servicing provider architectures.
Some work has also been done on evaluating the economics of OOS, including several graduate
theses at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).
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2.4.1 Industry and Government Reports
Industry and government reports on how to service satellites date from the start of the
commercial space industry (Kiersarksy, 1969). OOS studies grew during the 1970's and 1980's
as the development of the Space Transportation System (Shuttle) progressed. Rather than
providing a complete history of the numerous OOS studies conducted throughout the space age,
this section documents the findings of key studies from the past two decades.
2.4.1.1 NASA Report to Congress on Satellite Servicing (1988)
According to Section 118 of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization
Act of 1988, Congress stipulates that "...the capital investment in space satellites and vehicles
should be enhanced and protected by establishing a system of servicing, rehabilitation, and repair
capabilities in orbit (hereinafter referred to as 'satellite servicing')." Congress also requested a
comprehensive study of OOS, including flight experience, the use of Shuttle and ISS to support
OOS activities, potential customers, the impact of OOS on space insurance, and economic
viability. NASA responded with a report documenting past experience with OOS as well as a
vision of future Shuttle-based and ISS-based satellite servicing with the Orbital Maneuvering
Vehicle (OMV) and Orbital Transfer Vehicle (OTV).1
NASA's report to Congress included many other interesting elements. In discussing design
considerations for OOS, NASA noted that a Martin Marietta study estimated a 4% incremental
cost increase for design of a serviceable spacecraft. Recurring costs were estimated to grow by
8% and mass penalties were expected to be in the range of 5-10%. Regarding the impact of OOS
on insurance, a leading underwriter stated that it would look favorably on the ability to repair and
retrieve satellites (i.e., reduced premiums) but also that it cannot require satellite manufacturers
to incorporate these features. Finally, in reference to pricing policies, NASA stated that the costs
charged to date for satellite servicing (STS 51-A, STS 51 -D, and STS 51-I) were only associated
with mission planning, development of unique hardware and training, and retrieval operations.
The report stated that these charges (all less than $10 million) occurred at a time when NASA
was strongly interested in demonstrating its Shuttle-based servicing capabilities and that it was
"NASA's intent, in accordance with the civil space policy, to seek full cost recovery for pricing
of Shuttle servicing" (NASA Office of Space Flight, 1988).
2.4.1.2 Space Systems/Loral Economic Study (1990)
In 1990, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center funded Space Systems/Loral to estimate the cost
of various servicing activities for an OOS provider (e.g., NASA). Previous economic models
had been created but all were in different formats and employed different assumptions. Using a
stochastic space mission lifecycle cost model, economic data from 14 past studies was correlated
to produce parametric curves showing the sensitivity of satellite cost, reliability, and servicer
costs on the lifecycle cost of servicing future spacecraft. The study found an average of 19.6%
in lifecycle cost savings when a servicing architecture was employed. The data also indicated
1 Neither the OMV nor the OTV were developed. The OMV was intended to be a free-flying OOS system deployed
by Shuttle, extending the 28-57 degree inclination and 320 nautical mile altitude range of Shuttle by 7.5 degrees and
1400 miles. The OTV was intended as an advanced upper stage for Shuttle, carrying cargo, and perhaps humans,
from to LEO to GEO (NASA Office of Space Flight, 1988).
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that a servicing architecture based on a space station was not cost effective and that the high cost
associated with Shuttle launch greatly reduces servicing benefits. Expendable vehicles were
endorsed as the most cost effective servicing method in all cases except for polar orbiters in
which case no cost-effective servicing method was found to exist if total payload replacement
was a requirement (Space Systems/Loral, 1990).
2.4.1.3 NASA Advisory Council Report on Satellite Rescue and Repair (1992)
In 1992, the NASA Advisory Council released a report reviewing the policies, pricing, and
implementation of Shuttle-based satellite repair and rescue missions. The study began with a
survey of launch vehicle and spacecraft failures from 1970 to 1992, identifying a total of 42
failures. Of these 42 failures, 15 were identified as servicing opportunities for Shuttle rescue
given orbital accessibility, damage that was not irreversible, and safety and economic
considerations.2 Noting that NASA's pricing has not recovered the full cost of satellite rescue
missions, the NASA Advisory Council advocated charging U.S. government agencies the
marginal cost for future rescue missions while charging commercial and international customers
the marginal cost and a portion of the full cost as a negotiated portion of revenues. Among
numerous conclusions and recommendations, the report found that the time required to prepare
Shuttle for rescue missions has varied from approximately 4 months to 2.5 years and that NASA
needed to develop a routine training program for astronauts in rendezvous techniques and RMS
operations (NASA Advisory Council, 1992).
2.4.1.4 Space Assembly, Maintenance and Servicing Study (1993)
The Space Assembly, Maintenance and Servicing study (Waltz, 1993) defined where cost-
effective OOS missions could be carried out to improve space system capabilities, flexibility,
and affordability. Five orbital zones were identified as candidate servicing regimes and generic
design reference missions were created for typical satellites in each zone. Servicing was found
to be potentially cost effective when ORU cost is less than 50% of the satellite replacement cost
and when servicing time intervals are shorter than 5 years.
2.4.1.5 Spacecraft Modular Architecture Design Study (1999)
The Spacecraft Modular Architecture Design study ((Reynerson, 1999) identified a cost-effective
level of OOS for a classified constellation of LEO satellites and developed a conceptual design
for a servicing vehicle. It was found that approximately one-third of all satellite components
could be replaced and that this fraction could be easily increased with the adoption of a more
modular bus and payload design. A detailed technical assessment of enabling OOS technologies
was conducted including laser ranging, docking mechanisms, and autonomy. In the study, a
serviceable spacecraft is defined as any spacecraft for which the benefits of OOS outweigh the
associated cost.
The servicing architecture envisioned in the Spacecraft Modular Architecture Design study
includes a Rendezvous/Docking Servicer which can repair two satellites. Each servicer has two
payload modules for connection to a satellite's electrical power system, data buses, and
2 Five of the 15 candidate failed spacecraft were rescued by Shuttle (NASA Advisory Council, 1992).
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propellant lines. Rather than requiring the servicer to conduct repair operations, the satellite
simply turns off failed components and reroutes functionality to the replacement components
which remain at the docking interface. This architecture was found to achieve a lifecycle cost
savings of 10.3% to 38.2%, depending on the targeted life extension (2-6 years) and the number
of servicers used (1 or 2).
Problems and issues associated with OOS are identified, including the possible inadequacy of
available telemetry points to pinpoint the exact cause of on-orbit failures and the need precisely
to align the reference coordinate system or allow for on-orbit calibration in the case of
replacement of attitude determination and control components. Also discussed are operational
downtime, the impact of varying radiative surfaces and heat sources on the thermal control
system after servicing, and the need to design electrical power and attitude control systems with
adequate margin for the extra load caused by the payload module.
2.4.1.6 Draper Modular Servicing Architecture (2000)
The Draper Modular Servicing Architecture study explored high-level OOS trades, analyzed
enabling avionics architectures, and proposed a point design for a servicing provider vehicle.
One of the more interesting elements of the study was a comparison of two module servicing
arrangements: (1) remove and replace and (2) plug and stay. The plug and stay approach was
found to be superior because it allows traditional satellite design and packaging to be maintained,
allows new hardware to be brought on-line before turning off old hardware, does not require de-
orbit of failed components, and is lower risk than the remove and replace strategy (Moynahan
and Tuohy, 2000).
2.4.1.7 MIT Space Tug Architecture and Design Study (2002)
Work done at MIT in 2002 explored the architectural tradespace of space tugs and defined point
designs for specific space tug applications. First, several orbital zones were surveyed for target
satellites in GEO along with four LEO planes that were selected for further analysis. Next, a
rapid system design methodology called Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration (MATE) with
Concurrent Design (Ross, 2004) was used to identify "optimal" architectures for each orbital
zone for further analysis. Architectures are defined with design parameters (e.g., propellant type,
parking location, level of autonomy, and hardware sophistication) and assessed with a utility
metric composed of performance attributes (i.e., timeliness, mating capability, and delta-v
capability). A space tug employing electric propulsion was found to maximize utility for the
GEO servicing missions while conventional bipropellant was adequate for the LEO missions
(McManus and Schuman, 2003).
For the second phase of the MIT study, detailed space tug designs were developed based upon
promising architectures (i.e. pareto-efficient regions of the cost-utility tradespace). Seven
designs were built during integrated concurrent engineering sessions, including design of
propulsion, power, attitude determination and control, thermal, and communications subsystems
(Galabova et al., 2003).
Figure 2.12 depicts the cost-utility tradespace of the architecture analysis and incorporates the
SLES space tug being developed by ConeXpress (triangle labeled CX-OLEV). As can be
observed in the lower right portion of the tradespace, the ConeXpress architecture lies near the
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pareto-efficient region identified previously by the MIT study. Table 2.2 compares the
characteristics of GEO electric cruiser from the MIT space tug study and the ConeXpress
system.
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Figure 2.12 Tradespace of MIT Space Tug Study
Table 2.2 Comparison of Electric Cruiser in MIT Space Tug Study and ConeXpress SLES
Electric Cruiser (2002 study) CX-SLES (2009 launch)
Wet Mass kg 1405 1400
Dry Mass kg 805 670*
Propellant kg 600 730*
Equipment kg 300 213*
DV m/s 12000 -16500*** 15900**
Utility 0.69 0.69
Cost 148 130*
* back-calculated using space tug tradespace tool
** calculated based on stated 3 km/s capability attached to target, normalized to space tug ability to move in orbit
*** higher figure is using original 3000 sec thrusters, lower uses 2200 assumed by CX-OLEV
2.4.1.8 NRC Assessment of Hubble Servicing Options (2005)
In addition to finding that the chance of achieving three or more years of post-servicing Hubble
science to be 70% for a Shuttle servicing mission and 20% for a robotic mission (due primarily
to schedule risk-see Figure 2.5), the 2005 NRC report "Assessment of Options for Extending
the Life of the Hubble Space Telescope" also identified mission risks associated with
autonomous or teleoperated rendezvous and docking and robotic instrument replacement. The
report noted that relative attitude control with safe pause points, vital for proximity operations, is
only rated at a TRL of 3 and that the requisite autonomous grapple system for final capture is a
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capability that has never been accomplished in the history of the U.S. space program (Orbital
Express to demonstrate in 2006).
Risky elements of robotic instrument change-out operations include the chance of encountering
bent connector pins and losing free-floating parts during disassembly and assembly tasks. Loss
of situational awareness is also a concern (e.g., impact of sagging thermal insulation on machine
vision). Also, astronauts on past servicing missions have encountered difficulty opening and
closing bay doors which have become warped over time (National Research Council, 2005).
2.4.2 Customer Valuation Research
Most existing OOS studies, including many of those discussed in Section 2.4.1 (Industry and
Government Reports), focus on the design of a servicing architecture for specific space missions.
These studies estimate a servicing cost based upon historical data and assess the improvement in
mission cost-effectiveness. While these point designs may provide some insights for particular
OOS applications, this method cannot be used to yield general results. The servicing price
assumed in these models is highly uncertain due to inadequate historical cost models and the fact
that price is not necessarily equal to cost.
To understand the maximum price a customer is willing to pay, it is necessary to calculate the
intrinsic value of servicing. Research at MIT and the University of Maryland has addressed this
question by treating OOS as a real option for a space system. In the five recent student theses
summarized here, satellite operators choose among several alternatives along a mission timeline
to maximize future mission value. The combination of real options theory with decision tree
analysis in the presence of uncertainty has proven effective in capturing the three main
components of the value of servicing: cost, performance, and flexibility.
2.4.2.1 Lamassoure (2001)
In "A Framework to Account for Flexibility in Modeling the Value of On-Orbit Servicing for
Space Systems," Lamassoure (2001) proposes a generalized real options approach for space
systems. In particular, a decision tree analysis incorporating elements of real options theory is
developed by allowing an infinite number of branches for an uncertain parameter (e.g., market
dynamics, military contingency location, random failures). It is assumed that this uncertainty
parameter follows a Markov process (path independence) and that government satellite operators
are risk-neutral (risk-free interest rate discounting) while commercial entities are risk-averse
(requiring a risk premium).
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Figure 2.13 Decision Making Map as a Function of Servicing Price (Lamassoure, 2001)
After conducting a trade study of several servicing infrastructures and space missions using the
traditional cost-effectiveness metric, Lamassoure calculates the value of servicing for
commercial missions with uncertain revenues. Servicing is found to maximize value in highly-
volatile markets (Figure 2.13), illustrated with Iridium and Globalstar case studies.
Following the commercial cases, maximizing military utility with maneuverable satellites via
refueling is explored. The potential for reducing the number of satellites in a LEO radar
constellation and the potential for improving capacity of a fleet of GEO communications
satellites are both considered. Results indicate that while no value is derived from thinning a
LEO radar constellation, the maneuverability concept is very promising for a fleet of GEO
satellites.
2.4.2.2 Saleh (2002)
In "Weaving Time into System Architecture: New Perspectives on Flexibility, Spacecraft Design
Lifetime, and On-Orbit Servicing," Saleh (2002) develops a comprehensive framework for
evaluating the benefits of flexibility for system architecture. The latter part of the dissertation
develops a customer-centric perspective on OOS (Figure 2.14) and proposes three main ideas:
(1) estimating the value of servicing independent of its cost or specific implementation, (2) OOS
as a real option offering future flexibility for space systems, and (3) benefits of OOS include cost
savings as well as the ability to meet new mission requirements. A formal valuation process
combining decision tree analysis and real options is also introduced whereby a customer may
determine if the value generated by OOS exceeds the servicing cost.
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Saleh's work showing how the value of OOS may be assessed independent of its cost was
instrumental in enabling a series of customer valuation studies at MIT (Lamassoure, 2001;
Joppin, 2004; Long, 2005). Furthermore, by explaining how OOS provides satellite operators
with options to react to the resolution of uncertain parameters, Saleh added flexibility as a
dimension to be added to OOS studies.
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Figure 2.14 Customer-Centric Perspective on On-Orbit Servicing (Saleh, 2002)
2.4.2.3 Joppin (2004)
In "On-Orbit Servicing for Satellite Upgrades," Joppin (2004) applies the customer-centric OOS
valuation methodology introduced by Lamassoure (2001) and Saleh (2002) in two case studies:
(1) a power upgrade for a typical commercial GEO communications satellite facing uncertain
demand and (2) upgrade of scientific instruments on the Hubble Space Telescope. Regarding the
GEO commercial upgrade, OOS was not an attractive option given predictable power
degradation and the ability to mitigate such phenomena with design modifications. OOS was
found to be desirable for Hubble as its modular design maximized scientific returns over its long
mission life.3
Joppin (2004) develops a model of Hubble to estimate the value of servicing for a scientific
mission. In particular, a utility metric is developed to capture scientific return and the decision to
upgrade or repair is made if the utility per cost metric exceeds a predefined threshold. Empirical
data was used to estimate the probability of Hubble failures, instrument utility, and servicing
costs. A Monte Carlo simulation models four sources of uncertainty: the appearance of a new
instrument, the emergence of new satellite bus technology, spacecraft failure, and servicing
failure. Figure 2.15 depicts one of the model results-the high sensitivity of Hubble lifetime
utility improvements to servicing risk and cost assumptions.
3 The ability to service Hubble saved the actual Orbiting Observatory from significantly degraded scientific capacity
when flaws in the primary mirror (discovered at BOL) were corrected on the first servicing mission (see Table 2.1).
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Figure 2.15 Evolution of Hubble Mission Utility and Cost Depending on OOS Assumptions (Joppin, 2004)
2.4.2.4 Sullivan (2005)
In "Technical and Economic Feasibility of Telerobotic On-Orbit Satellite Servicing," Sullivan
(2005) develops a comprehensive database of satellite characteristics and on-orbit failures to
estimate the size of various servicing markets. The database contains all civilian, military,
commercial, and nongovernmental organization spacecraft launched from 1957 through 2000.
For successfully launched satellites, it is found that more than 6% suffer from BOL failures-an
opportune time for OOS given that satellites at BOL would provide the longest payback period.
Sullivan's database includes satellite information, orbital elements, and failure information.
Mechanism failures include problems with separation events (e.g., failure to separate from upper
stage) and solar array and antenna deployment. Component failures include degradation of
transponders, control processors, and payload instrumentation. Other failures recorded are
collisions with upper stages or launch vehicle fairings, software bugs, human error, and
inadvertent consumable depletion. In order to tailor use of the database for market assessments
of OOS, some spacecraft failures were omitted (e.g., satellites that failed to achieve orbit,
spacecraft beyond Earth orbit, classified spacecraft, amateur radio satellites).
Having developed a database of on-orbit failures, Sullivan analyzes the frequency and value of
OOS opportunities. Table 2.3 displays the results from this analysis, including the breakeven
servicing fee for a variety of OOS missions, the average number of annual opportunities, and the
total annual value for each OOS market. The breakeven servicing fee is the maximum fee
chargeable for the revenue of the serviced satellite to balance the servicing fee and possible
negative outcomes. Sullivan employs decision trees and the expected value method to calculate
the breakeven servicing fee. As such, results are dependent on the probabilities assigned to the
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chance nodes. The average number of annual opportunities comes from empirical data compiled
in his on-orbit failures database. A key assumption in Sullivan's OOS market assessment is that
satellite failure rates follow a "bathtub" curve whereby reliability is constant during the
operational life of a satellite (with high failures during BOL "infant mortality" and EOL wear-
out). Empirical data in his doctoral dissertation somewhat conforms to this assumed Poisson
failure distribution.
For example, the expected value for "Relocation in GEO" (row in Table 2.3) was calculated as
follows. Initially, the Satellite Encyclopedia and Jonathan's Space Report were consulted to
identify an annual market of 13 maneuvers (averaging 36.2 degrees per maneuver) for GEO
communications satellites. The rocket equation and orbital mechanics were then used to relate
fuel mass expended and time out of service. Without conducting a sensitivity analysis on
reaction time, it appears a fixed transfer time is assumed, costing approximately one month of
transfer time and one month worth of stationkeeping propellant (translating to a total cost of $9.2
million). It is then assumed that, while a servicer could not make up for operational time lost
during transfer, it could provide the fuel for the burn. As such, $4.6 million of value is assumed
for each relocation mission.
Table 2.3 Expected Value of Various Servicing Markets (Sullivan, 2005)
Break-Even Average AnnualService Servicing Fee Annual Op- Market
portunities Value
Refuel $401 20 $8001
RemoNve nactive 841.9M 10.5 $440Ml
ORT Replacement $81M 4.4 $356MI
Geiieral Repair $811\ :3.8 $308MI
GEO Retirement 810.9NM 20 $218AI
LEO To GEO Tranfer 8131M 1 $13IN
Relocation In GEO $4.6I 13 $60M
Deployment \Lonitorilg $1.41\I 20 $28N1
Deployment Assistanice $841\ 0.3 $25MI
Health NIonitoring $0 200 $0
Tota ] 82.366Nl
In his doctoral dissertation, Sullivan also documents the past economic impact of satellite
failures and uses his extensive database to inform a decision tree analysis incorporating
operational uncertainties. The expected value market assessment is proposed as a tool for
validating the financial viability of servicing architectures and then applied to a GEO EOL
retirement mission. Lifetime extension (e.g., relocation, retirement maneuvers, refueling) is
identified as the leading OOS opportunity for commercial enterprise.
2.4.2.5 Long (2005)
In "Framework for Evaluating Customer Value and the Feasibility of Servicing Architectures for
On-Orbit Satellite Servicing," Long (2005) calculates the customer's maximum servicing price
and proposes a framework for identifying feasible OOS markets. Case studies include life
extension for commercial GEO communications satellites and upgrades for commercial and
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government spacecraft. Figure 2.16 depicts a typical result of the analysis-the value of
servicing options (i.e., three-year life extensions) for the Intelsat 801 as a function of servicing
price and time. To promote the adoption of OOS by the satellite industry, Long recommends
that servicing providers focus on medium volatility markets as well as low-risk servicing
missions and incorporate fast-evolving technologies that result in significant increases in satellite
value.
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Figure 2.16 Value Provided for Intelsat 801 Through 3-Year Life Extensions (Long, 2005)
2.4.3 Provider Architecture Research
Graduate research at MIT and the Air Force Institute of Technology has addressed the servicing
provider side of OOS. Leisman (1999) analyzed servicing architectures for the Global
Positioning System (GPS) constellation, and McVey (2002) explored OOS applications of a low-
cost launch vehicle being studied by Space Systems/Loral. Galabova (2004) proposed the
application of families of space tugs to generic servicing missions in multiple orbital zones.
McConnell (2005) investigated servicing architectures for a future constellation of space radar
satellites.
2.4.3.1 Leisman (1999)
In "Design and Analysis of On-Orbit Servicing Architectures for the Global Positioning System
Constellation," Leisman (1999) evaluates OOS architectures for decreasing the cycle time for
incorporating new technologies into GPS. The thesis proposes a large design space consisting of
all possible combinations of 8 different orbital architectures, 3 different ORU capacities, 3 types
of robotic servicers, and 2 different GPS constellations. However, rather than analyzing the
entire tradespace, only 30 alternatives are subjected to a cost-benefit analysis over a 15-year
operational period. An arbitrary "value" metric is assumed. The possibility of servicing vehicle
failure does not appear to be accounted for in the model. Predictably, robotic servicing is found
to be more cost effective than replacing entire spacecraft for infusing current technology into the
GPS constellation.
55
2.4.3.2 McVey (2002)
In "Valuation Techniques for Complex Space Systems: An Analysis of a Potential Satellite
Servicing Market," McVey (2002) combines a real options valuation approach with several
servicing provider architecture baseline missions to identify feasible OOS markets. A low-cost
launch vehicle called Aquarius is used for fuel delivery across potential servicing missions
(Table 2.4). Electric propulsion is discussed as a leading competitor to life extension servicing
missions and two feasible OOS markets in GEO are identified: space tug for north-south
stationkeeping and preplanned servicer for refueling.
Table 2.4 Provider Architecture Configurations (McVey, 2002)
Case Servicing Task Initial Propulsion Configuration
Orbit Approach
Baseline None GTO_ Standard Biprop Current s/c design
AQR I Fuel 1-Time at Staging" Standard Biprop Reduced Launch
Staging Orbit for (launched dry) Cost
OR' and SK La: 2 s c. I LV
Ib: Cheaper LV
AQR 2 Tug for OR and Staging Biprop used only 2a: Reduced Launch
NSSK for EWSK and Cost
contingency 2b: Additional
Transponders
AQR 3 Tug for NSSK GEO Biprop used only Additional
for EWSK and Transponders
contingency
AQR 4 Refuel before GEO Refuelable Biprop Additional
each NSSK Tanks Transponders
inaneuver
AQR 5 "Optinal Just in GEO Refuelable Biprop Additional
Tinie Refueling Tanks Transponders
AQR 6 Tug for OR Staging OR: Biprop 6a. Reduced Launch
SK: Electric Cost
Propulsion 6b: Additional
Transponders
AQR 7 Tug for NSSK Staging Use Separable Additional
Biprop Apogee Transponders
Stage for OR
AQR 8 Fuel 1-Time at Staging OR: Biprop Reduced Launch
Staging Orbit for SK: Electric Cost or Additional
OR Propulsion Transponders
2.4.3.3 Galabova (2004)
In "Architecting a Family of Space Tugs based on Orbital Transfer Mission Scenarios,"
Galabova (2004) expanded upon the MIT Space Tug Architecture and Design Study (Section
2.4.1.7). For GEO retirement missions, a space tug in GEO parking orbit using storable
bipropellant is found to be technically and economically feasible. For satellite rescue missions, a
space tug launched on-demand and employing electric propulsion is found to be optimal.
2.4.3.4 McConnell (2005)
The AFIT Master's thesis by Captain McConnell entitled "An Approach for Optimizing the On-
Orbit Servicing Architecture for a Given Client Satellite Constellation" investigated applications
of a future Orbital Express servicing capability for a future constellation of space radar satellites.
Developing a servicing model as a large combinatorial optimization problem, several provider
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architecture attributes are calculated including the optimal number and type of servicing vehicles
and the most efficient routing to meet client satellite demand for two commodities within
multiple time windows. The objective function seeks to minimize the total launch costs for
servicing vehicles while finding the least expensive path through the constellation (in terms of
AV). Rather than treating timing as a parameter, time windows for servicing events are assumed
constraints in the model. McConnell found the use of one small servicing vehicle and one
supply depot for each plane of three space radar satellites to be optimal. Furthermore,
McConnell recommends launching the servicing vehicles dry to the depot spacecraft for
refueling before visiting each of the space radar satellites in that plane.
2.4.4 Related Research
Related graduate research at MIT has explored issues relevant to OOS: modularity and
evaluating flexibility in space systems.
2.4.4.1 Shah (2004)
In "Modularity as an Enabler for Evolutionary Acquisition," Shah (2004) explores the design
features of modularity as well as the characteristics of evolutionary acquisition, a strategy for
acquiring a minimum capability early and then enhancing that capability as risks are resolved.
Modularity is a requisite for several servicing missions including upgrade and repair missions.
Evolutionary acquisition provides a rationale for several missions enabled by OOS such as
expanding satellite constellations through reconfiguration. The thesis concludes with a case
study of Space-Based Radar and shows how a modular constellation architecture maximizes
expected stakeholder value over the lifecycle of the system.
2.4.4.2 Nilchiani (2005)
In "Measuring the Value of Space Systems Flexibility: A Comprehensive Six-element
Framework," Nilchiani (2005) identifies interfaces, time horizon, system properties, uncertainty,
responsiveness, and accessibility as key attributes for understanding flexibility in space systems.
Case studies include measuring the flexibility created by DARPA's Orbital Express program for
sets of LEO and GEO client satellites.
Among Nilchiani's contributions in her doctoral dissertation is a framework to evaluate provider-
side flexibility for an orbital transfer network. Three types of flexibilities are included in the
framework: mix flexibility (the ability of an organization to produce different combinations of
products economically and effectively), volume flexibility, and emergency service flexibility.
Overall flexibility for an orbital transportation network such as an OOS provider is then defined
as a combination of these three flexibilities. Figure 2.17 displays these flexibilities and shows
how each relate to long-term, medium-term, and short-term time scales, respectively.
One key finding from Nilchiani's framework to evaluate provider-side flexibility is that smaller
architectures with lower investment costs have the highest volume flexibilities, while larger
architectures have higher emergency flexibility. Given that volume flexibilities may be more
important to an OOS system for commercial clients, and that emergency flexibilities are more
valuable to an OOS system for military applications, it is recommended that separate
architectures be developed for each customer set.
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Figure 2.17 Service Flexibility Components and their Respective Time Scales (Nilchiani and Hastings, 2003)
2.5 Key Findings
Given the history of OOS, current programs and studies, conclusions may be drawn regarding its
degree of success. Technically, OOS by human servicing architectures has been validated when
target satellites are within range of Shuttle. However, the economic case for human servicing
architectures is not strong. As originally envisioned, Shuttle would fly 60 times a year at a
mission cost of less than $20 million (NASA Advisory Council, 1992). Shuttle hasn't come
close to meeting this goal with estimates of marginal mission costs in excess of $55 million and
total mission costs (including supporting ground infrastructure) of $1.3 billion (Pielke, 1993).
Furthermore, Challenger stranded commercial programs based on Shuttle (Wheelon, 1988) and
Columbia has grounded the fleet from operational use.
The short history of robotic servicing is promising. Beginning with the Japanese ETS-VII
autonomous rendezvous and docking demonstration (Section 2.1.6.1), several robotic systems
with minimal capabilities have been successfully flight-tested. The AFRL series of XSS
microsatellites and NASA's AERCam have qualified free-floating proximity inspection
capabilities. Military (e.g., DARPA's SUMO and OE) and commercial (e.g., ConeXpress's
SLES) systems that offer expanded OOS capabilities are in development. Although
technological successes for robotic OOS far outnumber failures (e.g., NASA's DART), more on-
orbit validation of critical technologies is needed before robotic servicing technology can be
considered an operational capability. The commercial viability of robotic OOS is an open
question as one of the most lucrative markets identified (i.e., GEO lifetime extension) is poised
to shrink due to the shift of GEO communications satellites to electric propulsion (Figure 2.18).
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Figure 2.18 Number of Bipropellant Satellites Reaching End-of-Life (Long and Hastings, 2004)
In reviewing contemporary government, industry, and academic studies, it was found that much
OOS work has been done on servicing provider architecture and some on customer valuation.
However, little work was found on the satellite architecture of the customer. Furthermore, the
work that does exist on serviceable spacecraft was found to focus on implementing design
changes in future satellites. Although an understanding of the amenability of different orbits to
OOS (Section 4.2), as well as the degree of complexity associated with servicing various satellite
bus designs (Section 4.4), are necessary precursors to evaluating servicing missions, no studies
were found that address these questions for existing satellites. The central goal of this thesis is to
build on previous OOS studies by developing and implementing a framework to assess the
serviceability of spacecraft currently in orbit around the Earth.
Opportunities also exist to contribute to the OOS literature in the technology and policy domain.
Little work was found that deals with the political and financial challenges associated with OOS
or the impact of export control and international law on servicing operations. As such, another
goal of this thesis is to couple quantitative analysis with qualitative analysis as a means to
address both the technical and non-technical challenges facing the implementation of robotic on-
orbit servicing.
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3 Development of an Ordered Taxonomy for Space Systems
This chapter adds structure to the problem of performing satellite serviceability assessments. In
particular, this chapter decomposes the functions performed during servicing missions, develops
an ordered taxonomy of space systems, and then surveys operational satellites currently in orbit
around the Earth. The following questions are addressed:
How might a taxonomy of space systems for serviceability be constructed?
o What activities comprise a servicing mission?
o What are the attributes for categorizing the active population of Earth orbiting
satellites?
o Which satellite attributes drive serviceability assessments?
3.1 Decomposition of Servicing Activities
This section decomposes the process of servicing into general activities and then maps these
activities to on-orbit servicing missions. Four unique activities are found to compose a servicing
mission: (1) rendezvous, (2) acquire, (3) access, and (4) service.
3.1.1 Rendezvous
Rendezvous is the movement of a servicing vehicle from a starting position to the vicinity of the
servicing target. For OOS missions, rendezvous comprises two steps. First, the servicing
vehicle moves from a starting position (e.g., launch pad, parking orbit) to a position where
relative navigation is possible with laser ranging, radar, and cameras (< 500 meters). The second
step of rendezvous involves the positioning of the servicing vehicle for acquisition (< 3 meters).
10000 m
1000 m
100 m
S5
50 m S6 550 km
S7 20 m
j 13 m I
V-bar SAT S4 S3 (S2
R-bar
232
km
Servicing
Vehicle
Figure 3.1 Rendezvous Phases - Geosynchronous Servicing Vehicle
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Figure 3.1 illustrates the basic phases of rendezvous for a Geosynchronous Servicing Vehicle
proposed by the European Space Agency (ESA) (Yasaka and Ashford, 1996). In the first phase
(up to Sl), the servicer is in a phasing orbit a couple hundred kilometers below the target
satellite. Once within 10000 km, the servicer transitions to GEO and closes in on the target (S2
to S4). Next, the servicer flies around the target satellite for inspection (S4 to S5) before final
approach (S5-S7).
3.1.2 Acquire
Acquire is a servicing activity involving the transfer of a servicing vehicle from the target
vicinity to the holding of the target. In OOS, acquire is defined as the docking or mating of a
servicing vehicle to the target satellite. Most proposed mating operations involve approaching
the target satellite from behind, along the Earth direction. For spin-stabilized spacecraft, the
servicing vehicle is "spun up" to synchronize with the target. A similar approach may work for
mating with uncontrolled satellites as the main axis of inertia is typically perpendicular to the
plane of the solar array (de Peuter, et al., 1994).
3.1.3 Access
Access is a servicing activity involving the deployment of servicing tools from a stowed position
to the area of interest on or within the target. For OOS, access consists of all the steps required
to deploy the stowed tools, upgrades, and replacement parts of the servicing vehicle to the target
satellite components that require servicing. With the servicing vehicle expected to mate with the
back of the satellite and with most payload located on the front of the satellite (e.g., antennae
reflectors), the accessibility of the repair area for the servicing vehicle is a non-trivial element of
serviceability.
3.1.4 Service
Service is a value-added servicing activity involving the operation of deployed servicer to
improve the components of a system. For OOS, service may comprise a variety of activities
including the repair, replacement, upgrade, addition, and/or removal of satellite components.
The undocking, separation, and escape of the servicing from the target spacecraft is the final step
in an OOS mission. The functions during this phase are essentially the same as rendezvous,
acquire, and access but performed in the opposite order. Although the separation and escape step
will require significant mission planning, no new technology development is required (Wertz and
Bell, 2003). As such, it is assumed that separation and escape will not be a driver for
serviceability assessments, and this step is not assigned its own category in the set of unique
servicing activities.
3.1.5 Mapping of Servicing Activities to OOS Functions
Table 3.1 relates the four servicing activities to the five high-level on-orbit servicing functions
identified in Chapter 1. The rendezvous activity is part of all OOS functions, and the acquire
activity is part of all functions except proximity inspection. Access and service are activities
composing augmentation and assembly operations but not necessarily the restore function.
Although the restore function might be manifested in a repair mission requiring the accessing
and servicing of faulty components, restore might only constitute the recovery of attitude control
via external grappling.
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Table 3.1 Mapping Servicing Activities to OOS Functions
function
activity inspect relocate restore augment assemble
rendezvous X X X X X
acquire X X X X
access ? X X
service ? X X
3.2 Towards a Taxonomy for Space System Serviceability
The number of operational satellites in orbit around the Earth is approximately 800. This section
proposes a classification system for space systems to add structure to the problem of conducting
serviceability assessments. Five satellite attributes comprise this proposed framework: (1)
mission area, (2) orbital elements, (3) attitude control system, (4) bus structure, and (5) payload
configuration. Each attribute is judged to impact the degree of difficulty for conducting at least
one of the servicing activities discussed in Section 3.1. The following discussion analyzes the
attributes and introduces a combination of discrete and continuous categories for classifying
space systems within each attribute.
3.2.1 Mission Area
Satellites perform a wide range of missions from weather monitoring to imaging distant stars.
Satellite mission areas may be used to understand physical and temporal constraints on servicing
operations. For example, Earth observation payloads will typically incorporate optics sensitive
to thruster plume impingement from other spacecraft. An example in the temporal domain is the
need to minimize satellite downtime given the criticality of availability for communication
satellite operators (typically on the order of 99.95%). Table 3.2 defines four broad mission areas
independent of the user community (e.g., commercial, civil, military).
Table 3.2 Satellite Mission Areas
Observation of space objects and phenomena such as distant planets,
Astronomy galaxies, and radiation fields; includes miscellaneous civil space science
and engineering missions
Communications Telecommunications using radio at microwave frequencies
t OTerrestrial observation for applications such as environmental monitoring,
Earth Observation meteorology, map making, reconnaissance, and launch detection
.t Radio time signal transmitters that enable mobile ground receivers to
Navigation determine their exact location
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3.2.2 Orbital Elements
Orbits may be completely characterized with five constants and one parameter that varies with
time. The location of satellites in space is perhaps the most fundamental element of conducting
serviceability assessments as all OOS activities require proximity operations and propulsion is a
key driver in servicing vehicle design. Table 3.3 defines the Keplerian orbital elements.
Table 3.3 Classical Orbital Elements
Semimajor axis (a) Orbit size: half of the long axis of the ellipse
Eccentricity (e) Orbit shape: ratio of half the foci separation to the semimajor axis
Orbital plane's tilt: angle between the orbital plane and equatorial
Inclination (i) plane, measured counterclockwise at the ascending node
Right ascension of the Orbital plane's rotation about the Earth: angle from the vernal
ascending node (Sl) equinox to the ascending node (measured eastward)
Argument of perigee (w) Orbit's orientation in the orbital plane: angle from the ascending
node to perigee (measured in the direction of satellite motion)
Satellite's location in its orbit: angle from perigee to the satellite'sTrue anomaly (v) location (measured in the direction of satellite motion)
Figure 3.2 displays the classical orbital elements.
W)
vernal eqwnox
Figure 3.2 Orbital Elements (Credit: NASA)
Table 3.4 identifies various orbital zones, principally in terms of orbital altitude. Further
refinement of orbital zones as a function of inclination will be required later as plane changes
require large quantities of propellant.
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Table 3.4 Orbital Zones
200 to 1200 km above the Earth's surface, includes sun-
Low Earth Orbit synchronous orbits in which the surface illumination angle is
the same every time for any given point on the Earth's surface
1200 to 35,286 km, e.g. GPS constellation of consists of 24Medium Earth Orbit satellites in six orbital planes at 20,200 km
Subsynchronous 35,286 to 35,786 km, drift orbit for GEO in easterly direction
35,786 km, includes most communications spacecraft in
Geosynchronous Earth Orbit geostationary orbits with i=0
Supersynchronous 35,786 to 36,286 km, drift orbit for GEO in westerly direction
High Earth Orbit Above 36,286 km, e.g., satellites launched to detect 
nuclear
explosions in space or to Lagrangian points
An orbit with an eccentricity less than 1, includes Molniya
Highly Elliptic orbits (i=64.4 degrees and e=.72 with a period of 12 hours)
that feature apogee dwell
3.2.3 Attitude Control System
The attitude control system (ACS) maintains the angular position and rotation of the satellite.
Tightly coupled with other spacecraft subsystems such as propulsion and navigation, the ACS is
comprised of sensors for monitoring external disturbance torques and actuators for controlling
attitude. Sensor data from star trackers, sun sensors, magnetometers, Earth horizon indicators,
and inertial gyroscopes are input to actuators which may include momentum/reaction wheels,
control-moment gyros (CMG), electromagnets, and thrusters (Wertz and Larson, et al., 1999).
The current population of operational satellites employs numerous methods for attitude control.
In general, however, control methods can be divided into three broad areas: passive control, spin
control, and three-axis control. Tumbling satellites with failed ACS but otherwise healthy are
potential targets for OOS (as is orbital debris removal). Table 3.5 describes the spectrum of
potential target satellite attitude control facing servicing vehicles.
Table 3.5 Spectrum of Satellite Attitude Control
Tumbling Uncontrolled angular position and rotation (analogous to orbital debris)
Gravity gradient control Inertial properties keep satellite pointed towards Earth (i.e., elongated object ina gravity field aligns its longitudinal axis through Earth's center)
Passively resist disturbance torques about two axes by spinning about axis with
Spin control largest moment of inertia, some satellites incorporate dual-spin stabilization
a sMost expensive and complex (and most common), employs thrusters orThree-axis stabilization magnetic torquers as well as momentum wheels
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Understanding and cooperating with the ACS of target satellites is critical for conducting
satellite serviceability assessments. Assuming cooperative spacecraft, ACS sophistication is
inversely proportional to the complexity required in the servicing vehicle docking system.
Understanding the ACS is also an important element in understanding the OOS value proposition
for satellite operators. In some cases, a satellite's operational life may be limited by the ACS.
Bearings on momentum wheels are subject to wear-out, sensors may fail, and supply of thruster
propellant is a limiting factor in conventional propulsion systems. One OOS business in
development is focused on the GEO lifetime extension market by taking over the ACS of target
satellites with a space tug (see Section 2.2.3 - ConeXpress Spacecraft Life Extension System).
3.2.4 Bus Structure
The satellite bus structure is also important for serviceability assessments as it constrains
servicing vehicle docking strategies and may impact other proximity operations. Unlike mission
area and orbital element categories, a discrete framework for assessing the ease of docking with a
particular bus structure is difficult to develop. Likert scales are one possible means by which it
may be possible to characterize the ease of docking with common satellite bus structures. This
type of analysis may be practical given the limited number of satellite bus structures currently in
production.' Numerous attributes of satellite bus structures are relevant to serviceability
assessments. Five are discussed in this section: (1) bus shape and size, (2) solar arrays, (3)
antennae, (4), boom-mounted instruments and other appendages, and (5) launch vehicle mating
interface.
3.2.4.1 Bus Shape and Size
Knowledge of satellite bus shape and size informs design of the servicing vehicle's capture
system. With spacecraft launched in cylindrically symmetric containers, with the axis of
symmetry parallel to the thrust axis, satellite buses are typically cylindrical in shape with
diameters in the range of 1-5 meters. Booster diameters serve as an upper limit for satellite bus
diameters.
3.2.4.2 Solar Arrays
Satellites typically have solar arrays either mounted on external panels or on the surface of the
equipment compartment. If mounted on external panels, solar arrays are more vulnerable to
sustaining damage during proximity operations; but more surface area may be available on the
surface of the bus. Solar arrays attached to the bus surface may limit the ability of a servicing
vehicle to safely grapple with a target satellite.
3.2.4.3 Antennae
As with solar arrays, the antenna configuration on a satellite may constrain OOS docking
activities. Antenna aperture size (along with transmitter power) is critical in driving satellite
mass. In general, high-gain antennae are utilized to support high data rates with low transmitter
'In 2004, only 15 commercial satellites were launched worldwide. They were built by only five prime contractors
(Boeing, EADS, Lockheed Martin, Prikladnoi Mekhaniki, and Space Systems/Loral) and were based on just five
satellite bus families-BSS-601, Eurostar 3000, A2100, Express-M, and LS-1300 (Caceres, 2005).
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power. Basic antenna types include the reflector, lens, and phased array whereby multiple beams
may be formed simultaneously. The parabolic reflector is a common antenna type on
communications satellites. For a peak gain of 19.1 dBi and an 18 degree beam at 400MHz, the
aperture diameter of a parabolic reflector is 2.9 meters. Other reflector antenna types for satellite
systems include the helix and horn (Wertz and Larson, et al., 1999).
3.2.4.4 Boom-Mounted Instruments
Some spacecraft feature boom-mounted instruments which constitute additional appendages
relevant to an OOS provider. Boom-mounted instruments are often unique to individual
missions and may include sensors for detecting particle and radiation measurements.
3.2.4.5 Launch Vehicle Mating Interface
As the leading candidate location of capture for space tug providers, the launch vehicle mating
interface of the satellite bus is a critical element for assessing serviceability. For example, the
end effectors on the robotic arms of DARPA's proposed space tug (see SUMO, Section 2.3.3)
are designed to fit inside the launch bolt holes of Boeing 702 satellites. SUMO's three-fingered
end effectors grab the hole from the inside and apply 300 pounds per square inch of gripping
force. Designers are also developing end effectors for launch vehicle adaptor rings on the
Lockheed Martin A2100 (Iannotta, 2006). With the ability to exchange end effectors while in
orbit and given the finite number of satellite bus designs, SUMO is positioned to offer tugging
services to the vast majority of space systems.
3.2.5 Payload Configuration
Spacecraft configuration is driven by many factors including legacy bus designs, booster
diameter, thermal constraints, radiation environment, and field-of-view requirements. Payloads
configured with a modular architecture (i.e., consisting of modules with tightly controlled
interfaces) are more serviceable than otherwise similar satellites configured with highly
integrated components. Modularity increases the range of "manageable" complexity by limiting
the scope of interaction, allowing multiple components of a system to be worked on concurrently
and accommodating uncertainty (Baldwin and Clarke, 2000).
Although motivated by the potential for improvements in manufacturing efficiency, industry
efforts to develop modular spacecraft configurations may aid future OOS activities. Northrop
Grumman, in association with AFRL's Materials and Manufacturing Directorate, is running the
Flexible Space Vehicle Production Line Program (FSVPL) with stated goals of reducing cost by
50% and cycle time by 70%. While most spacecraft are custom-designed for a single purpose
with a given payload (resulting in costly and time consuming integration and test activities due to
unique structural, electrical, and thermal properties), the FSVPL has reduced costs through
standardization. With common interfaces, modules developed for one spacecraft can be used in
another (Shah, 2004).
As with various satellite bus structures, a framework for assessing the degree of modularity in a
satellite's payload configuration is difficult to structure. Likert scales are a candidate method for
characterizing the degree of modularity in common satellite payload configurations.
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3.3 Spacecraft Currently in Earth Orbit
Approximately 800 functioning satellites are currently in orbit around the Earth.2 As a means to
rapidly survey the operational population of satellites for OOS targets, the Union of Concerned
Scientists (UCS) Satellite Database was utilized. The database is derived from open-source
information and is available in Excel as well as a tab-delimited text format (Union of Concerned
Scientists, 2006). Updated quarterly, the database includes 21 fields of basic information on
each active satellite. Technical information about each satellite, its orbit, as well as its user,
owner, operator, and builder are included in the database (Table 3.6). While specifications are
provided for launch mass, dry mass, power, and launch vehicle type, satellite volume is not made
available. Launch vehicle fairing volume is readily available from other sources (Isakowitz and
Hopkins, et al., 2004) but may not represent satellite volume given the possibility of multiple
satellites having been launched on a single vehicle. As a comprehensive and easily manipulated
source of information on all active Earth satellites with orbit types, the UCS Database is well-
suited as an input to a low-fidelity, astrodynamics-based model of satellite serviceability (see
Section 4.2).
Table 3.6 UCS Satellite Database Fields
A: Name of Satellite, Alternate Names
B. Country of Operator/Owner
C: Operator/Owner
D: Users
E: Purpose
F: Type of Orbit
G: Perigee
H: Apogee
I: Inclination
J: Period
K: Satellite Launch Mass
L: Satellite Dry Mass
M: Power
N: Date of Launch
O: Expected Lifetime
P: Contractor
Q: Country of Contractor
R: Launch Site
S: Launch Vehicle
T: COSPAR Number
U: NORAD Number
3.3.1 General Distributions
Of the 773 satellites included in the UCS database, 534 are communications satellites (318 of
which reside in GEO and 203 in LEO). Astronomy and earth observation spacecraft reside
2 Included in this thesis are all operational satellites launched through March 11, 2006-773 satellites. Classified
U.S. Government launches were omitted from the UCS database.
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primarily in LEO (with GEO early warning satellites being the primary exception for earth
observation). Navigation satellites (i.e., U.S. Navstar GPS and Russian Glonass) comprise the
preponderance of MEO systems.
Table 3.7 General Distribution of Active Satellites
Total
Astronomy 53 0 1 17 71
Communications 203 2 318 11 534
Earth Observation 87 0 23 2 112
Navigation 9 44 3 0 56
Figure 3.3 Distribution of Satellites by Mission Area
3.3.2 Satellite Locations
Other than navigation satellites in MEO, operational satellite orbits largely consists of LEO for
mapping Earth resources, meteorology, and communications and GEO for communications
spacecraft. In LEO, resolution and aperture requirements drive orbits to lower altitudes while
coverage, lifetime, and survivability drive orbits to higher altitudes (Wertz and Larson, et al.,
1999). Of the 352 operational LEO satellites, one is in equatorial orbit, 141 are in intermediate
orbits (with inclination between 200 and 850), 86 are in polar orbits (with inclination between
850 and 950), 122 are in sun-synchronous orbit (with inclination between 950 and 1040), and two
are in retrograde orbits (with inclination between 1040 and 1800). Figure 3.4 displays the
distribution of satellites as a function of inclination and apogee altitude. Due to the
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concentration of satellites in GSO, it is not clear that over 90% of active satellites are present in
LEO and GEO. Figure 3.5 alleviates this problem somewhat by zooming in on satellites near
GEO altitude with inclinations less than 15*.
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Figure 3.5 Distribution of Geostationary and Near-Geostationary Satellites
3.3.3 Bus Manufacturers
The attributes of satellite bus design relevant to conducting serviceability assessments are
discussed in Section 3.2.4. While the UCS Satellite Database does not provide the bus type, it
does provide the name of the contractor that built the satellite. Given the limited number of
satellite bus types built by each contractor (e.g., Lockheed Martin has converged on the A2100
design), it may be possible to infer satellite bus serviceability metrics as a function of the
contractor. Figure 3.6 displays the distribution of active satellites across top contractors. The
top 13 contractors each have at least 16 operational satellites in-orbit and constitute 75% of all
active satellites.
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satellite. These include a harpoon configuration in which a probe is launched onto the target,
latched on, and reeled in; a telescoping probe that extends to mate with the target; impact
docking with a large conical guide; and "claw-type" linkages interfacing with a trefoil (Stamm
and Motaghedi, 2004). For satellites already in operation and not designed for servicing, the
launch vehicle mating interface is the leading candidate surface to conduct docking operations.
As such, the satellite launch vehicle (and its associated docking interface) may serve as a proxy
for assessing the degree of difficult in conducting docking operations. Figure 3.7 shows the
distribution of active satellites across launch vehicle providers. The top 10 launch vehicle
families are responsible for transporting 84% of active satellites to their orbits.
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3.3.5 Expected Life
Empirical data suggests that satellite failures follow a bathtub distribution whereby failures are
concentrated during initial check-out operations at BOL and around EOL due to expected
degradation (Sullivan, 2005). Figure 3.8 shows the distribution of remaining life for satellites.
As illustrated by the red bars, over 38% of active satellites have exceeded EOL projections.
Figure 3.8 Distribution of Remaining Life for Active Satellites
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3.4 Synthesis
Having identified rendezvous, acquire, access, and service as four unique activities comprising
generic servicing missions, satellite attributes were reviewed as potential drivers for on-orbit
serviceability assessments. In particular, five elements of satellites were deemed relevant: (1)
mission area, (2) orbital elements, (3) attitude control system, (4) bus structure, and (5) payload
configuration. Attributes of the fourth element, bus structure, were discussed further including
bus shape and size, solar array configuration, antenna placement, and launch vehicle mating
interface.
In order to make this taxonomy of space systems useful for serviceability assessments, the five
satellite attributes need to be related to the servicing functions discussed in Chapter 1 (i.e.,
inspect, relocate, restore, augment, and assemble). This may be accomplished by decomposing
servicing functions into sets of servicing activities (Table 3.1) and then identifying which
satellite attributes affect the degree of difficulty of each servicing activity (Figure 3.9). In this
way, the attributes of a satellite may be related to the degree of difficulty of servicing missions.
ZFunction (Activity) Satellite Attribute
Figure 3.9 Tracing OOS Functions to Satellite Attributes
The availability of data for populating the taxonomy is critical for making serviceability
assessments. However, global databases such as the one maintained by the Union of Concerned
Scientists offer only general satellite information. While mission area and orbital elements data
are available, detailed technical information on attitude control, bus structure, and payload
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configuration is not included. Fortunately, this information may be derived from an analysis at
the spacecraft bus level given the limited number of satellite designs currently in production.
Looking ahead to a methodology for assessing satellite amenability to OOS, the availability of
data informs the research approach: utilize the data contained in comprehensive satellite
databases (i.e., mission area, orbital elements) as much as possible and, then, gather information
on satellite attitude control, bus structure, and payload configuration. Figure 3.9 shows the
dependencies of each satellite attribute on assessing serviceability for the OOS activity. The
mission area and orbital element attributes drive rendezvous and access activities. However, the
degree of difficulty of the access activity is also a function of bus structure and payload
configuration. Therefore, only the serviceability of the rendezvous activity can be assessed from
the metrics contained in comprehensive satellite databases. Serviceability assessments of
acquire, access, and service activities must be derived from other sources.
Chapter 4 builds on the taxonomy of space systems for serviceability with a two-tiered approach:
(1) assessment of rendezvous amenability by inputting the UCS data into an agent model based
on orbital transfers and (2) development of a framework for comparing the relative amenability
of various satellite bus designs to the full set of OOS activities including acquire, access, and
service.
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4 Methodology to Assess Amenability of Satellites to On-
Orbit Servicing
This chapter proposes and tests a methodology for performing satellite serviceability assessments
across the four OOS activities discussed in Chapter 3. First, relative motion between satellites is
reviewed and the amenability of satellites to orbital rendezvous is investigated. A servicing
campaign simulation in GEO is employed to conduct serviceability assessments of the
rendezvous activity. The simulation is based upon orbital transfers, and may be extended to
other orbital zones to identify clusters of satellites warranting further investigation. Second, a
framework is proposed for comparing the relative amenability of various satellite bus designs for
all OOS activities including acquire, access, and service. The following questions are addressed
in this chapter:
* What is the amenability of existing satellites to OOS?
o Given deployment of a limited OOS capability, in what orbits would a servicing
capability most likely be available?
o How might relative serviceability assessments be made across various satellite bus
designs?
4.1 Relative Motion between Satellites
In order to accomplish OOS, it is necessary to rendezvous a servicing vehicle with target
satellites. To maneuver between orbits, a servicing vehicle's velocity vector is changed in
magnitude and direction using a thruster. Since most propulsion systems operate for only a short
period of time relative to the orbital period, maneuvers are treated as an impulsive change in
velocity while the positions remain fixed. In general, the change in the servicing vehicle's
velocity vector, AV, to maneuver to from one orbit to another is given by:
AV = Vinal - Vnitiai (4-1)
Initial and final velocity vectors may be derived from the orbital elements. Depending on the
starting location of a servicing vehicle and assuming circular orbits, total AV required to
maneuver to a target satellite may consist of five maneuvers: (1) inclination changes, (2) changes
in the right ascension of the ascending node, (3) coplanar orbit transfers, (4) phasing maneuvers,
and (5) proximity operations for final rendezvous. The time required to accomplish each
maneuver is also an important attribute of relative motion for a vehicle servicing multiple
satellites with potentially limited availability.
4.1.1 Inclination Changes
Changing the inclination of a satellite's orbital plane requires changing the direction of the
velocity vector. Inclination changes are very expensive in terms of AV and associated fuel
consumption. For satellites in elliptical orbit, inclination changes are conducted at apogee when
velocity is at its lowest to minimize required AV. In some cases, AV may be minimized by
boosting a satellite into a higher orbit, conducting the inclination change at apogee, and then
returning the satellite to its original orbit (Wertz and Larson et al., 1999).
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In the case of a simple inclination change for a circular orbit where final velocity (Vf) is equal to
initial velocity (Vi) the velocity change reduces to
Ainclination = 2Vj sin(9 / 2) (4-2)
where 0 is the angle change required (Wertz and Larson et al., 1999).
Inclination changes are impulsive maneuvers that require no time themselves. However, there is
a wait time associated with proper alignment which is discussed in Section 4.1.4, Phasing
Maneuvers for Rendezvous.
4.1.2 Changes in the Right Ascension of the Ascending Node
For circular orbits, there are two points of intersection at which a bum can be applied to match
up the line of nodes. Solving this problem requires determining the location of the common
point for the bum, the angle (v) through which the orbit plane must rotate, and the required AV.
Because both the initial and final orbits are circular, velocity is equal at all points and the
problem of changing the ascending node reduces to solving the following two equations:
cos(v) = cos 2 (iin,,,a )+ sin 2 ( initial) cos(AQ) (4-3)
AVQ = 2Vini,,asin(-) (4-4)
2
As with inclination changes, changes in the right ascension of the ascending node are impulsive
maneuvers that require no time themselves. There is a wait time associated with proper
alignment (Section 4.1.4, Phasing Maneuvers for Rendezvous).
4.1.3 Coplanar Orbit Transfers
Unless the initial and final orbits intersect, in-plane maneuvering requires a transfer orbit.
Hohmann transfers are maneuvers between circular orbits of different altitudes that minimize AV
expenditures. The Hohmann transfer orbit consists of half of an elliptical orbit that is tangent to
both the initial and final circular orbits. Because the Hohmann transfer orbit is tangential to both
circular orbits, the velocity vectors are collinear at the intersection points. Two impulsive bums
are required: one to initiate the transfer ellipse and one to apply a velocity change to match the
velocity of the final orbit.
Total AV for the Hohmann transfer is the sum of the velocity changes at perigee (AVA) and at
apogee (AVB) of the transfer ellipse (i.e., differences in magnitudes of the velocities in each
orbit). Differences in velocities are calculated from the orbital elements using the energy
equation
111 11
2 1 )2 1 2 1 )2 12AV AV A VB = + 2 (4-5)
rA a,, rA rB atx r.
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where p is the product of the universal constant of gravitation and the mass of the Earth, r, is
the altitude of the lower altitude circular orbit, rB is the altitude of the higher altitude circular
orbit, and a,, is the semimajor axis of the transfer ellipse (which is the average of the radii of the
initial and final orbits) (Wertz and Larson et al., 1999).
The time required for a Hohmann transfer is equal to half the period of the transfer orbit.
Minutes of transfer time may be computed from the energy equation in terms of r, and rB as
follows:
3
T - P (ra+r) 2  (4-6)
Hohmann 2 620703
Transferring a satellite between orbits in less time than that required for a Hohmann transfer may
be accomplished with a one-tangent burn (e.g., -3.5 hours rather than -5.3 hours for LEO to
GEO transfers). However, one-tangent bums require more fuel than Hohmann transfers (-3.9
km/s AV rather -4.7 km/s AV for LEO to GEO transfers). For a one-tangent burn, the transfer
orbit is tangential to the initial orbit and intersects the final orbit at an angle relative to the flight-
path of the transfer. A third option for coplanar orbit transfers is the spiral transfer which uses a
constant low-thrust burn.
When orbital transfer involves rendezvousing with another space object, precise timing of when
to initiate the coplanar transfer is required. For example, the servicing vehicle may remain in its
initial orbit until the relative motion between itself and the target satellite results in the desired
geometry. This wait time in the initial orbit, Twai,, is calculated as a function of angular velocities
Twait= (0i -Of +2 ktargetg) (47)
((Oservicer - Wt arget )
where $, is the angular separation of the initial positions, $f is the angular separation required
for rendezvous, k is the number of revolutions of the target satellite, ,se,,cer is the angular
velocity of the servicing vehicle, and o,,ge, is the angular velocity of the target satellite (Wertz
and Larson et al., 1999).
4.1.4 Phasing Maneuvers for Rendezvous
Phasing maneuvers may also be required within one orbital plane in the case of a servicing
vehicle transferring between two satellites in the same circular orbit. Phasing maneuvers may be
performed by lowering or raising the orbit and waiting for the difference in period to cancel the
difference in phase. Two circular phasing scenarios exist: (1) target satellite leading the
servicing vehicle and (2) servicing vehicle trailing the target satellite (Figure 4.1). The initial
angular separation or phase angle (39) is measured from the target satellite to the servicing
vehicle (with the direction of the target satellite's motion defined as the positive direction).
Because the two satellites are in the same orbit, .servicer is the same as ,,, which is given in
Vallado and McClain (2001):
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Itarg et
For the case of circular rendezvous with the servicing vehicle trailing the target
target satellite may complete one revolution minus the initial separation (0) in the
servicing vehicle revolves once in the phasing orbit. The formula for phase time is
Tphase = ktarget( 2 ))+ 9
target
where multiple revolutions of the target satellite enumerate multiple solutions.
(4-8)
satellite,,
time that
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the
(4-9)
target satellite (to)
servicing vehicle (to, t1)
,target satellite (t1)
Figure 4.1 Circular Coplanar Rendezvous (Servicing Vehicle Trailing Target Satellite)
Given that these are only circular orbits with tangential bums, AV is simply the change in
magnitudes of the different orbits. Total AV is twice the change in velocity of the initial bum
because the servicing vehicle must reenter the original orbit. Therefore, total AV for phasing
maneuvers is calculated as
(4- 10)AVhase = 2Vphase Vservicer =2 2 p _ p
targtet - phase - target
where target is the semimajor axis of the target satellite's orbit. The semimajor axis of the
phasing orbit, aphase is calculated as
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a U( Tphase 13 (4-11)
where kse.vcer is the number of revolutions of the servicing vehicle (Vallado and McClain, 2001).
4.1.5 Proximity Operations
Relative motion for two close orbiting satellites is addressed by the Clohessy-Wiltshire or Hill's
equations. The satellite coordinate system is used for relative motion whereby the system moves
with the target satellite. Radial positions are parallel to the position vector (along the R axis),
transverse displacements are along-track or normal to the position vector (along the S axis), and
normal positions are normal to the orbital plane (W axis). Assuming circular motion and writing
each vector component separately yields
- 2wp -30ox =f
+ 2ox = f, (4-12)
+ w 2z = f.
where x, y, and z represent the three components of the target satellite's relative range vector
(Vallado and McClain, 2001). Proximity operations vary across the set of possible OOS
activities. Whether OOS involves cooperative docking with a preplanned servicer or external
grappling with a space tug, AV expenditures for proximity operations are difficult to predict a
priori (e.g., Intelsat 603 satellite rescue on STS-49, see Section 2.1.5.8). Maneuvers are
composed of small velocity increments which are highly dependent upon control algorithms. As
a first-order estimate, 50 m/s is assumed for AV for proximity operations, A Vprxi,,mY (Meissinger
and Collins, 1999).
4.2 Agent Model of Satellite Servicing Based on Orbital Transfers
Having reviewed relative motion between satellites, the amenability of satellites to the
rendezvous servicing activity is assessed through the development of an agent-based model of
OOS. With the context of a multi-year servicing campaign in the GEO belt, the model consists
of a series of phasing maneuvers between GEO parking slots. OOS is treated as a multi-variable
optimization problem with the principal trade of minimizing both AV expenditures and transfer
time. Assuming current launch vehicle, propulsion, and robotic technology for servicing
vehicles, the focus in the model is on the serviceability of target satellites. Servicing vehicle
operations are simulated over time, completing maneuvers as a function of path-dependent
servicing operations. With servicing operations initiated by requests from target satellites that
issue "tickets" in a binomial process, a Monte Carlo analysis is performed to derive general
results. Primary outputs of the agent model are the cost of servicing (mean AV expenditure by
servicing vehicle for satisfying tickets) and the performance of target satellites (availability for
mission operations). Although the focus is on serviceability assessments of target satellites, the
model is readily adapted to the design of concept-of-operations for servicing vehicles.
Upon explaining the scope of the model, the two agents (target satellites and servicing vehicles)
are described with a discussion of potential states and the rules governing state transitions.
Assumptions regarding servicing vehicle capabilities and initial conditions are also discussed
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before presenting results. Other parts of the thesis related to the agent model include Section
8.3.2, which suggests possible extensions for future work, and Appendix A that documents some
of the underlying MATLAB code.
4.2.1 Scope
While Sections 4.3 and 4.4 discuss serviceability assessments at the satellite bus level (acquire,
access, and service activities), this section is focused on the rendezvous servicing activity. As
such, activities involving physical manipulation of target satellites are "black box" operations in
the agent-model. Also, while the serviceability framework developed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4
applies to satellites in any orbit, Section 4.2 focuses on servicing multiple satellites at or near
GEO. This initial focus on GEO is driven by the two main factors, the high propulsive cost of
LEO plane changes using existing technology and the current concentration of high-value
satellites in GEO. Differences in transmission delay times are factors as well.
For a typical satellite in LEO, a plane change of only three degrees requires on the order of 10%
of the mass of the satellite. With cost of propellant approximately $10,000/kg, the lifecycle cost
of a LEO servicing system would be high. Servicing operations in GEO require relatively small
amounts of propulsive effort. Despite large physical distances separating GEO satellites, most
satellites are in essentially the same orbit. Large servicing demands are possible with the
concentration of high-value satellites. Furthermore, continuous visibility from a single ground
station keeps the supporting infrastructure simple. This also leads to less transmission delay
time. Although GEO is nearly 70 times farther from the ground than LEO, transmission delays
are cut in half (assuming that continuous coverage in LEO is provided through GEO relays)
(Yasaka and Ashford, 1996).
4.2.2 Agents, States, and Behaviors
The two agents in the OOS model, target satellites and servicing vehicles, each has a variety of
potential states which are governed by underlying behavioral models.
4.2.2.1 Target Satellites
Target satellites may be in one of three states: full health with no need of servicing, full health
with a request for scheduled servicing, and not operational with a request for urgent servicing.
Requests are communicated to servicing vehicles through tickets by target satellites in need of
attention. Table 4.1 illustrates the annual OOS market size in GEO. Based on empirical data
compiled on satellite operations between 1957 and 2000 (Sullivan, 2005), five types of servicing
missions are identified: refuel, ORU replacement, general repair, relocation in GEO, and
deployment assistance. The probabilities in Table 4.1 inform the frequency of servicing ticket
requests in the OOS model with tickets issued in a binomial (discrete Poisson) process. One
hour is used as the time step in the model with annual servicing requests mapped to the hourly
probability of an individual satellite requesting a given servicing mission. Over the course of a
given ten year servicing campaign, 175 of the 335 GEO satellites modeled can be expected to
generate at least one servicing request (on average).
If in need of servicing, two types of tickets may be issued by the target satellite: scheduled and
urgent. Whether a ticket is scheduled or urgent is assumed to be a function of the predictability
of the servicing operation (i.e., unpredictable servicing missions cause urgent servicing tickets to
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be initiated).' Table 4.1 captures the assumed predictability of each OOS mission. With
refueling needs readily projected and ORU replacement a preplanned activity, the first two OOS
missions trigger normal servicing tickets. Repair and deployment assistance missions are
assumed to be opportunistic servicing events that are not generally predictable. These trigger
urgent servicing tickets. Relocation missions are assumed to be equally divided between
predictable (e.g., movement of commercial communications satellites to capture emergent
terrestrial markets, retirement) and unpredictable (e.g., surge communication need in war time,
sudden loss of attitude control).
Table 4.1 Annual Number of GEO Servicing Opportunities
Average Annual Average Annual
Service Opportunities Opportunities in GEO Predictable?
Refuel 20.0 8.9 yes
ORU Replacement 4.4 2.0 yes
General Repair 3.8 1.7 no
Relocation in GEO 13.0 13.0 yes and no
Deployment Assistance 0.3 0.1 no
4.2.2.2 Servicing Vehicles
Servicing vehicles may be in one of four states: parked in GEO, in transit to a target satellite,
servicing a target satellite, or out of fuel. When a ticket is issued, each servicing vehicle
calculates the AV required to complete the mission (AV,,s, + AVr,,i.,,) and compares this value
to its remaining propellant. Of the servicing vehicles possessing enough fuel, the servicing
vehicle that will expend the least amount of AV is selected for the servicing mission. Having
"grabbed" a ticket, the servicing vehicle transits to the target satellite with the circular coplanar
phasing maneuvers discussed in Section 4.1.4. 2
One of the parameters subjected to sensitivity analysis in the simulation is the transit time for the
servicing vehicles to the target satellite. The key trade in the model is between transfer time and
AV efficiency. Should a servicing provider expend extra fuel to transit more quickly (i.e.,
reducing the number of phasing orbit revolutions) to a target satellite that has issued an urgent
ticket? This issue is addressed by treating response time as a parameter and modeling two
servicing architectures: (1) treating all servicing tickets as equals, using a constant number of
phasing orbit revolutions and (2) distinguishing between servicing tickets by varying the number
of phasing orbit revolutions as a function of ticket urgency. Incorporating Equation 4-8 and then
Equation 4-9 into Equation 4-11 informs the selection of the number of phasing orbit
revolutions.
1 In this discussion, a predictable mission does not imply that it is known years in advance. Rather, it implies that a
servicing vehicle may respond in weeks rather than days without strongly affecting the value proposition to the
target satellite.
2 Shen and Tsiotras (2002) have studied the issue of optimal scheduling for servicing multiple satellites in a circular
constellation. A similar minimum-AV two-impulse maneuver is used for each rendezvous. In contrast to the agent
model of OOS, which is a dynamic simulation driven by probabilistic servicing requests, Shen and Tsiotras seek to
find the best sequence with the minimum total AV to service all the satellites in the constellation (regardless of
order).
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As observed in the simplification of Equation 4-13, given a common orbit and an initial phase
angle, the only parameters to trade are the number of revolutions for the target satellite and for
the servicing vehicle during phasing. Since AV is minimized the closer aphase is to atarget, the
quantity in parentheses in Equation 4-13 should be as close to one as possible. Given that the
phasing angle varies between -rc and rr, it follows that kservcer and kr arget should be equal.
The next issue to resolve is to determine the appropriate number for kerv,er and k,,rge,. The
greater their value, the smaller the AV expenditure will be. However, large numbers of phasing
revolutions will take more time (Figure 4.2a). In general, this trade between speed and fuel
efficiency should be settled by a competitive OOS market (i.e., servicing urgency may drive
OOS market segmentation). For the purposes of the agent model of OOS here, it is only
necessary to select a baseline value. A heuristic investigation indicates that an optimal tradeoff
between fuel expenditure and time of travel occurs at around kservcer =kervicer =5 (Figure 4.2b).
A formal investigation of this tradeoff is left to future work.
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One constraint on the number of phasing revolutions is the need select a number of revolutions
for the target satellite that does not cause the perigee of the transfer orbit to impose a AV penalty
due to atmospheric drag or to pass through the Earth. The high velocities and high drag
characterizing extremely low altitude orbits imposes a AV penalty for orbit maintenance. So as
to make this AV penalty trivial, a constraint is imposed on the servicing vehicle (in the case
when it trails the target satellite) such that the perigee of the transfer orbit may not be less than
1000 km in altitude.
Upon reaching the target satellite, the servicing operations begin. The AV and time costs to the
servicing vehicle for operations are assumed to be constants of 50 m/s and one day, respectively.
The mission completes with the servicing vehicle assuming a parking orbit in GEO adjacent to
the target satellite it just serviced. As such, the orientation of servicing vehicles in the simulation
is dependent upon the location of the last set of target satellites. Total AV cost and time for each
servicing mission is calculated with Equations 4-14 and 4-15:
AVtolal = A Vpase +AVproxImity (4-14)
Total = Tphase +Te,,,ing (4-15)
4.2.3 Initial Conditions
Initial conditions for the target satellites in the model are based on the orbital elements provided
on GEO spacecraft in the UCS satellite database. Four servicing vehicle are assumed to be
parked in the GEO belt.
4.2.3.1 Target Satellites
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Figure 4.3 GEO Satellite Density
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Target satellites are initialized based upon the UCS satellite database. Of the approximately 800
total spacecraft in the database, 335 are listed as being in GEO and contain true anomaly data.
These 335 spacecraft comprise the target satellites used in the model and are assumed to be at
GEO altitude with zero degree inclination (a close approximation of reality). NORAD
identification tags are also tracked in the simulation to establish traceability to satellite attributes
beyond orbital elements (e.g., mission area, operator, payload) for later post-processing. Figure
4.3 depicts GEO satellite density as a function of longitude in thirty discrete bins (with bin
magnitude representing the number satellites occupying a particular twelve-degree section of the
GEO belt). Local maximums may be observed over Europe and North America.
4.2.3.2 Servicing Vehicles
Although the purpose of the OOS model is not to design a servicing provider architecture, it is
necessary to assume a baseline set of servicing vehicles from which the physical amenability of
target satellites to rendezvous activities may be derived. For the provider architecture in the
model, four servicing vehicles are assumed to be parked in the GEO belt with initial locations of
0, 90, 180, and 270 degrees around the globe.
Current robotic, launch, and propulsion technologies are assumed in the simulation. Each
servicing vehicle is based on ESA's Geosynchronous Servicing Vehicle (GSV). With a dry mass
of 1088 kg, the GSV consists of a conventionally designed bus, an augmented attitude maneuver
and transfer capability, a sensor system for both rendezvous and docking and visual monitoring,
and teleoperated robotic arms for mechanical manipulation (de Peuter, et al., 1994). Assuming
launch with a Delta IV Heavy, the wet mass of the GSV delivered to GEO is 6276 kg (Isakowitz,
et al., 2004). This leaves 5188 kg of fuel for each GSV maneuvering in GEO. Assuming H2/0 2
(sp = 450 sec) propulsion for the GSV (Wertz and Larson, et al., 1999), the rocket equation
yields:
A V, = g()n = 9.81(450)n 51881088 7700 m/s (4-16)
Mf 1088
4.2.4 Results
Figure 4.4 depicts a sequence of three snapshots taken of the OOS agent model "dashboard" over
the course of a typical servicing simulation. The column on the left depicts remaining AV
capability of each of the four servicing vehicles. The cumulative number of servicing tickets
issued by target satellites is displayed above these "fuel bars." Polar views of the Earth are
depicted in the right column. Small, blue dots represent GEO satellites and the four large, red
dots each represent a servicing vehicle. Time is displayed above the polar view. While time
steps in the model are tracked in hour increments, the time step depicted in the tool dashboard is
30 days. At t=0 (row one), each of the four servicing vehicles possess a full AV capability (i.e.,
7700 m/s). No tickets have been issued and the servicing vehicles are evenly spaced in GEO
parking orbits. At t=60 (row two), almost five years have passed and 126 tickets have been
issued. Each servicing vehicle is parked in the slot of its last servicing operation and has
between 2 and 5 km/s of AV capability remaining. After ten years have passed (row three), 243
servicing requests have been made. However, each servicing vehicle has run out of fuel so it is
likely that some servicing requests have not have been satisfied. Each simulation terminates at
the end of the 10 th year (~122 30-day increments).
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lime: 0
Time=0 years (AV=7700 m/s for each servicing vehicle, 900 spacing)
#of tickets: 126 Time: 60
Time=-5 years (AV varies between 2 and 5 km/s for each servicing vehicle, variable spacing)
# of tickets: 243
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Time: 121.687
Time=10 years (AV-0 for each servicing vehicle, variable spacing)
Figure 4.4 Servicing Vehicle Evolution over Ten Years - Dashboard Snapshots of OOS Agent Model
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Two ten-year OOS campaigns in GEO are investigated. In the first campaign, servicing vehicles
use a constant number for phasing orbit revolutions (k=5). In the second campaign, the number
of phasing orbit revolutions for the servicing vehicle varies as a function of servicing ticket
urgency (k=5 for normal tickets, k=1 for urgent tickets). Since servicing tickets are issued
probabilistically; and, since AV expenditures and response time are functions of both the location
of the target satellite of the current servicing mission and the target satellite of the last servicing
mission, calculations in the agent model are path dependent. As such, a Monte Carlo analysis,
consisting of 1,000 runs of each servicing campaign, is performed to derive meaningful results.
The following two subsections explain the implications of the assumed k value(s) for their
respective servicing vehicles and then show the results of the Monte Carlo analyses. The
discussion is focused on two key "orbit serviceability" parameters: the availability of target
satellites in a particular orbital slot for mission operations (where availability between target
satellites is distinguished only by the response time of servicing vehicles) and the average AV
expenditure for OOS missions to a particular orbital slot (where AV expenditure is driven only
by the rendezvous activities).
4.2.4.1 Servicing Campaign #1 - Constant Response Time
250
0
200
100 -200
150
0 50 10
-100 '' 15 -100 -50
Target Satellite Slot (deg) 200 -200 Sericing Vehicle Slot (deg)
Figure 4.5 Distribution of AV Expenditures for Bi-Impulsive Phasing Maneuvers in GEO (k=5)
Figure 4.5 depicts the range of possible AV expenditures by servicing vehicles for bi-impulsive
phasing maneuvers (assuming five revolutions). When the target satellite leads in the orbit
(negative phase angle), the servicing vehicle must move into a lower orbit with a shorter period
to account for the initial time displacement (Figure 4.1). Maximum AV expenditures of -225
m/s occur when the servicing vehicle is displaced exactly 1800 from the target satellite. When
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the target satellite trails the servicing vehicle (positive phasing angle), the phasing orbit is made
higher than the target orbit to allow the target satellite to catch up.
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Figure 4.6 Target Satellite Availability (k=5)
Availability is defined as the percentage of the time in the simulation that a given satellite is able
to perform its operational mission. Satellites issue urgent servicing tickets (for repair, relocation,
or deployment assistance) when they are unable to perform their operational mission. Figure 4.6
displays the average availability for ten-degree clusters of GEO satellites over the course of
1,000 decade-long servicing campaigns. Availability is extremely high (around 0.9996%), and,
as observed by the horizontal shape of the scatter plot, relatively constant across GEO orbital
slots. Although more variation was expected, this result is not altogether surprising given the
small probability of urgent servicing tickets being issued and the fact that servicing operations
always succeed.
Figure 4.7 depicts the average AV expenditure for servicing missions to a particular orbital slot
for each of the 1,000 simulation runs. Only nonzero AV averages are plotted.3 Each vertical line
of points (marked with a unique color) represents the distribution of average AV expenditures for
one of the 335 GEO satellites included in the model. The spacing between vertical lines
indicates the varying density of GEO satellites (e.g., light concentration over the Pacific Ocean at
-160*) as depicted in Figure 4.3. Also evident in Figure 4.7 is the presence of numerous outliers
in each vertical distribution. While average AV expenditure values appear to be concentrated
starting at the lower limit (i.e., 50 m/s, the minimum given the assumed fixed cost of proximity
operations), a few average AV's are outliers with values as high as 280 m/s in some simulation
runs.
3 If an orbital slot was not serviced over the course of a run of the ten-year simulation, average AV expenditure
would be zero.
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Figure 4.8 Sample Distribution of Average AV Expenditure (GEO #150 at -.75")
Although Figure 4.7 contains lots of data, it is not useful for deriving general results. Further
distillation of the data is required to understand how AV expenditure for servicing missions
varies with respect to GEO orbital slot (if at all). However, one thing that Figure 4.7 does tell us
is that simply taking the mean value of each distribution would be misleading given the effect of
outliers on the high-end.
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Figure 4.9 Median AV Expenditure for Servicing Missions (k=5)
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Figure 4.9 plots the median AV expenditure for servicing missions in each GEO orbital slot. As
observed in the polar view, most GEO satellites are expected to cost servicing vehicles around 80
m/s for each mission. Unlike availability, AV expenditure is not constant around the belt as
North American values hover around 70 m/s with a spike to 95 m/s above the Pacific Ocean.
European AV expenditures are expected to be around 75 m/s, rising irregularly to around 85 m/s
in the Far East.
4.2.4.2 Servicing Campaign #2 - Variable Response Time
Performing a sensitivity analysis on the baseline provider architecture is important for
understanding the extent to which assumptions regarding the servicing vehicles impact the
serviceability results. Since the principal trade in the servicing architecture is between transfer
time and AV efficiency, the number of allowed phasing orbit revolutions is treated as a
parameter as a means to assess its impact on the relative performance of satellites in the
serviceability metrics (i.e., availability and AV expenditure per servicing mission).
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Figure 4.10 Distribution of AV Expenditures for Bi-Impulsive Phasing Maneuvers in GEO (k=1)
In contrast to the first servicing campaign in which k was assumed to be five across all servicing
tickets, the number of phasing orbit revolutions for the servicing vehicle in the second campaign
varies as a function of servicing ticket urgency (k=5 for normal tickets, k=1 for urgent tickets).
Figure 4.10 depicts the range of possible AV expenditures by servicing vehicles for bi-impulsive
phasing maneuvers in the case of k=l. Maximum AV expenditures of -2 km/s occur when the
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servicing vehicle is displaced exactly 1804 from the target satellite. These maximum AV
expenditures are almost an order of magnitude greater than those in the case of k=5 (Figure 4.5).
Figure 4.11 displays the average availability for ten-degree clusters of GEO satellites over the
full set of Monte Carlo runs. As in the first servicing campaign, availability is very high (around
0.998%) and effectively constant across GEO orbital slots. Although availability values are very
high in Figure 4.11, they do not reach the extreme values of approximately 0.9996% observed in
Figure 4.6. This is counterintuitive because a servicing architecture that rapidly responds to
urgent tickets (which are generated when a target satellite is down) might be expected to achieve
a higher availability than a servicing architecture which has a constant, slower response time.
However, this outcome is an artifact of inactivity of servicing vehicles in the simulated time
window. In the first campaign, servicing vehicles would typically retain around 2 km/s of AV
capability after ten years of operation. In the second campaign, servicing vehicles frequently run
out of fuel. In the case that all four vehicles lose operational capability, servicing tickets
accumulate and target satellites remain down for the remainder of the simulation.4
-150 -100 -50 0
Orbital Slot (deg)
50 100 150
Figure 4.11 Target Satellite Availability (variable k)
Figure 4.12 depicts the average AV expenditure for servicing missions to a particular orbital slot
for each of the Monte Carlo runs. As before, only nonzero AV averages are plotted. Average
AV expenditures again appear to be concentrated starting at the lower limit. What distinguishes
Figure 4.12 from the associated Figure 4.7 (from the first servicing campaign) is the magnitude
of the numerous vertical outliers across the GEO slots. While average AV outliers in the first
4 Once a single servicing vehicle becomes inoperable, it not only adds to the number of missions for other servicing
vehicles, increasing the rate of fuel consumption, but also raises average AV expenditures for each mission due to an
increase in the average magnitude of the phasing angles.
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campaign have values as high as 280 m/s, average AV outliers for some simulations in the
second campaign reach 2300 m/s. The impact of rapid response times for urgent servicing
requests (reducing mean transit time from approximately 5 days to around 24 hours) lowers fuel
efficiency by around 88% for the most extreme missions.
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Figure 4.12 Average AV Expenditure for Servicing Missions in Each Simulation Run (variable k)
Figure 4.13 plots the median AV expenditure for servicing missions in each GEO orbital slot. As
observed in the polar view, most GEO satellites are expected to cost servicing vehicles around
100 m/s for each mission, an increase of approximately 20 m/s from Figure 4.9. Again, AV
expenditure varies between target satellites as a function of orbital slot. North American values
constitute the minimum median AV expenditure at approximately 85 m/s. GEO slots are most
costly above the Pacific Ocean with AV expenditures at 120 m/s. European AV expenditures are
expected to be around 90 m/s, rising irregularly to around 100 m/s in the Far East. An important
outcome of Figure 4.13 is that the general trend of AV expenditure for servicing missions to
particular orbital slots is the same as in Figure 4.9. This allows statements to be made about the
serviceability of target satellites independent of the servicing architecture. Another interesting
outcome of Figure 4.13 is the roughly 25% increase in AV expenditure across orbital slots from
the first servicing campaign. Given that approximately 25% of servicing tickets are urgent
(Table 4.1), this suggests that reducing the number of allowed phasing revolutions from five to
one roughly doubles the required AV expenditure for a typical servicing mission.
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4.2.5 Discussion
Many interesting lessons emerged from the agent-based model of OOS with implications for
both serviceability assessments of target satellites and servicing provider architecture. Most
fundamentally, the high availability of GEO satellites in the model (Figure 4.6, Figure 4.11)
suggests that satellites work too well to stress a simple OOS system. Even in the first simulation
with the intermediate response time, servicing vehicle availability exceeded 90%. This means
that servicing provider utilization could have increased by an order of magnitude and there still
would be overcapacity in terms of what four servicing vehicles can do at a given point in time.
The probability of two or more servicing vehicles conducting servicing missions simultaneously
was less than 1%. Underscoring this high availability of servicing vehicles is the fact that all
servicing opportunities in the model initiated servicing tickets. Although the GEO servicing is
the most lucrative with a high concentration of valuable spacecraft and friendly orbital dynamics,
satellites launched over the past two decades are simply designed too well to stress a simple
servicing system.
While availability is not a good metric for distinguishing between orbital slots, Figure 4.14 and
Figure 4.15 illustrate that AV expenditure for servicing missions does vary across the GEO belt
as a function of the concentration of other target satellites (note that the magnitude of the rose
petals of satellite concentration in Figure 4.15 are increased by a factor of three so as to be
visible along the m/s axis). By subjecting the baseline OOS system to sensitivity analysis, the
value of the AV expenditure metric for performing serviceability assessments-independent of
provider architecture-is affirmed given that varying response times does not affect the relative
performance of the GEO slots.
92
120r-------------
100k--
80 F
60 F
-- - - I
I-,
40 F- -
20 F
0
-200 -150
-- - - - - -
- -I I
-- 
- - - - - - - - - -
Ii
I I
-I--
I\ I
I Ix
I '~
I I I
-100 -50 0 50 100 150 200
' --I
Figure 4.14 Histogram of Median AV Expenditure for Both Servicing Campaigns
0 900 0IV I 7
-1050 -900 -750
Figure 4.15 AV Expenditure for Both Servicing Campaigns with GEO Satellite Density
93
4.3 Framework for Conducting Serviceability Assessments
This section lays the theoretical foundation for a generalized framework for conducting on-orbit
serviceability assessments. Other industries that perform remote servicing operations are
surveyed as means to gather ideas for the construction of this framework. Having extracted
lessons learned from servicing offshore oil platforms, knowledge, scale, precision, and timing are
proposed as four elements for characterizing the complexity of servicing operations.
4.3.1 Lessons from Servicing Offshore Oil Platforms
After discussing the general problem of robotic servicing in high-risk environments, offshore oil
platform maintenance activities are reviewed as a case study in the remote servicing of complex
systems. The purpose of this investigation is to extract lessons from a well-established field
which may be applied towards a general framework of serviceability.
4.3.1.1 Robotic Servicing in High-Risk Environments
Remote intervention in hostile environments is not a problem limited to the OOS domain. From
deep-sea exploration and nuclear-reactor servicing (de Peuter, et al., 1994) to toxic waste clean-
up and improvised explosive device detection and removal in Iraq, remotely-controlled machines
are employed in a variety of risky environments to limit losses to human life. As a first step in
developing a framework for comparing the serviceability of satellite bus designs to OOS, lessons
may be extracted from other servicing operations conducted by machines in harsh environments.
Five criteria inform the applicability of other servicing missions to assessing on-orbit
serviceability. First, the system to be serviced must be complex and technologically enabled.
Second, the system must be difficult to access and characterized by limited servicing
opportunities. Third, the system must operate in a harsh environment and be subjected to
component wear-out and degradation. Fourth, the system should operate over a period spanning
years or decades. Fifth, the system should constitute critical infrastructure to the decision makers
for the servicing operation. Off-shore oil platform maintenance meets all these criteria and is
used in this analysis.
4.3.1.2 Overview of Offshore Oil Platforms
Offshore drilling operations extract oil and natural gas from beneath the ocean floor. Platforms
are usually located on the continental shelf and may be attached to the ocean floor, to artificial
island, or be floating. Typical platforms have thirty wellheads located on the platform and
directional (or slant) drilling allows reservoirs to be accessed at positions up to 5 miles from the
platform. Components in the oil/gas production process include wellheads, production
manifolds, production separators, gas compressors, water injection pumps, metering equipment,
and pumps. Most platforms are self-sufficient in energy and water needs with electrical
generation and water desalination capabilities. Minimizing environmental impact and
minimizing EOL disposal cost are both drivers in offshore oil platform design (disposal costs are
measured in the tens of millions of dollars) (Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology,
1995). Off-shore drilling operations are supported by platform supply vessels during normal
operations, emergency support vessels for unexpected contingencies, and anchor handling tug
supply vessels which assist in a variety of functions including supply, towing, and emergency
operations (i.e., rescue and firefighting).
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4.3.1.3 Servicing Operations
The key actors in any offshore oil platform servicing operation are the oil platform, remotely
operated vehicles (ROV) which support maintenance and repair activities, and associated drilling
infrastructure (e.g., pipeline). As such, an understanding of serviceability necessitates an
analysis of the way in which servicing operations are initiated, how servicing operations are
conducted, and the associated context (e.g., temporal constraints).
ROV servicing operations fall into two categories: scheduled and unscheduled. According to Dr.
Robert Perrons of Shell International, servicing frequency schedules are derived from the
extensive repositories of maintenance data complied by companies over the decades. "We know
how often a pump breaks down, and how many years a length of pipe should last
because.. .we've been extracting oil and gas from the North Sea since the 1970s. There's a
statistic for pretty much every event you care to mention: how often people sprain an ankle, how
often the waves rise above 30 feet, how quickly a pipe corrodes in a particular environment,
etc." Rather than basing maintenance schedules on first principles, oil companies use statistical
precedents as a starting point for establishing servicing policy. Dr. Perrons further explains how
servicing schedules are implemented:
For the most part, maintenance is handled by fairly rigorous schedules. On a Shell U.K. offshore platform,
a computer automatically issues "job cards" that trigger a servicing or maintenance procedure on a
particular component. Example: "It's now time for the annual non-destructive inspection of this section of
pipe via x-ray to determine if there are any cracks forming inside of it." A procedure and checklist is then
automatically issued, and the relevant operators are given specific instructions as to how they should tackle
this problem. Any problems that arise are dealt with after this.
Servicing operations are also conducted as unscheduled activities. In this case, ROV servicing
operations may be initiated when on-board health monitoring equipment indicates failed or
failing components. A variety of sensors characterize the state of offshore oil platforms. These
may be broken into two categories: sensors for monitoring the extraction process (i.e.,
components that actually contain oil, gas, and water) and sensors for monitoring the structural
integrity of the platform. In general, three pieces of information characterize the majority of
segments in the extraction process: temperature, pressure, and flow rate. Pressure sensors are the
first line of defense for monitoring the extraction process as pressure drops may indicate leaks.
"Corrosion coupons" are also used as health monitoring equipment in flow lines. As sacrificial
metal strips that are made of the same material as the flow line itself, corrosion coupons are
inserted into flow lines and regularly removed and analyzed to assess the rate of corrosion
occurring within the pipeline. Another method for monitoring the health of the systems involved
in the extraction process is non-destructive testing (NDT). This method employs x-rays, eddy
currents, and ultrasonic techniques to assess the integrity of pipes and load-bearing members
without removing them.
The other major facet of offshore oil platform health is the integrity of the components not
directly involved in extraction (i.e., structure that holds up the platform and keeps everything in
place). The ocean is a harsh environment with salt water continuously corroding steel
components. Given that the construction of entire platforms out of stainless steel to prevent
rusting is not economical, expensive materials are reserved for more critical or precise
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components for which corrosion isn't an option. While NDT may be employed for assessing the
non-process components of oil platforms, visual inspection is the primary means by which
structural health is monitored.
(a) Seaeye Falcon (b) Seaeye Panther Plus
The Seaeye Falcon (a) is a portable ROV weighing only 50 kg and rated to 300 meters depth. A wide range of
standard tools and accessories can be fitted for survey applications in coastal and inshore waterways. The Seaeye
Panther Plus (b) is a medium-work class ROV for survey and drill support operations. It designed for strong currents
and depths of up to 1000 meters.
Figure 4.16 Remotely Operated Vehicles for Oil Platform Servicing (Photo Credit: Seaeye Marine Limited)
Remotely operated vehicles also support offshore servicing operations. Depending on the
servicing operation, there is a wide range of ROV services available to offshore oil platform
operators (Figure 4.16). There are a myriad of companies making ROV for underwater
applications ranging from small ROVs that fit inside a suitcase for visual inspections to large
ROVs for manipulating steel pipes on the sea floor. (Oil companies typically do not own ROVs
for underwater servicing. These are usually procured from independent vendors who transport
and operate the equipment.) Functionally, ROVs are capable of drill support, well workovers,5
structural inspections, site surveys, pipeline inspections (visual and NDT), pipeline maintenance,
and submerged construction.
4.3.1.4 Synthesis
In generalizing offshore oil platform servicing operations, determining the frequency of servicing
events is a primary step. This is accomplished by monitoring how the state of the system evolves
over time through a combination of historical data and health monitoring equipment. With a
5 A "workover" is any one of a broad range of operations on a producing well to restore or increase production. A
workover may be performed to stimulate the well, remove sand or wax from the well bore, mechanically repair the
well, or address other issues.
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range of platform supply vessels and emergency support vessels available to conduct servicing
operations, it is also necessary to determine the size and precision required of the servicing
mission in order to deploy robotic vehicles with an appropriate range of capability.
4.3.2 Generalized Framework for Assessing System Serviceability
A four-element framework of serviceability is proposed (Table 4.2) as a means to assess the
probability of success of a servicing mission: knowledge (K), scale (S), precision (P), and timing
(T). Scale and precision represent the size and accuracy required in the spatial domain while
timing captures the temporal characteristics of the servicing mission. Knowledge is critical as
information regarding the state of the system defines a finite range of servicing scale, precision,
and timing requirements.
Table 4.2 Serviceability Framework Definitions
Four Elements of Serviceability I I Four Servicing Activities (p)
Within this framework, serviceability is a function of sixteen parameters as each element is
decomposed by the set of four servicing activities. For example, K2 represents the quality of
information regarding the system to be serviced for planning the docking activity.
Serviceability = f (K ,S , T ) (4-17)
Implicit in the serviceability framework is the assumption that serviceability is a subjective
definition (e.g., as technology matures, serviceability of a system increases). Given the difficulty
in divorcing the question of system serviceability from the capabilities of the servicing system, it
is necessary to incorporate both into the framework.
One way to proceed is to consider the question of serviceability as a relationship between the
range of the servicing vehicle's capabilities and the range of the system's potential states. Suh
(2005) provides a theoretical foundation for this form of analysis in axiomatic design by defining
functional requirements (e.g., dock with satellite) within a specified range (e.g., robotic arm end
effector position accuracy of 0.2 to 0.4 mm/0. 1). There is uncertainty of satisfying a functional
requirement within the specified accuracy or tolerance because the range of potential system
states (represented as a probability density function in Figure 4.17) may not fully overlap with
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(K) Quality of information
Knowledge regarding state of system
(S) Size of the task to be
Scale performed(spatial domain)
Accuracy level required for
success
Precision (spatial domain)
Time constraints required of
Timing servicing architecture(temporal domain)
(1) Movement of servicing
Rendezvous vehicle from starting positionRendevousto target vicinity
(2) Transfer of servicing vehicle
Acquire from vicinity to holding oftarget
3) Deployment of servicing
tools from stowed position toAccess area of interest of target
(4) Operation of deployed
Servioe servicer components forsystem improvement
the accuracy or design range of the function provider (e.g., robotic servicer). A functional
requirement is only satisfied when the system range is within the design range, an area Suh refers
to as the common range.
Figure 4.17 Probability Density Function of a Functional Requirement (Suh, 2005)
Applied to servicing, Suh's theory of relative complexities holds that when the system range is
completely within the design range of the servicing vehicle, complexity is zero and the
probability of success of the servicing mission is 100%. When the system range and design
range do not overlap, complexity is infinite and the probability of servicing mission success is
zero. If the system range partially overlaps the design range, the probability of success is finite.
Suh's theory may be incorporated into the serviceability framework by considering each
servicing activity as a functional requirement and calculating the common range between system
state and servicer capability.
Temporal
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Figure 4.18 Dimensions of Servicing Mission Complexity
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Figure 4.18 illustrates the temporal and spatial dimensions of a servicing mission and how the
serviceability elements inform the system range in each dimension. Timing and scale are the
temporal and spatial anchors, respectively. Each defines the target functional requirement (e.g.,
refuel 200 m/s worth of fuel every four years). Precision refers to the tolerances of the system to
deviations from this target functional requirement (e.g. within 10 m/s and within three months).
Knowledge bounds the distribution of the system range along both axes from the perspective of
the servicing provider. Without knowledge of the system, its range of potential states is
unbounded and the common range with the servicing vehicle's design range is low.
4.4 Applying Framework to On-Orbit Servicing
This section surveys candidate serviceability metrics before selecting specific metrics for each
serviceability parameter. These metrics are then mapped to the high level OOS functions
identified in Chapter 1-inspect, relocate, restore, augment, and assemble.
4.4.1 Serviceability Metrics
The following four sections propose qualitative and quantitative methods for defining the
serviceability elements across each servicing activity.
4.4.1.1 Knowledge
Knowledge is the element of serviceability representing the quality of information on the state of
the system. Applied to OOS, knowledge is best described as the availability and extent of
satellite design data and current telemetry. The knowledge available to a servicing provider is a
driver for the amount of adaptable (as opposed to scripted) behavior required by the servicing
vehicle. For example, the servicing vehicle and target satellite included on Japanese ETS-VII
(Section 2.1.6.1) were designed to demonstrate autonomous rendezvous and docking. The
sophistication of a servicing vehicle with analogous capabilities (but designed for a mission with
less available knowledge on the system to be serviced, e.g., removing unidentified pieces of
orbital debris) would need to incorporate additional adaptable behavior. The lack of information
necessitates adaptable behavior. There are three elements of an adaptable servicing architecture:
information gathering (e.g., design data from manufacturer, telemetry, ground-based sensing, in-
situ inspection, on-board sensing), decision-making (telerobotic or autonomous), and execution.
Perfect information allows for scripted behavior in which case the servicing architecture only is
required to execute pre-planned activities.
[K1] Knowledge for OOS rendezvous activities is high across all satellites given space
situational awareness capabilities. For example, the position of a satellite at
geosynchronous altitude can be determined from the ground to within 24 km in the along-
track direction, 17 km in the cross-track direction, and 2.6 km in range (Settelmeyer,
1997). If telemetry is available to supplement ground-based sensing or relative GPS, the
orbital elements and orientation of the spacecraft may be determined to identify any
constraints on proximity operations (e.g., axis of rotation for a tumbling satellite). Given
these two cases (i.e., telemetry or no telemetry), [K'] may be treated as a binary
serviceability parameter. [K1] may be boosted with proximity inspections.
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* [K2] Knowledge for docking activities is defined as the accuracy of data available to the
servicing provider on the external structure of the target satellite. For example,
knowledge of the structure of the apogee boost motor (as a first 'hook for temporary
stabilization) and the launcher interface ring docking (for rigid attachment) would enable
a servicing provider to incorporate docking mechanisms tailored for target satellites. Key
factors in the analysis of docking performance include mass properties of the vehicles;
initial lateral and angular misalignments; approach, lateral, and angular relative
velocities; contact friction; contact damping; capture mechanism stiffness properties;
capture mechanism damping properties; and contact geometry (Ma, et al., 2002). High
levels of [K2] may improve docking performance as capture mechanism stiffness
properties, capture mechanism damping properties, and contact geometry are under the
control of the docking designer. Based on whether the servicing provider knows the
satellite bus type, [K2] may be treated as a binary serviceability parameter. As with [Ki],
[K2] may be boosted with proximity inspections.
[ K3] Knowledge for the access servicing activity is defined as the accuracy of data
available on the structure of the target satellite leading to the components requiring
servicing. [K3] includes knowledge on internal composition which may not be boosted
by proximity inspections. Although manageable for adaptable servicing architectures,
low [K3] may cripple autonomous servicing as bent connector pins or even sagging
insulation (blocking visibility) may disrupt scripted o Perations. A subjective measure
such as Likert scales are probably needed to assess [K ]. Discrete levels of [K3] do not
exist as [K3] is a function of several factors including the extent of available satellite
design data, the extent of internal sensors, configuration control during assembly, level of
vibrations and shocks experienced during launch, and cumulative damage sustained while
exposed to the space environment (e.g., distortion due to thermal cycling).
* [K4] Knowledge of the condition of the satellite components to be serviced (e.g.,
payload, consumables) will be high if sensors are monitoring these items. (Degradation
of supporting spacecraft infrastructure may be more difficult to measure; however, these
components on the satellite are less likely to be serviced). Reliability analysis with
empirical data may supplement telemetry sets. The best quantitative metric for [K4] is
probably the number of telemetry points monitored. It may be possible to boost [K4] with
proximity inspections.
4.4.1.2 Scale
Scale is the element of serviceability representing the size of the servicing task. Applied to OOS,
scale is measured in different ways depending on the particular OOS activity be measured.
" [S'] The scale of the rendezvous servicing activity is a function of the starting position of
the servicing vehicle and the orbit of the target satellite. Quantity of required changes in
the servicing vehicle's velocity vector is the best metric for assessing [S']. Modeling [S]
is the subject of Section 4.2 and is not further addressed here.
e [S2] The scale of the docking servicing activity drives the required capability of the
docking subsystem of the servicing vehicle. Target satellite metrics for assessing [S2]
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may be the satellite mass, the principal moments of inertia, and the contact friction
coefficient (Table 4.3).
Table 4.3 Conditions and Parameters for Docking (Ma, 2002)
Parameter Value(s)
Target spacecraft imass and 50 to 3000 kg
principal inoients of inertia 1. 5 to 1000 kg.in
Chaser spacecraft inass and 500 to 9000 kg
principal moments of inertia 50 to 2000 kgmuf
Lateral misalignment at contact 0.05 in
Roll inisaliginnent at contact 5 deg
Tilt (pitch + yaw) inisaliginient 5 deg
at contact
Approaching speed 0.03 to 0.05 in s
Lateral dlrifting rates 0.005 in s
Roll drifting rate 0.25 deg S
Tilt (pitch + yaw) drifting rate 0.25 deg s
Contact friction coefficient 0 to 0.3
e [S3 ] The scale of the access servicing activity is defined as the distance between the
docking location and the repair zone on the target satellite. [S3] is a major driver of
serviceability in GEO where the spacecraft subsystems likely to be serviced (payloads
and antennae) are located on the Earth-pointing side of the satellite (five meters from
projected docking locations on the back end of the spacecraft).
* [S4] Servicing scale may be measured as the number of unique tasks to be performed.
Serviceable spacecraft may incorporate modularity and commonality to enable functional
periodicity, limiting the number of unique servicing tasks and the associated level of
complexity required in the servicing vehicle. Other possible metrics for servicing scale
are the mass and cost of the components being delivered or repaired.
4.4.1.3 Precision
Precision is the element of serviceability representing the accuracy level required of servicing
tasks. Applied to OOS, precision is defined as the permitted tolerances for robotic operations in
each activity.
e [P ] Rendezvous precision is required during proximity operations near the target
satellite (e.g., approaches for docking, circumvention and hovering for damage
assessment) to maintain proper relative position and orientation and to avoid thruster
plume impingement. According to Wertz and Bell (2003), thruster plume impingement
can damage sensitive optics, disturb thermal blankets and coating, and also impart large
disturbance torques.6 A possible proxy metric for assessing satellite sensitivity to thruster
plume impingement (and hence [P1]) is the satellite mission area with astronomical and
6 "The plume is likely to hit deployables and appendages such as the end of the solar array that can be a long way
from the center of mass. With the long moment arm, even small forces can provide significant torque that can
disturb or even tumble the target vehicle. This, in turn, can cause either thruster firings or a direct collision that
could damage either or both spacecraft. When expanding into a vacuum, the thruster plume will have a component
90 deg or more from the line of thrust."
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earth-sensing spacecraft requiring higher [P'] than communications and navigation
satellites.
* [P2] Docking precision specifies the permitted tolerances for aligning the position and
attitude of the servicing vehicle and target satellite. Table 4.4 specifies attributes of
DARPA's Orbital Express docking system, including angular capture misalignment
tolerances. Metrics for [P2] include the relative position and attitude accuracy required of
the robotic servicing vehicle (e.g., ±5 cm and ±2 degrees, respectively. Due to time lags
in supporting communications infrastructure, autonomous docking is typically required of
robotic servicing vehicles. Another element of [P2] is the combined spacecraft attitude
control problem. Once docked, the two spacecraft have a combined moment of inertia
and center of mass different from each separate spacecraft. Cargo or fuel transfer may
further change attitude control properties over time. As performed on the Cassini
mission, calibration firings may be performed whereby thrusters are fired on the new
combined spacecraft and the new mass properties are determined based on responses
measured by on-board gyros (Wertz and Bell, 2003).7
Table 4.4 Orbital Express Docking System Requirements (Stamm and Motaghedi, 2004)
Parameter Value
Axial Capture Distance: 6 inches
Angular Capture Misalignment Tolerance
Pitch/Yaw +/-5 degrees
Roll +1-5 degrees
Lateral Misalignment Tolerance*: +/- 2 inches
Linear Contact Velocity Tolerance*: 3 cm/s
Preload: 2500 lbf
Capture Time: < 10 s
Capture and Latch Time: < 240 s
Interface Outer Diameter: < 18 inches
Active Mass: < 50 lbs
Passive Mass < 25 lbs
e [P 3] Access precision specifies the permitted tolerances for transferring the servicing
tools to the area of interest on the target satellite. Possible robotic concepts for
accomplishing this include a large crane concept, a micro-macro manipulator, and
innovative concepts such as truss-building robots (de Peuter, et al., 1995). The large
crane concept may be able directly to access the repair zone but suffers from low
precision (on the order of centimeters) and poor local dexterity. The micro-macro
manipulator is effective but requires a large mass budget. One method for assessing [P3]
is to categorize the location of the area of interest in terms of degree of integration. Three
categories might be (1) externally mounted, (2) inside two layers of access doors, and (3)
fully integrated and inaccessible. However, given the continuum across the range of
possible component locations, a Likert scale is more appropriate.
7 Thruster plume impingement remains a concern because control anomalies or tumbling may occur if thrusters
from either of the spacecraft face appendages from the other (Wertz and Bell, 2003).
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e [P4] Service precision refers to the ability to add value to the components requiring
replacement or repair. [P4] assessments may be informed by the degree of component
integration. The Spacecraft Modular Architecture Design Study (Section 2.4.1.5) was
conducted in 1999 and included an analysis of the replacement potential of satellite
components. Collecting data on redundancy, reliability, weight, power, physical location,
and electrical architecture, the replaceability of various satellite components was
categorized. Table 4.5 documents some of the results with replaceability categories: (A)
no design modifications required, (B1) minor design modifications required, (B2) major
design modifications required. As with [P3], [P4] has a wide range of states and is best
assessed with a Likert scale.
Table 4.5 Practically Replaceable Satellite Components (Reynerson, 1999)
Component Name Replaceability Category
Intertial Reference Unit A
Direct Down Link A
Three Axis Magnetometer Sensor B1
Star Tracker B1
Reaction Wheel B1
Electromagnetic Torque Rods B1
GPS Receiver B1
Payload Electronics B1
Gimbal Control Electronics B2
Digital Sun Sensor Electronics B2
Three Axis Magnetometer Electronics B2
Drive Control Units B2
Power Distribution Unit B2
Batteries B2
Command Auto-Track Receiver B2
Encoder Modulator Unit B2
4.4.1.4 Timing
Timing is the element of serviceability representing the temporal
architecture.
constraints for the servicing
e [T'] Rendezvous timing represents the duration and time constraints
vehicles in-transit to target satellites. For example, rescue missions may
windows of opportunity. Modeling [T'] is the subject of Section 4.2 (e.g.,
time) and is not further addressed here.
on servicing
have limited
phasing wait
e [T2] Acquire timing captures any time constraints which may exist for the docking
activity. Timing requirements have been specified for servicing vehicles (e.g., < 10
seconds) but it is not clear how this might inform serviceability assessments of the target
satellite. [T2] may be related to limited windows of opportunity for docking operations
and to the question of satellite downtime while the servicing vehicle is docked.
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" [T 3] Access timing is the duration of transporting the servicing tools to the area of
interest on the target satellite. [T3] is related to the issue of satellite downtime while the
servicing vehicle is docked. Key potential OOS customers (e.g., national security
systems, direct broadcast) are strongly averse to satellite downtime.
* [T4] Service timing is the duration of the value-added activities. Servicing activities may
be time-critical, such as the need to replace the Hubble Space Telescope's gyroscopes
before science operations are paused (projected September 2007) and Hubble's batteries
before irreversible damage is sustained in the optical assembly due to thermal instability
(projected May 2011) (Figure 2.5). Dynamic serviceability assessments are the focus of
Chapter 5.
4.4.2 Mapping Metrics to Servicing Functions
Table 4.6 summarizes the previous section with a top-level view of serviceability parameters and
associated metrics for on-orbit serviceability assessments. As observed, metrics are qualitative
and quantitative with relative and absolute values.
Table 4.6 Metrics for Serviceability Assessments
Label Parameter Names Metric for Satellite Servicing Unit
K1 Rendezvous knowledge position/attitude telemetry binary (yes/no)
K2 Acquire knowledge bus type binary (yes/no)
K3 Access knowledge structure and composition (evolved) Likert scale
K4 Service knowledge telemetry points monitored number
S1 Rendezvous scale delta-v m/s
S2 Acquire scale principal moments of inertia kg-m2
S3 Access scale distance between docking and service zones m
S4 Service scale unique servicing tasks number
P1 Rendezvous precision mission area discrete categories
P2 Acquire precision angular misalignment tolerance degree
P3 Access precision service zone integration Likert scale
P4 Service precision component integration Likert scale
T1 Rendezvous timing phasing and transfer duration time
T2 Acquire timing window of opportunity time
T3 Access timing permitted satellite downtime time
T4 Service timing projected failures, value-added duration time
Table 4.7 identifies the serviceability metrics to be used as input parameters for calculating the
complexity of each OOS function. Each row informs the development of a unique serviceability
function for each servicing function with a subset of relevant serviceability metrics.
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Table 4.7 Mapping Satellite Serviceability Metrics to OOS Functions
Knowledge Scale Precision Timing
K1 K2 K3 K4 S1 S2 S3 S4 P1 P2 P3 P4 TI T2 T3 T4
Inspect X X X X X X X
Relocate X X X X X X X X X X
Restore X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Augment X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Assemble X X X X X X X X X X X X
4.4.2.1 Inspect
Seven serviceability parameters were identified for the inspection function, the observation of a
space object from an attached position or a remote surveillance vehicle. The availability of
telemetry, AV expenditures, mission area (servicing as a proxy for the sensitivity of the satellite
to thruster plume impingement), and phasing and transfer durations are fundamental (knowledge)
parameters of serviceability across all OOS functions. The number of required inspection tasks
is also relevant (e.g. in-track "hovering" requires no thrusting while any other position requires
continuous thrust). Additionally, the level of integration of the areas of interest is related to the
visibility of that area for the inspection function. Finally, permitted satellite downtime informs
constraints on the inspection function (e.g., circumnavigation around the Earth-pointing side of a
GEO communications satellite will not be possible if transponders are left on).
4.4.2.2 Relocate
Ten serviceability parameters were identified for the relocate function, the modification of the
orbit of a space object. In addition to the four fundamental parameters of serviceability, four
serviceability parameters inform the complexity of docking operations: target satellite bus type,
principal moments of inertia, permitted angular misalignment tolerance for capture, and docking
timing constraints. Permitted satellite downtime is relevant as it informs the trade between the
duration of transfer orbits and AV efficiency.
4.4.2.3 Restore
The restore function, returning a satellite to a previous state (or intended state), may require a
wide range of servicing vehicle activities. Restoration activities include refueling for lifetime
extension and maneuverable spacecraft, docking and providing stationkeeping to extend mission
life, repairing or replacing faulty hardware, and deploying appendages which fail to reach
operational orientations at BOL. Therefore, the full set of serviceability parameters is required.
Using the relocate OOS function as a baseline, additional parameters are required, including
knowledge of the internal state of the satellite, the number of telemetry points monitored, the
distance between the docking and service zones, and the number of unique servicing tasks for the
robotic vehicle. The level of integration of the service zone and components of interest are also
relevant serviceability parameters.
105
4.4.2.4 Augment
The augment OOS function, increasing the capability of a satellite, consists of replacing or
adding hardware to improve spacecraft performance. As with the restore function, augment
complexity is informed by all sixteen serviceability metrics (Table 4.6).
4.4.2.5 Assemble
The assemble OOS function, mating modules, involves complex robotic operations. The
primary difference between restore and augment is that servicing activities only occur around
modules, not within. Therefore, knowledge of the internal satellite structure (e.g., internal health
monitoring telemetry, level of component) is not essential.
4.5 Synthesis
Developed in this chapter is a methodology for assessing both "orbit serviceability" (i.e.,
rendezvous activity) and "satellite bus serviceability" (i.e., acquire, access, and service
activities). To assess orbit serviceability, an agent-based model of target satellites and servicing
vehicles was developed in which OOS is treated as a multi-variable optimization problem with
the principal trade of minimizing both AV expenditures and transfer time. This model was
applied to the GEO belt with satellite failure behavior based on empirical data (Sullivan, 2005).
It was found that, while availability is not a good metric for distinguishing between orbital slots,
AV expenditure for servicing missions does vary across the GEO belt as a function of the
concentration of other target satellites (e.g., satellites in GSO above North America were found
to be approximately 25% less expensive in terms of fuel than satellites above the Pacific). It
was also found that AV expenditure was largely driven by response time (e.g., up to an order of
magnitude increase in fuel utilization in GEO when switching from the baseline intermediate
response time to urgent response). To validate the "orbit serviceability" assessments, it was
necessary to show that relative performance of orbital slots does not vary as a function of the
assumed servicing provider architecture. Therefore, the concept-of-operations of the servicing
provider was subjected to sensitivity analysis, and it was found that varying response times does
not affect the relative performance of the GEO slots in terms of the AV serviceability metric.
In contrast to LEO satellites for which the high propulsive cost of maneuvering severely limits
the number of target satellites which may be serviced, GEO orbital dynamics are relatively
friendly with a concentration of high-value satellites in GSO. In terms of "orbit serviceability,"
physical amenability for GEO target satellites is high. With approximately 25 servicing
opportunities in GEO each year, an OOS architecture consisting of four servicing vehicles
parked in GEO is able to maneuver to virtually all satellites requiring servicing over the course
of a decade. The high availability of satellites in the model suggests that satellites are too
reliable to stress an OOS system. Servicing provider utilization could have increased by an order
of magnitude, and there still would be overcapacity in terms of what four servicing vehicles can
do (e.g., the probability of two or more servicing vehicles conducting servicing missions
simultaneously was less than 1%). As such, future work is needed to explore the trade between
redundant, highly reliable space systems (current paradigm), and lower cost, less redundant
systems that utilize an OOS system to achieve similar reliability.
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Having focused on "orbit serviceability" in the first half of Chapter 4, a generalized framework
for conducting serviceability assessments was developed. Based in part on lessons extracted
from maintaining offshore oil platforms, the framework decomposed servicing mission
complexity into four elements: knowledge (K) of the state of the target system, scale (S) and
precision (P) required of the servicing operations, and timing (T) characteristics or constraints
imposed on servicing operations. By further decomposing servicing missions into four sets of
activities, sixteen serviceability parameters were proposed. The framework was then applied to
the OOS domain by identifying metrics which characterize the performance of satellite bus
attributes for each serviceability parameter. However, in contrast to "orbit serviceability"
assessments which were performed across all operational GEO satellites, serviceability
assessments at the satellite bus level cannot be performed for large numbers of spacecraft
simultaneously due to the lack of comprehensive data on detailed satellite bus attributes.
Therefore, it is deemed necessary to perform case studies of individual spacecraft to conduct
"satellite bus serviceability" assessments. Chapter 5 builds on the serviceability framework
developed here by analyzing how architecture frameworks might be used as a tool for assessing
serviceability at the satellite bus level.
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5 Development of a Dynamic Servicing Architecture Model
The goal of this chapter is to explore the value of architecture frameworks for conducting
serviceability assessments.' The primary questions addressed in this chapter are:
* How can architecture frameworks inform dynamic serviceability assessments?
o What forms of architecture description exist to expand the scope of OOS
understanding to both the physical and functional domains?
o Can static representations of space systems in the Department of Defense
Architecture Framework be extended to incorporate time as a dimension in
serviceability assessments?
Initially, architecture frameworks are introduced and illustrated as tools for managing space
system complexity and tracking the state of satellites over time. Upon selecting the U.S.
Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) for describing space systems,
desirable attributes of architecture framework development tools are identified and industry-
leading software applications are surveyed. CORE* a systems engineering modeling language
with the ability to create executable models, is then applied to the construction of a high-level
DoDAF representation of the Hubble Space Telescope.
The value of the DoDAF and CORE software for conducting serviceability assessments is
explored through the development of a discrete event simulation of Hubble servicing missions.
Having investigated the temporal dimension of servicing in Chapter 4 for only the rendezvous
OOS activity with a servicing simulation based on orbital transfers, the simulation described in
this chapter incorporates all four OOS activities-rendezvous, acquire, access, and service-in a
single executable model. In particular, a multi-year servicing campaign is modeled for Hubble,
including behavioral threads that characterize the Orbiting Observatory, servicing architecture,
and science customers. Preliminary results indicate that, when coupled with an executable
model, the Department of Defense Architecture Framework can be utilized for dynamic
quantitative evaluation of space system servicing architectures. The chapter concludes with
lessons learned from constructing the Hubble DoDAF and the executable model. Ideas are
offered for improving the DoDAF as are prescriptive considerations for users and developers of
architecture frameworks.
5.1 Overview of Architecture Frameworks
Architecture frameworks are tools for managing complexity by establishing standards for the
description of architectures. These standards define the system to be characterized as well as
how the system is to be constructed and operated. Architecture frameworks serve as a
communication tool by presenting a common set of information with multiple views (Figure
5.1). Each view reflects the perspective of a unique stakeholder (e.g., customer, designer, user).
This chapter is based on a paper entitled "Managing Complexity with the Department of Defense Architecture
Framework: Development of a Dynamic System Architecture Model" (Richards and Shah, et al., 2006).
2 CORE Workstation and associated training was provided by Vitech Corporation as part of an outreach program for
academic research. The survey of architecture framework development tools was completed after work on the
Hubble DoDAF in CORE had begun.
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Maier and Rechtin (2002) identify five goals of architecture frameworks: (1) institutionalize best
practices for architectural description, (2) ensure system sponsors receive information in the
format they desire, (3) facilitate comparative evaluation of architectures, (4) improve the
productivity of development teams, and (5) improve interoperability of information systems by
requiring that critical interfaces are described. The third goal (i.e., comparative evaluation of
space system architectures) motivates the application of architecture frameworks to this research.
Figure 5.1 Architecture Framework "Unwrapped" (U.K. Ministry of Defence, 2005)
Several architecture frameworks have been developed for enterprises, systems, and software
since the late 1980's. This section provides a brief overview of three enterprise architectures
critical in the evolution of these tools: the Zachman Framework, The Open Group Architecture
Framework (TOGAF), and Federal Enterprise Architecture Framework (FEAF). Two
architecture frameworks for communicating system design concepts-the DoDAF and U.K.
Ministry of Defence Architecture Framework (MoDAF)-are then evaluated for application to
space systems. Major architecture frameworks excluded in this overview include the Computer
Integrated Manufacturing Open Systems Architecture (CIMOSA), Integrated Architecture
Framework (IAF), Architectural Descriptions of Software Intensive Systems (i.e., IEEE 1471),
and International Standards Organization Reference Model for Open Distributed Processing (ISO
RM-ODP). A detailed analysis of architecture frameworks is outside the scope of this thesis and
has been conducted elsewhere (Tang et al., 2004).
5.1.1 Zachman Framework
The Zachman Framework was released in 1987 by IBM to provide a blueprint for an
organization's information infrastructure (Figure 5.2). Embraced by the architecture community,
the Zachman Framework has been incorporated into the four other architecture frameworks
discussed in this section. The framework consists of populating a 6x6 matrix-establishing
relationships of six elements of information systems (i.e., data, function, network, people, time,
motivation) across six perspectives (i.e., planner, owner, designer, builder, subcontractor, and
working system). Unlike the TOGAF, FEAF, DoDAF, and MoDAF, design tradeoffs are not
captured (Tang et al., 2004). Since the Zachman Framework was not developed by a
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professional organization, no explicit compliance rules have been published. No architectural
development process is documented in publications and most prescriptive guidance is only
offered through consulting services by the Zachman Institute (Schekkerman, 2004).
I
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I I
Figure 5.2 Zachman Framework
5.1.2 The Open Group Architecture Framework
The Open Group Architecture Framework is a freely-available industry standard for designing,
evaluating, and building enterprise architectures. Although it does include documentation on
architecture framework development and views for design rationale, TOGAF is principally a tool
for business organization.
5.1.3 Federal Enterprise Architecture Framework
The Federal Enterprise Architecture Framework was first published in 1999 and represents the
realization of the 1996 Clinger-Cohen Act, which requires federal agencies to develop, maintain,
and facilitate integrated systems architectures. The FEAF structure borrows heavily from
Zachman (Couretas, 2003) and is optimized for enterprise engineering and program and capital
management.
5.1.4 Department of Defense Architecture Framework
In contrast to enterprise architectures which also connect organizational goals to business
activities, system architectures relate operational concepts and capabilities to technical
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architectures. The Department of Defense Architecture Framework Version 1.0, released in
2003, defines a common approach for describing and comparing DoD architectures (Figure 5.3).
The DoDAF evolved from the 1996 Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Architecture Framework which was
developed following lessons learned from the Persian Gulf War of 1991. A host of integration
problems occurred during Desert Shield and Desert Storm as C4ISR systems were deployed for
the first time in support of tactical operations for a large-scale conflict. Older platforms were
used for missions for which they were not designed (e.g., Defense Support Program satellites for
Scud detection), new technologies were applied piecemeal, and interoperability problems
hindered full exploitation of information technology (Spires, 2001). Some of these integration
problems were solved during the six month build-up to war (e.g., early warning satellites were
used successfully for detection of tactical ballistic missiles) while others were not (e.g., paper
copies of air tasking orders had to be flown from the
aircraft carriers) (Zinn, 2004).
command center in Riyadh to the decks of
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Figure 5.3 Sample Work Products from Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF, 2003)
In developing the C4ISR/DoD Architecture Framework to aid interoperability and system-of-
systems integration, the Department of Defense selected three views (composed of multiple work
products) to characterize major systems: Operational, Systems, and Technical. To first order, the
Operational View may be thought of as a functional decomposition of the system, specifying
mission-critical activities and information exchanges. The Systems View constitutes the form
decomposition of the system, tracing the needs identified in the Operational View to resources
and capabilities of the technical architecture. Taken together, the Systems View and the
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Operational View fully describe the system and how it will operate. Since the two views are
built simultaneously, the system architect allocates operational tasks to particular system
components, whether physical or organizational. Conversely, knowledge of the system behavior
can inform operational design. Finally, the Technical View captures standards and conventions
for the architecture, prescribing the minimal set of rules governing the arrangement, interaction,
and interdependence of system components (DoDAF Working Group, 2003).
Although developed for acquisition supervisors concerned with interoperability, the DoDAF in
practice is primarily used to produce architecture descriptions during the early-stages of system
development (Maier et al., 2004). Maier further argues that the DoDAF is not necessarily well-
suited for this application. Another criticism of DoDAF is that it does not provide analytical
techniques or mechanisms for synthesizing the architecture information into "cogent, compelling
conclusions" (French, 2005). No formal DoDAF development process is prescribed. A variety
of tools, discussed in the following section, have been developed to aid in the construction of
DoDAF work products.
5.1.5 Ministry of Defence Architecture Framework
The UK Ministry of Defence Architecture Framework, released in 2005, is an extension of the
DoDAF with identical Operational, Systems, and Technical views to facilitate information
exchange for interoperability analyses across US-UK systems. The MoDAF formalizes two
perspectives not explicitly addressed in the DoDAF by adding two views: Strategic and
Acquisitions (Figure 5.4). Both are aimed at improving portfolio management across MoD
programs. The Strategic Viewpoint translates MoD policies into appropriate measures of
effectiveness that can be used for capability audit and gap/overlap analysis. The Acquisitions
Viewpoint incorporates programmatic details such as dependencies across development efforts
(Ministry of Defence, 2005). Through these new views, the MoDAF intends to capture the
perspectives of all MoD system stakeholders throughout the acquisitions process. This is
consistent with the principles of enterprise architecture but at odds with the primarily technical
approach prescribed in the DoDAF (Barrett, 2004).
Strategic
Viewpoint
Documents the strategic picture of how military
capabil is ev g i der to support apability
Documents the operational processes. Documents system functionality and
relationships and context to support operational I nterconnectivity to support system
analyses and requirements development analy d mhh-life manageient
Docume~nts acquisition programme
dependencies. timelines and DLED status to
inforn programme management
Technical
Viewpoint|
Documents policy. standards. guidance
and constraints to specify and assure
quality expectations
Provides summary information for the
architecture that enables it to be indexed.
searched and queried
Figure 5.4 Six Views of UK Ministry of Defence Architecture Framework (Ministry of Defence, 2005)
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All Vlows
For the application of comparative evaluation of architectures (i.e., serviceability assessments of
space systems), the DoDAF and MoDAF offer similar qualities. Both are oriented towards
technical architecture with Operational and Systems views to enable structured analyses of
satellite functions, physical attributes, and servicing activities. However, the DoDAF was
selected for this research due to a variety factors exogenous to the frameworks themselves:
industry experience with DoD architecture frameworks over the last decade, availability of
literature and research on the DoDAF, and the existence of several tools supporting the DoDAF
development process.
5.2 Tools Available for Constructing Architecture Frameworks
Table 5.1 Tools Supporting DoDAF Development (as of April 2006)
Product Company Key Features
Core Vitech Corporation - Modeling language with modifiable database schema
Workstation - Executable behavior models with discrete event simulator
- Automatically export DoDAF views from central data repository
DoDAFLive! Wizdom Systems - Niche DoDAF project management tool
- Provides online data repository for all information and models
EA Agilense - Central repository of data accessed via standard web browser
WebModeler - Supports Zachman, TOGAF, FEAF, and DoDAF development
Elements Enterprise Elements - Web-based data management tool
Repository - Integrates DoDAF views from multiple modeling tools
Metis Client Troux Technologies - "Living Timeline" support for system evolution
Tools (acquired from - Operational capabilities as objects
Computas) - Architecture reuse via broad support for DoD reference models
netViz netViz - Generic enterprise architecture tool with relationship modeling
Enterprise 
- Documents all 27 DoDAF work products
ProVision Proforma - Only DARS-certified tool (July 2005)
Modeling Corporation - Web-based repository for enterprise and system architectures
Suite 
- Discrete event simulator coupled with Monte Carlo analysis
Rhapsody Telelogic - UML/SysML modeling and simulation tool
(bought I-Logix) - Includes "DoDAF pack" for outputting DoDAF views
System Telelogic - First tool to offer a DoDAF extension (industry leader)
Architect (acquired from - Integrated with Telelogic DOORS for requirements traceability
Popkin Software) - Supports Zachman, TOGAF, and DoDAF development
TAU Telelogic - UML/SysML modeling and simulation tool
- Includes "Enterprise Architect for DoDAF" extension
- Integrated with Telelogic DOORS for requirements traceability
While the views of the DoDAF are well-defined, little documentation is provided on how the
views are to be constructed. This lack of documentation, coupled with a focus on final view
outputs in early user training, led to a work product-centric approach to DoDAF development.
As a result, many early DoDAF work products were pictures (many done in PowerPoint) that
were neither internally consistent nor complete in capturing relevant data. In order to analyze the
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behavior of a system, it is essential to capture dependencies and parallelisms among activities,
processes, and supporting technologies. However, these abilities are lacking in standard office
automation programs that are often used to develop DoD architecture frameworks (Troche et al.,
2004). To fix this problem, DoD has made a significant push towards data-centric architecture
development with the implementation of the DoD Architecture Repository System (DARS) for
certified formal methods and modeling languages.
Ideally, a common process for constructing DoDAF views is followed to maintain consistency
and enable comparisons across architectures. Several companies offer enterprise architecture
tools with templates to construct DoDAF work products. In general, each tool offers relatively
complete DoDAF support with certain tools offering unique capabilities (Table 5.1).
One of the shortcomings of architecture frameworks is that they rely on static pictures, diagrams,
and textual descriptions-not necessarily adequate for conveying the logical, behavioral, and
performance properties of the architecture (Levis and Wagenhals, 2000). To capture the
dynamic properties of a system, an executable model is necessary to carry out simulations
(Wagenhals et al., 2000). Therefore, it is important to select a DoDAF development tool that can
input the information contained in the static views to an executable model.
Five criteria were deemed essential for architecture framework development tools: (1) a
hierarchical structure to enable high-level representations, (2) support for exporting operational
and systems views, (3) modeling and simulation capabilities for dynamic performance analyses,
(4) a learning curve consistent with an eight-month research project, and (5) affordability.
Vitech Corporation's CORE* Workstation (Figure 5.5) meets these criteria and was used for this
research.
Source Requirements Domain Behavior Domain
Originating reqtirements
trace to behavior
|verified by
} V&V Domain
- A
veniied by
veiied by
Beha vor is allocated to
physical components
Architecture Domain 4
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Originating requirements
trace to physical components
Figure 5.5 Domains of CORE Workstation (Vitech Corporation)
CORE is a systems engineering tool that couples requirements management with functional
analysis and simulation. The tool accomplishes this by representing these domains with a
common modeling language. Leveraging a central system design repository for rapid population
of DoDAF views, CORE traces originating requirements to functions in the behavior domain.
Behaviors are represented with Enhanced Functional Flow Block Diagrams (EFFBD) and then
allocated to physical components in the architecture domain. One of the most interesting
elements of CORE is a discrete event simulator that allows an EFFBD to be executed. Ascent
Logic Corporation's RDD-100 tool offered a similar suite of capabilities but has been
discontinued.
5.3 Sample DoDAF: Hubble Space Telescope
Given the large quantity of open-source data available (National Research Council, 2005; Nelson
et al., 2002) and its status as the only uninhabited space platform that is currently serviced,
Hubble was a natural choice for exploring the value of the DoDAF and CORE. In scoping the
problem, populating all DoDAF work products (Table 5.2) in full detail was found to be
unnecessary and unrealistic. Completion of a DoDAF for a small uninhabited air vehicle with
only 150 components took two person-years (Cooper and Ewoldt, 2005)-Hubble has 400,000
parts. Therefore, each DoDAF work product was studied and seven were found to be applicable
to the problem of conducting serviceability assessments: (1) Overview and Summary
Information (AV-1), (2) High-Level Operational Concept Graphic (OV-1), (3) Operational Node
Connectivity Description (OV-2), (4) Operational Activity Model (OV-5), (5) Systems Interface
Description (SV-1), (6) Systems Evolution Description (SV-8), and (7) Systems Technology
Forecast (SV-9).
Source: DoDAF Deskbook
sv-6 Needed view
SV o Supporting view
Figure 5.6 Data-Centric DoDAF Build Sequence
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Table 5.2 Description of DoDAF Work Products (DoDAF Working Group, 2003)
Information
anavplcl findi ng
analytical findings
All Views AV-2 Integrated Dictionary Architecture data repository with definitions of all terms used in
all products
Operational OV- 1 High-Level Operational High-level graphical/textual description of operational concept
Concept Graphic
Operational OV-2 Operational Node Connectivity Operational nodes, connectivity, and information exchange
Description needlines between nodes
Operational O- 3 Operational Information Information exchanged between nodes and the relevant
Exchange Matrix attributes of that exchange
Operational OV-4 Organizational Relationships Organizational, role. or other relationships among
Chart organizations
Operational OV-5 Operational Activity Model Capabilities, operational activities, relationships among
activities, inputs, and outputs: overlays can show cost.
performing nodes, or other pertinent information
Operational OV-6a Operational Rules Model One of three products used to describe operational activity-
identifies business rules that constrain operation
Operational OV Operational State Transition One of three products used to describe operational activity-
Description identifies business process responses to events
Operational OV-6c Operational Event-Trace One of three products used to describe operational activity-
Description traces actions in a scenario or sequence of events
Operational OV-7 Logical Data Model Documentation of the system data requirements and structural
business process rules of the Operational View
Systems SV- 1 Systems Interface Description Identification of systems nodes, systems. and system items
and their interconnections, within and between nodes
Systems S\-2 Systems Communications Systems nodes, systems. and system items, and their related
Description communications lay-downs
Systems SV-3 Systems-Systems Matrix Relationships among systems in a given architecture: can be
designed to show relationships of interest, e.g.. system-type
interfaces, planned vs. existing interfaces, etc.
Systems SV-4 Systems Functionality Functions performed by systems and the system data flows
Description among system functions
Systems S\/- Operational Activity to Systems Mapping of systems back to capabilities or of system functions
Function Traceability Matrix back to operational activities
Systems SV-6 Systems Data Exchange Matrix Provides details of system data elements being exchanged
between systems and the attributes of that exchange
Systems SV-7 Systems Performance Performance characteristics of Systems View elements for the
Parameters Matrix appropriate time frame(s)
Systems V- Systems Evolution Description Planned incremental steps toward migrating a suite of systems
to a more efficient suite, or toward evolving a current system to
a future implementation
Systems SV-9 Systems Technology Forecast Emerging technologies and software/hardware products that
are expected to be available in a given set of time frames and
that will affect future development of the architecture
Systems SV- 1 Ga Systems Rules Model One of three products used to describe system functionality-
identifies constraints that are imposed on systems functionality
due to some aspect of systems design or implementation
Systems SV- 1Gb Systems State Transition One of three products used to describe system functionality-
Description identifies responses of a system to events
Systems SV-10c Systems Event-Trace One of three products used to describe system functionality-
Description identifies system-specific refinements of critical sequences of
events described in the Operational View
SV-11 Physical Schema Physical implementation of the Logical Data Model entities,
e.g., message formats, file structures, physical schema
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Systems
TV-1 Technical Standards Profile Listing of standards that apply to Systems View elements in a
given architecture
TV-2 Technical Standards Forecast Description of emerging standards and potential impact on
current Systems View elements, within a set of time frames
In constructing high-level views, a data-centric build sequence is followed whereby several
DoDAF relationship and attribute classes for subsequent work products are automatically
generated from core entities constructed in earlier work products. Figure 5.6 depicts the
suggested build sequence derived from the relationships between DoDAF views. Given this
suggested build sequence, two supporting views of Hubble Space Telescope are selected for
completion along with the five needed views. It is important to note that a data-centric build
sequence does not imply rigid sequencing as the highly related nature of the views necessitates
an iterative work process.
5.3.1 Overview and Summary Information (AV-1)
Overview and Summary Information (AV-1) provides an executive-level summary of Hubble
including scope, assumptions, constraints, and limitations of the architecture description (Figure
5.7). High-level features of the Orbiting Observatory are described (e.g., 2.4 meter primary
mirror, 11,110 kilogram weight).
- Description
- The Hubble Space Telescope is a joint venture of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) and European Space Agency (ESA). Launched
into Low Ear Orbit on April 24, 1990 by the Space Shuttle Discovery (STS-31),
Hubble's location above the Earth's atmosphere enables high resolution
imaging of astronomical objects.
- Hubble features a 2.4 meter primary mirror, is composed of more than 400,000
parts and contains 26,000 miles of electrical wiring. Total dimensions of the
telescope are 13.3 meters in length and 4.3 meters in diameter. Hubble weighs
11,110 kg.
* Purpose
- Hubble Space Telescope is a scientific instrument and its main scientific
objectives are to determine:
- The constitution, physical characteristics, and dynamics of celestial bodies.
" The nature of processes which occur in the extreme physical conditions existing in and
between astronomical objects.
- The history and evolution of the universe.
- Whether the laws of nature are universal in the space-time continuum.
- Scope
- The Hubble Space Telescope program includes the orbiting observatory, the
Space Telescope Science Institute, and the Space Telescope Operations
Control Center. The system is supported by the Space Shuttle, the Tracking
and Data Relay Satellite System, and the NASA Communications Network.
Figure 5.7 Hubble Overview and Summary Information (AV-1)
5.3.2 High Level Operational Concept Graphic (OV-1)
High Level Operational Concept Graphic (OV-1) depicts Hubble's interaction with its
environment as well as with external systems (Figure 5.8). For the purposes of this research,
OV-1 was deemed useful for rapidly communicating the missions of various space systems and
their operational context-both of which might elicit constraints on servicing operations (e.g.,
imaging payload sensitivity to thruster plume impingement).
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Figure 5.8 Hubble High-Level Operational Concept Graphic (OV-1)
5.3.3 Operational Node Connectivity Description (OV-2)
Operational Node Connectivity Description (OV-2) tracks the need to exchange information
across nodes. This includes internal operational nodes as well as external nodes. OV-2 does not
depict the connectivity between nodes. For example, Figure 5.9 shows that the Orbiting
Observatory depends on the Space Telescope Operations Control Center (STOCC) for command
and control, which in turn needs to downlink data to STOCC. The Tracking Data Relay Satellite
System (TDRSS)-the communications pipeline between these two operational nodes-is not
depicted. Understanding communication needlines for satellites is necessary for eliciting
constraints on servicing operations (e.g., aversion of fixed satellite service providers to
transponder downtime).
T
Figure 5.9 Hubble Operational Node Connectivity (OV-2)
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5.3.4 Operational Activity Model (OV-5)
Operational Activity Model (OV-5) describes the operations that are normally conducted in the
course of achieving a mission. It specifies activities and inputs and outputs between activities.
OV-5 delineates lines of responsibility when coupled with OV-2 and is a necessary foundation
for depicting activity sequencing and timing. Figure 5.10 is a high-level EFFBD representation
of OV-5 for a typical Hubble science mission. Similar diagrams were constructed for other
Hubble activities including monitoring spacecraft health, attitude determination and control, and
Space Shuttle servicing operations (see Appendix B). In the next section, two Hubble servicing
methods are simulated using an executable EEFBD-enabling comparison of two architectures
in the behavioral domain.
Figure 5.10 Hubble Operational Activity Model - Imaging (OV-5)
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5.3.5 Systems Interface Description (SV-1)
Systems Interface Description (SV-1) identifies the systems nodes that support operational
nodes. Detailed SV-1 work products may be used for specifying requirements and for
interoperability assessments. For the Hubble architecture, SV-1 was used to show the physical
decomposition of 42 components, including the TDRSS communications pipeline excluded in
OV-2. Five levels are present in the constructed hierarchy. Figure 5.11 displays a sample of this
decomposition-level IV-V components of the Telescope Instrument Assembly. Appendix B
includes more views of the system decomposition.
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ACS - Advanced NICMOS - Near STIS - Space COSTAR- WFPC2 - Wide
Camera for Sur... Infrared Camer... Telescope Imag... corrective optics Field / Planetary...
Component Component Component Component Component
Figure 5.11 Hubble Systems Interface (SV-1) of Instrument Assembly
5.3.6 Systems Evolution Description (SV-8)
Systems Evolution Description (SV-8) captures how the system, or the architecture in which the
system is embedded, will evolve over time. Applied to Hubble, SV-8 is used to record
completed and planned maintenance and upgrades of the Orbiting Observatory during Space
Shuttle servicing missions. Since its launch in 1990, Hubble has been serviced four times,
enabling NASA to equip Hubble with state-of-the-art science instruments every few years and
replace limited-life components.
5.3.7 Systems Technology Forecast (SV-9)
Systems -Technology Forecast (SV-9) provides a summary of expected improvements in
technology that affect the capabilities of the architecture or its systems. For Hubble, SV-9
principally involves a survey of emerging instruments. If there is a fifth servicing mission, the
Wide Field Camera 3 and Cosmic Origins Spectrograph will be installed to allow Hubble to
continue its high level of scientific return (National Research Council, 2005).
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Figure 5.12 Integrated Hubble Servicing Model
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5.4 Hubble Servicing Simulation
Upon developing static DoDAF work products, the value of architecture frameworks for
conducting serviceability assessments was explored through the development of an executable
model that captures the dynamic properties of Hubble at a level of detail consistent with
conceptual design. In particular, the performance of two servicing architectures was compared
using the discrete event simulator packaged with CORE. Figure 5.12 is a top-level view of the
multi-layered behavioral model developed of Hubble performance in the context of a multi-year
servicing campaign. The behavioral model is depicted as an EFFBD and shows the interactions
of three key actors in the simulation: the Orbiting Observatory, servicing architecture, and
science customers. System behaviors are represented using sequential, parallel, repetitive, and
decision logic. Five parallel threads are modeled: (1) Hubble Component Failure and
Degradation, (2) Hubble Health, (3) Hubble Imaging, (4) Shuttle/Robotic Servicing, (5) Science
Dissemination.
5.4.1 Component Failure and Degradation Thread
Hubble Component Failure and Degradation Thread models the wear-out of various critical
Hubble components (i.e., batteries, avionics, gyroscopes, reactions wheels, and fine-guidance
sensors). Hubble has a battery capacity of 540 ampere-hours (Ah) with energy storage
requirements of 160 Ah to support science operations and 40 Ah to maintain thermal stability of
the optical assembly. Gradual loss of charge capacity may be projected and is modeled
deterministically at 5 Ah each month. The state of the avionics system is modeled as a binary
whereby it is either functioning or broken. If broken, no science operations are conducted and
Hubble waits for the next successful servicing mission to restore the avionics system.
Table 5.3 Key Assumptions in Servicing Simulation
Component Wear-Out Servicing Missions
Probabilistic Failures Monthly Rate Probabilistic Failures Space Shuttle Robotic Vehicle
gyroscopes 0.036 launch and rendezvous 0.02 0.10
reaction wheels 0.022 dock (catastrophic) 0.01 0.05
fine-guidance sensors 0.025 dock (non-catastrophic) 0.01 0.05
avionics system 0.006 access 0.05 0.15
service 0.02 0.10
Deterministic Degradation Monthly Rate
solar panels 0 mission frequency 36 months 36 months
battery capacity 5 Ah services avionics? yes yes
Gyroscopes, reaction wheels, and fine-guidance sensors failure is both probabilistic and
deterministic. For simplicity, these three components are assumed to fail probabilistically (Table
5.3) with half-lives mapped to most-likely failure projections (National Research Council, 2005).
Three gyroscopes are required to sense drift rates during normal pointing and slewing operations.
At launch and following successful servicing operations, six healthy gyroscopes are on the
telescope-offering "three for six" redundancy. Fine-guidance sensors, used for precision
pointing of the observatory, are modeled similarly and have "two for three" redundancy.
Reaction wheels provide three-axis control of the telescope and incorporate "three for four"
redundancy.
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Figure 5.13 Assumed Reliability of Critical Subsystems over Time (no servicing)
5.4.2 Health Thread
Hubble Health Thread monitors the overall state of Hubble. Three states are possible: fully
functional for conducting science operations, survival mode during which no science is
conducted, and dead. To be fully functional, Hubble must possess a working avionics system
and at least 160 Ah of battery capacity, three healthy gyroscopes, two healthy fine-guidance
sensors, and three healthy reaction wheels. Figure 5.13 plots the probability of each of these
conditions being met (in isolation) as a function of time (if no servicing missions were carried
out). Once one of these conditions is not met (e.g., four of the six gyroscopes fail), Hubble
enters into a survival mode, pausing science operations until the next successful servicing or the
occurrence of a catastrophic failure. Catastrophic failures may be caused by docking collisions
during attempted servicing operations or degradation of battery capacity below 40 Ah (minimum
energy required to prevent irreversible structural deformation of the optical assembly).
5.4.3 Imaging Thread
Hubble Imaging Thread tracks science operations (Figure 5.10). The imaging thread is triggered
by the sequence of images sent by a fully functioning Hubble. Science operations are conducted
in one-month increments. In the simulation, Hubble's target science goal is 120 months of
successful imaging operations. In its first ten years of operation, the actual Hubble system took
approximately 350,000 exposures of 14,000 astronomical targets (Nelson et al., 2002).
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5.4.4 Shuttle/Robotic Servicing Thread
Shuttle/Robotic Servicing Thread tracks the implementation of the servicing architecture. Two
servicing threads were created-one representative of the Space Shuttle and the other of a
robotic servicing vehicle. Four servicing activities are included in each model: (1) Launch and
Rendezvous, (2) Dock, (3) Access, and (4) Service. Launch is defined as the movement of a
servicing vehicle from a starting position (i.e., launch pad) to a position where relative
navigation is possible with laser ranging, radar, and cameras (< 500 meters). Rendezvous
positions the servicing vehicle for docking (< 3 meters). Docking is defined as the mating of the
servicing vehicle to Hubble. In the case of a robotic servicing vehicle, autonomous execution is
required for proximity operations because of a two-second communications delay in routing
signals through TDRSS (National Research Council, 2005). Access constitutes all activities
required to deploy the stowed tools, upgrades, and replacement parts of the servicing vehicle to
the Hubble components which require servicing. Finally, Service entails operation of the
servicing vehicle to improve Hubble and return it to full operation. All four servicing activities
must be completed for servicing to be successful. Differences between Space Shuttle and robotic
vehicle servicing activity success probabilities are outlined in Table 5.3. Figure 5.14 shows the
sequential servicing activities for Shuttle. If servicing is successful, all subsystems are
replenished to beginning-of-life levels, restoring Hubble to a "like new" condition.
H.5. 1
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Catastbrophic Failure
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Figure 5.14 Space Shuttle Servicing Thread
5.4.5 Science Dissemination Thread
Science Dissemination Thread tracks the transfer of images to the Space Telescope Science
Institute (STScI) and terminates the simulation upon STScI receipt of 120 months of science
data. The simulation terminates earlier if a catastrophic failure occurs.
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5.4.6 Results
Upon developing the multi-layered Integrated Servicing Model, the dynamic performance and
functional behavior of Hubble was analyzed using CORE's discrete event simulator. The
simulator outputs a timeline of functional activation, execution, and duration. Wait states,
resource inventory history, and queuing triggers (items waiting to be processed by functions) are
all depicted. Colored duration bars are used to represent different types of events. Grey
specifies the amount of resources available, teal indicates the execution of a function, yellow
indicates that a function is enabled but waiting for a trigger, and magenta indicates that a
function is enabled but waiting for resources.
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Figure 5.15 Hubble Servicing Simulation - Space Shuttle
Figure 5.15 shows a sample run of the Integrated Hubble Servicing Model for a Space Shuttle
servicing campaign. Rows depict resource levels and function states with a horizontal axis of
time (measured in months). It can be observed that in the 2 0th month the reaction wheel resource
had fallen from four to two (below the required level of three). This resource change initiated a
state change in Hubble from fully functional to survival mode, pausing science operations until
successful Shuttle servicing during the 3 7th month. The "ImageMonths" resource continued to
count down successfully from 120 until the 85th month when the fine-guidance sensor resource
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fell to one (below the required level of two), followed by a failure of the avionics system a
month later. Science operations were put on hold again until the third servicing mission
succeeded in replenishing all of the resources. In total, five servicing missions were attempted,
and all were successful. Once 120 months worth of science had been collected and
disseminated, the simulation terminated during Hubble's 17th year of operation.
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Figure 5.16 Hubble Servicing Simulation - Robotic Vehicle
Figure 5.16 shows a sample run of the Integrated Hubble Servicing Model with a robotic
servicing vehicle. In this particular run, an initial two years of science operations were followed
by nearly four years of survival mode due two events: an early failure of the avionics system and
a failure of the Access servicing activity during the first attempted servicing mission. The
second attempted servicing mission was successful in restoring, among other things, energy
storage capacity before battery degradation caused a catastrophic loss. Of the five robotic
3 With servicing scheduled once every three years, Hubble will not survive if there are two consecutive servicing
failures. After six year without servicing, the battery capacity will have degraded below the necessary level to
maintain the optical assembly.
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servicing missions that were attempted, three were successful. The simulation terminated during
the 16th year after 120 months of science data had been returned.
One metric for comparing the relative performance of the two servicing architectures is
availability, the percentage of time in the simulation that Hubble was able to perform its science
mission. (If a catastrophic failure occurs during the first 120 months of operation, 120 months is
used in the denominator of the availability calculation.) Given that each run of the discrete event
simulator produces a unique outcome, a Monte Carlo analysis was performed to calculate
availability across multiple Space Shuttle and robotic vehicle servicing campaigns (Appendix C
and Appendix D, respectively). Table 5.4 shows the results of this preliminary analysis. The
higher probability of success assumed for Shuttle in all four servicing activities is evident with
the 17% average availability advantage.
Table 5.4 Monte Carlo Comparison of Two Servicing Architectures
Number of Average # of Successful Average
Simulations Servicing Missions Availability
Space Shuttle 25 4.12 72.8%
Robotic Vehicle 25 2.24 56.0%
Although these preliminary results imply the superiority of a Shuttle servicing architecture, it is
important to keep in mind the impact of assumptions, the simplicity of the model, and the
limitations of the availability metric. Aggregating the assumed probabilities of servicing success
across the four servicing activities, the Space Shuttle only fails one out of ten missions while the
robotic vehicle fails nearly four out of ten missions. These assumptions were not subjected to
sensitivity analysis and also may need to be modified as teleoperated and autonomously
controlled vehicle technology improves. Regarding simplicity of the model, the executable
portion only describes the functional aspects of Hubble's operation and servicing as the physical
architecture of Hubble does not inform the success or failure of servicing. With another layer of
detail, the linkages in CORE between the physical architecture and functional behavior domains
can be leveraged to model the impact of physical design choices on serviceability. The model
also does not allow on-demand servicing to supplement the shortcomings of the scheduled
servicing campaign (e.g., four-year pause in science operations observed in Figure 5.16). Most
importantly, the availability metric captures only one of many attributes of a servicing
architecture. The added utility of instrument upgrades, servicing cost trades, and the risk to
astronaut life all need to be incorporated into the value proposition.
5.5 Key Findings
This chapter addressed the question of how architecture frameworks may inform dynamic
serviceability assessments. It was found that while architecture frameworks bring structure to
describing complex systems, the DoDAF views alone are insufficient for characterizing the
dynamic behavior inherent in a satellite servicing architecture. However, when such views are
constructed using a system engineering modeling tool such as CORE, both the DoDAF work
products and an executable behavior model are created simultaneously. The executable model
can then be used for quantitative evaluation of the dynamic system behavior.
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5.5.1 Implications for Serviceability Assessments
Over the course of this chapter, lessons emerged how the DoDAF and systems engineering
modeling tools may be applied to dynamic serviceability assessments at the satellite bus level. It
was found that the process of constructing the static DoDAF work products and building an
executable model enabled rapid understanding of the structure and operation of the larger Hubble
system (i.e., Orbiting Observatory, Space Telescope Operations Control Center, and Space
Telescope Science Institute). On its own, the model of Hubble does not provide insights into
whether Hubble is more or less physically amenable to servicing than other space systems.
However, other space systems can rapidly be incorporated into the same overall servicing
architecture to allow for comparison. Once these models for candidate target satellites are in
place, judgments will become possible about the relative amenability of spacecraft to on-orbit
servicing over time.
5.5.2 Implications for DoDAF
Lessons also emerged regarding the DoDAF and its development process. Emphasis is placed
on final architecture products rather than process. Work products are frequently too complex to
present to senior leadership without modification. Most fundamentally, weaknesses in the
DoDAF have been identified as it undergoes transition from a static, descriptive tool to a tool
that attempts to characterize dynamic system properties. Little guidance is provided on how to
translate requirements into the design of the work products. As promulgated, the DoDAF does
not have a companion architecture development process to take advantage of its interconnected
views. As a result, many developers of DoDAF have treated it as a contract deliverable as
opposed to a central communications tool in the design process. While it is not the business of
DoD to stipulate how contractors conduct system design, it is in the interest of DoD to require
architectures that are internally consistent and support dynamic performance analysis.
Architecture development software with DoDAF extensions and integrated modeling and
simulation capabilities is available to fill this void. In practice, however, 70% of DoDAF
developers are not building executable architectures (Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Networks and Information Integration, 2005).
Finally, the existence of a clear purpose for building the high-level Hubble architecture
framework (i.e., serviceability assessment) was a critical element in the construction of views
that were both compliant with the static DoDAF taxonomy and useful for understanding dynamic
system properties. For the value of the DoDAF to be fully realized, its construction must be
mission-driven, focused on providing information that supports decision-making processes.
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6 Architecting for Satellite Servicing: Prescriptive Technical
Considerations
This chapter synthesizes lessons from Space Shuttle servicing missions, previous studies, and
research described in Chapters 2 through 5 to determine how the design of future satellites may
be affected by an OOS requirement. First, previous studies on the modification of existing
satellites to enable OOS are reviewed. Second, the technical challenges facing OOS providers
are surveyed as a means to understand the drivers of servicing mission complexity. Third, the
serviceability framework proposed in Chapter 4 is used as a lens through which serviceability
lessons are discussed. The following questions are addressed:
e What are the "architectural principles" for developing serviceable spacecraft?
o What are the technical challenges facing servicing providers?
o What are prescriptive technical considerations for enabling serviceability?
6.1 Background
At present most spacecraft are not designed for on-orbit servicing. The electrical architecture does not
allow for function replacement of many components.... All of the electrical components are interconnected
by a combination of data buses (digital and optical fiber), power lines, and discrete digital lines. In order to
be replaceable, any component that is interconnected with discrete lines will need to have all of these
connections wired to the docking interface.... Current spacecraft designs do not have the basic hardware
which is needed to cooperatively interface with a servicer spacecraft.... The physical layout of current
spacecraft do not lend themselves to serviceability. Almost all external surface area and surrounding space
is occupied by components that have a range of motion or field of view which cannot be blocked
(Reynerson, 1999).
Such statements were extracted from the findings of the 1999 Spacecraft Modular Architecture
Design Concept. As a historical context for this chapter on the design of future serviceable
spacecraft, this section overviews two previous studies done on the modification of existing
satellite bus designs to enable OOS: the Nimbus satellite configuration study (1969) and the GPS
structural modification study (1999).
6.1.1 Nimbus Satellite Configuration Study
Representative of a class of complex research and development satellites in the late 1960's,
Kiersarsky (1969) discusses how the Nimbus satellite was selected as a candidate satellite for
determining how accessibility of components for an on-orbit servicing requirement would affect
configuration. Like many satellites, Nimbus was designed for accessibility during fabrication,
testing, and evaluation in the factory-not in-orbit. While a modular approach was employed
with equipment mounted in separate bays and with removable panels to assist in system
orientation and installation, the structure was designed as compact and dense and possible to
meet launch vehicle weight and fairing constraints.
In addition to evaluating the transport of Nimbus to an on-orbit hangar facility for "shirt-sleeve"
servicing, the effect of increasing the volumetric size of Nimbus was investigated with a
particular focus on the sensor ring and attitude control system (which are enclosed areas with
densely packed equipment). While the design modifications proposed to make the Nimbus
satellite more serviceable are only applicable to satellites in operation decades ago, the study did
derive a few heuristics, some of which may apply to modem spacecraft:
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* Equipment should be configured to modular type containers
* Decrease in volume utilization (i.e., low density packaging) appears to be unavoidable
* Access panels, either hinged or readily removable, are required
e All fasteners should be "captive" type
* Areas of access should be free of cabling and harnesses
e Cabling and harnesses should be routed in areas where no disassembly is required
* Connectors should be readily accessible through equipment access doors
* Insulation should be segmented and fixed to access panels
6.1.2 GPS Structural Modification Study
Hall and Papadopoulos (1999) document a preliminary assessment of the structural
modifications necessary to enable servicing of GPS spacecraft. Two scenarios were considered,
component addition and component replacement. Five serviceable GPS spacecrafts were studied
in depth with two providing standardized slots for upgrade components and three providing
hardware for both upgrades and replacements: basic bus with upgrade compartment, basic bus
with upgrade boom, removable equipment panels, drawer equipments panels, and access doors.
Depending on the level of serviceability, the study found that the mass impact on GPS spacecraft
ranges from 100 to 700 lb. Table 6.1 shows the distribution of the mass penalty across these five
bus types as a function of robotic servicer capability.
Table 6.1 Structure Mass Impact for Serviceability (Hall and Papadopoulos, 1999)
Satellite Config. High Medium Low
Capability RS Capability RS Capability RS
Mass Impact, lb Mass Impact, lb Mass Impact, lb
Basic Bus with 99 127 103
20 inch Upgrade Compartment
Basic Bus with 152 180 157
40 inch Upgrade Compartment
Basic Bus with 37 65 37
Upgrade Boom
Reconfigured Equipment Panels 184 212 200
Removable Subpanels
Reconfigured Equipment Panels 287 314 N/A
Drawers
Reconfigured Equipment Panels 200 227 N/A
Access doors
6.2 Key Technical Challenges Facing Servicing Providers
Having reviewed two previous studies on the modification of existing satellites to enable
OOS, the technical challenges facing servicing providers are surveyed as a means to
understand the drivers of servicing mission complexity.
Numerous technical challenges face OOS providers. For one, the available telemetry points
may be inadequate to determine the exact cause of on-orbit failure. Second, line loss issues
make analog and radio frequency connections weak candidates for functional replacement.
A third challenge is the replacement of attitude and determination control components which
require alignment to the reference coordinate system of the target satellite--or need to be
designed for on-orbit calibration-either of which impacts the design of the servicing
vehicle's structure and docking interface (Reynerson, 1999).
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Figure 6.1 depicts Orbital Express's prototype servicing vehicle, ASTRO, and its key
enabling technologies, such as the 3.3 meter robotic arm and fluid transfer system. With
plans for a flight test in 2006, ASTRO may serve as a baseline for the development of future
robotic vehicle technology. More generally, Hollander (2000) identifies five key features of
space robotics: (1) autonomy, (2) intelligence, (3) interface, (4) machine vision, and (5)
reliability.
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o 3~' kg propellant transfer quantity
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Figure 6.1 Orbital Express's Demonstration ASTRO (Shoemaker and Wright, 2004)
6.2.1 Autonomy
Robotic servicing vehicles should incorporate some degree of self-reliance but also keep a
human operator in the loop for tasking, notification, monitoring, and problem resolution. It is
highly desirable to automate most servicing tasks. For time-critical tasks such as final capture
and docking, autonomous control may be essential due to telemetry delays of an estimated 2 to 5
seconds (lanni, et al., 2002).
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While it is important for robotic vehicles to execute specific, pre-programmed tasks on their
own, it is also important that robotic vehicles do not proceed with servicing activities when
dangers to a target satellite or themselves arise. Given that lower-cost satellites are the least
likely to be serviced, OOS is expected to be performed on expensive satellites for which the
stakes will be too high to blindly trust an autonomous system. Through military research in
uninhabited vehicles, it has been found that it is arduous and costly to develop software that is
flexible enough to deal with the full set of possible outcomes (lanni, et al., 2002). Furthermore,
even the most sophisticated pre-planned logic sequences may not be adequate to deal with the
host of potential surprises which may arise, such as software errors, incorrect sensor calibration,
solar weather, and space debris.
6.2.2 Intelligence
Another enabling technology of OOS from the provider perspective is intelligence. Closely
associated with autonomy, intelligence is best described as a decision-making capability.
Through sensors, memory, and a predetermined set of rules, intelligent software may enable
servicing vehicles to perform a variety of tasks: planning, rendezvous, object recognition,
docking, task execution, fault diagnosis, and anomaly resolution (Hollander, 2000).
6.2.3 Interface
Ideally, robotic vehicles would impose no requirements upon the objects or systems they service.
Applied to OOS, this ideal would mean that the target satellite would not need to cooperate other
than to enter into a quiescent mode while being serviced.
The burden of interfacing with target satellites translates to several design requirements for the
servicing vehicle: an inter-satellite communications link to command the target satellite, an
autonomous rendezvous and docking capability, an ability to take over attitude control for the
combined spacecraft, and an ability to establish couplings with the target satellite including
electrical component insertion and fluid transfer.
Future satellites might incorporate standard mechanical and electrical interfaces to ease the
burden on servicing vehicles, particularly for complex OOS missions. One model for OOS
interface standards is the set of standards imposed on spacecraft by launch vehicles: a
mechanical interface consisting of a bolt pattern to accommodate a separation device and an
electrical interface consisting of an umbilical cord for pre-launch satellite testing and connections
to activate the separation system (Miller, et al., 2002).
6.2.4 Machine Vision
Robotic servicing vehicles need to be able to recognize complex three-dimensional objects that
vary in terms of orientation, distance, and lightening. Hollander (2000) documents two options
for automating machine vision for OOS, the process of determining range and orientation of one
spacecraft relative to another: two-dimensional scene analysis and three-dimensional surface
imaging and analysis.
In a typical scene analysis, edge detection methods are applied to develop a silhouette of the
target satellite. Corner points or edge shapes are compared to a three-dimensional model of the
target satellite to determine range and orientation. Weaknesses of edge detection include
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ambiguity problems for symmetric objects and loss of capability once the camera's field of view
(FOV) is filled. Recognition may be aided through the placement of fiducial marks on the
exterior of the target satellite which impose no weight or cost penalty. However, fiducial marks
do require surface area which may already be allocated to solar cells and thermal blankets. They
also require the servicing vehicle to carry an illumination source during eclipse.
In contrast to scene analysis, three-dimensional range imaging determines current distance to an
array of points distributed over the portion of the target satellite within the ranging instrument's
FOV. These three-dimensional surface images are then compared to three-dimensional models
of the target satellite taken prior to launch. No markings are required and objects may be
recognized from any aspect. Several range imaging sensors based on laser radar techniques
exist. A competing technology being developed at NRL employs cameras and a correlation code
projector for structured light triangulation.1
It is important to note that the machine vision technologies discussed here only support
proximity operations. Radar and beacons will be required for rendezvous. At altitudes below
7400 kin, GPS may also be employed.
6.2.5 Reliability
As highly complex electromechanical devices which require extensive servicing in terrestrial
environments, robotic systems deployed into the inaccessible and extreme environment of space
impose design challenges. Furthermore, given the need to amortize the cost of sophisticated
servicing vehicles over multiple missions, a design life exceeding a decade may be required.
Long operational lives impose significant burdens on lubricants, high throughput thrusters,
relays, and other active components (Hollander, 2000).
6.3 Architectural Heuristics for Designing Serviceable Spacecraft
Having reviewed the technical challenges facing servicing vehicles, we now turn to the question
of the design of future spacecraft that are serviceable. Table 6.2 lists the maintainability lessons
that were stated by the crew of STS-61, the first Hubble servicing mission. Although referring to
human servicing operations, these heuristics apply to enabling robotic servicing operations.
This section integrates lessons from Space Shuttle servicing missions and findings from previous
chapters to derive prescriptive technical considerations for satellite designers. Considerations are
divided into four broad categories: (1) maximize knowledge of target satellite, (2) manage scale
of servicing activities, (3) minimize precision of servicing activities, and (4) minimize temporal
constraints.
A structured light module emits sequentially pulsed illuminations from a light-emitting diode, and digital images
are synchronized with light source flashes.
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Table 6.2 Lessons Learned from Hubble Space Telescope Repair (Shishko, et al., 1995)
* For spacecraft in LEO, don't preclude a servicing option; this means, for example,
including a grapple fixture even though it has a cost and mass impact.
* When servicing is part of the maintenance concept, make sure that it's applied
throughout the space craft. (The HST Solar Array Electronics Box, for example, was
not designed to be replaced, but had to be nevertheless.)
" Pay attention to details like correctly sizing the hand holds and using connectors and
fasteners designed for easy removal and reattachment.
" Make sure ground-based mock-ups and drawings exactly represent the "as-deployed"
configuration.
" Verify tool-to-system interfaces especially when new tools are involved.
* Make provision in the maintainability program for high-fidelity maintenance training.
6.3.1 Maximize Knowledge of Target Satellite
Maximizing knowledge regarding the state of the target satellite is critical to reduce uncertainty
in servicing operations. If a servicing vehicle has perfect information, operations may be
scripted. The less knowledge available on the target satellite, the more operations need to be
adaptable which adds complexity. Two mechanisms are available for maximizing knowledge of
the target satellite: extensive spacecraft health monitoring and a mission operations profile that
minimizes spacecraft deviance from the original design state.
First, serviceable spacecraft should incorporate extensive fault detection, isolation, and
diagnostic capabilities. When an anomaly occurs, operators on the ground need to be able to
determine exactly which components have failed. Inspections may also boost knowledge of the
external structure of the target satellite. To lower the cost of inspections, orbits which are
amenable to remote-sensing or accessible to free-flying proximity inspectors should be
considered.
Second, serviceable spacecraft need to minimize deviance from the design documents used to
plan the servicing operation. According to former Astronaut Jeffrey Hoffman, the crew of STS-
41 C encountered difficulties during the repair of the Solar Max satellite due to the placement of
thermal insulation on the bus exterior that was not captured in design documents. While
difficulties such as these may not have compromised Shuttle servicing missions, robotic
servicing vehicles may not be as well-disposed to adapt to emergent requirements. One way to
prevent this problem is to strictly enforce configuration control during manufacturing, assembly,
and pre-launch operations.
Minimizing spacecraft deviance from design documents extends beyond configuration control.
Minimizing damage sustained in post-assembly operations is important as well. While it is
impossible to prevent all on-orbit anomalies, the concentration of radiation, thermal cycling, and
debris in certain orbits may inform architecture-level trades in planning mission operations for
serviceable satellites. In addition to evaluating orbits in terms of the potential for satellite
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degradation, it may also be valuable to consider the loads placed on spacecraft by various launch
vehicles.
6.3.2 Manage Scale of Servicing Activities
Managing the scale of servicing activities is critical for controlling the complexity of servicing
operations. If the scale of a servicing is too great, it may be impossible with current technology
or require multiple servicing vehicles (likely crippling the economic justification). Three general
recommendations are discussed: reducing AV expenditures for servicing missions by considering
the concentration of other potential OOS targets in orbit selection, minimizing the distance
between docking ports and servicing zones, and minimizing the number of unique tasks for
robotic vehicles.
First, target satellites should be within propulsive reach of servicing vehicles such that multiple
spacecraft can be reached by an individual servicer over the course of its design life. In terms of
orbital dynamics, this means that LEO satellites should be within 1 to 2 degrees inclination and
100 km in altitude of other target spacecraft (see Figure 3.4). GEO satellites are relatively
amenable to the rendezvous OOS activity with servicing vehicle ranges extending to 5 degrees
inclination and 1,000 km in altitude (Galabova, et al., 2003). As illustrated in Figure 4.9 and
Figure 4.13, AV expenditures for servicing missions vary not only as a function of orbit but also
as a function of orbital slot.
Minimizing the distance between the mating zone of the servicing vehicle and the area of interest
on the target satellite is a second mechanism for managing the scale of servicing activities. To
be serviceable, the robotic arm of the servicing vehicle must be able to access the necessary
components. Electrical interfaces, fluid transfer modules, and ORU storage bays should be
collocated with docking ports. This may constitute a major departure from the current
architecture of some GEO communications spacecraft in which the spacecraft subsystems likely
to be serviced (payloads and antennas) are located on the Earth-pointing side of the satellite (five
meters from projected docking locations on the back end of the spacecraft).
Third, target satellites should minimize number of unique tasks required of the servicing
operation. One method for reducing the number of unique servicing tasks is through functional
periodicity whereby functional requirements of servicing operations are repeated as much as
possible (Suh, 2005). Component commonality (e.g., use of limited number of bolt sizes
throughout satellite structure) is one mechanism for achieving functional periodicity.
Including margin on the spacecraft in terms of both functional capability and spatial volume is
another architectural heuristic for minimizing the number of unique servicing tasks. For
example, if the thermal control system is designed a priori for operation before servicing and
after servicing (e.g., when a payload module is docked), the impacts of varying radiative surfaces
and heat sources will not add the requirement of augmenting the thermal control system to the
servicing operation. Designing with capability margin for loads of additional payload modules
may also prevent modifications to the electrical power and attitude control subsystems.
Reducing the utilization of spatial volume in areas of the target satellite most likely to be
serviced may also improve accessibility for servicing operations.
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6.3.3 Minimize Precision of Servicing Activities
Minimizing the required precision of OOS involves designing target satellites such that
tolerances are permitted during servicing operations. Three general recommendations are made
for minimizing required precision: designing "safe modes" of satellite operation to mitigate
thruster plume impingement, tightly controlling interfaces with the servicing vehicle, and
employing loose coupling for serviceable components.
First, target satellites might incorporate "safe modes" of operation when servicing vehicles are in
close proximity. Thruster plume impingement can have serious detrimental effects on satellites
including disturbance torques, unwanted heating of components, and surface contamination. The
instrumentation of remote-sensing satellites is particularly sensitive to impingement damage.
Second, target satellites should tightly control interfaces such that interfaces are amenable to
robotic intervention. For example, satellites might incorporate a docking port with retro
reflectors to assist in autonomous rendezvous and docking maneuvers. Similar interfaces should
be designed to assist in disassembly and assembly tasks, the opening and closing of panels, and
instrument change-out.
Third, target satellites should avoid highly-integrated designs. Loose coupling is one mechanism
for enabling a modular architecture (e.g., "plug-n-play" avionics).
DARPA's NEXTSat from the Orbital Express program is the prototype for a future generation of
satellites designed for OOS. As observed in Figure 6.2, NEXTSat's servicing elements both
manage the scale of servicing activities and minimize the precision required of the servicing
provider.
Figure 6.2 Orbital Express's Demonstration NEXTSat (Shoemaker and Wright, 2004)
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NEXTSat Servking Elements
* Rendezvous / Prox Ops Aids
o Passive docking sensor
o Retro reflectors
o Grapple fitting for alternate docking
* Crosslink Antenna
* ASTRO Servicin2 Interfaces
o Starsys passive latch
= Triangular wedge design guides
and positions active side arms
o Electrical coupler interfaces
o Fluid pressurant transfer couplin2
" Self-sealing design
" Quick disconnect
* Separation Ring
o Transfers launch loads
* ORUs and Storage Bays
o Lithium-ion battery ORU
o Processor ORU
* Fluid Transfer Module
o Modular transfer system
o 34 kg fuel tank capacity
6.3.4 Minimize Temporal Constraints
Two general areas are suggested for minimizing the temporal constraints imposed by the target
satellite on the servicing architecture: enhancing the predictability of servicing missions and
mitigating timing constraints during servicing missions.
Compiling empirical data on satellite component degradation is critical for understanding
servicing frequency and hence a mechanism for minimizing temporal constraints on the OOS
provider. An analogy drawn from the oil industry pertains to the maintenance of offshore oil
platforms. Rather than basing maintenance schedules on first principles, oil companies use
statistical precedents as a starting point for establishing servicing policy (see Section 4.3.1). As
predictability of satellite servicing improves, servicing missions may be scheduled in advance of
component failure (e.g., Hubble). This will not only improve satellite availability but also may
reduce AV expenditures for servicing missions by an order of magnitude (Section 4.2.4).
OOS may also cause operational downtime (on the order of hours) for target satellites during
operations of a service mission. Following the considerations under the knowledge, scale, and
precision categories (discussed in the previous three sections) will reduce the duration of
servicing operations. If possible, functions of the serviceable vehicle should be replicated by
another means (e.g., temporarily rent transponder capacity on another satellite) to serve end-
users during this period.
6.4 Summary
Table 6.3 summarizes the architectural heuristics derived in this chapter for designing
serviceable spacecraft.
Table 6.3 Architectural Heuristics for Designing Serviceable Spacecraft
Maximize knowledge of target satellite
" Incorporate extensive fault detection, isolation, and
diagnostic capabilities
" Enforce configuration control during manufacturing,
assembly, and pre-launch operations
* Limit structural deformation from launch, radiation,
and thermal cycling
Manage scale of servicing activities
" Consider the proximity of other potential OOS
targets in orbit selection
" Collocate electrical interfaces, fluid transfer modules,
and ORU storage bays with docking ports
" Use common components
* Design electrical, thermal, and attitude control
subsystems with margin for loads of additional
payload modules
Minimize precision of servicing activities Minimize temporal constraints
" Design "safe modes" of satellite operation to mitigate e Compile empirical data on component degradation to
thruster plume impingement enable scheduled servicing
" Control servicing interfaces tightly * Allow for temporary outsourcing of functions to
" Substitute highly-integrated designs with modular, shield end-users from operational downtime
loosely-coupled configurations
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7 On-Orbit Servicing Implementation
This chapter addresses OOS issues located at the interface of technology and policy. Perfect
technical solutions are useless unless they can be implemented. Iridium was a technical marvel
(e.g., 48-hour assembly time, dynamic crosslinks) but failed economically with the collapse in
the projected demand for personal satellite communications (due to an extraordinary installation
of fiber optics cables and proliferation of cell phone service during the late 1990's). An example
related to OOS is STS-5 1 C in which the Shuttle retrieved the Palapa and Westar VI satellites.
Stuck in LEO because of upper stage failures, Hughes Aircraft Company and NASA engineers
worked out a technical solution for a Shuttle rescue mission in six weeks. However, it took over
six months to resolve the legal questions concerning ownership, salvage rights, insurance
coverage, and the release of liability between the insurance carriers before the recovery effort
began (Wertz and Larson, et al., 1999). Fortunately, this time window was consistent with the
preservation of the Palapa and Westar VI satellites. Other on-demand rescue operations may not
afford such temporal flexibility.
This chapter unifies the political, legal, and financial aspects of on-orbit servicing and highlights
the challenges that stand in the way of an operational servicing vehicle.' Implementation
strategies are proposed for the realization of a national servicing infrastructure in space. The
following questions are addressed:
* What are the non-technical challenges facing OOS implementation?
o What are the political issues and legal constraints for OOS?
o What economic themes characterize OOS? What financial models make sense for
servicing providers?
Embedded paradigm
Political Technical
Collective action 4 "Chicken and the Egg"
problem
Financial
Figure 7.1 Challenges Facing On-Orbit Servicing Providers
Portions of this chapter are based on a paper entitled "Assessing the Challenges to a Geosynchronous Space Tug
System" (Richards, Springmann, and McVey, 2005).
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First, U.S. Space Transportation Policy is reviewed, and OOS is recognized as an enabler of
emerging national space transportation requirements. Second, customary international and
United States laws are then explored as potential constraining forces on future servicing
missions. Third, potential financing models and the issue of insurance for OOS are discussed
and identified as the principal challenges facing implementation of a servicing system. This
chapter offers a positive forecast for the future of OOS and endorses continued government
support for proof-of-concept missions.
7.1 Policy Rationale
As the foundation for future government capabilities in space, it is necessary to consult national
space policy to justify government on-orbit servicing operations. In the post-Cold War,
development of a servicing capability was consistent with national space policy directives but
not explicitly addressed. In a victory for proponents of OOS, the recently released U.S. Space
Transportation Policy outlines a next-generation technology development program and
specifically endorses development of OOS capabilities. In addition to discussing the evolution
of U.S. space policy, this section will also address other important stakeholders of OOS and the
challenges these stakeholders might impose on implementation of a space tug system.
7.1.1 Post-Cold War National Space Policy
Until recently, the only published post-Cold War statement of U.S. space policy was the 1996
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) guidelines for national space security (White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy, 1996). Developed by the National Science and
Technology Council (NSTC), PDD/NSTC 8 provides a direction for U.S. space activities that is
consistent with the development of an OOS capability. Although servicing operations are not
mentioned specifically in PDD/NSTC 8, a servicing system might constitute a means of
accomplishing many of the guidelines outlined in the directive. For example, in the guidelines
for civil space activities, NASA is instructed to develop "new and innovative space
technologies.. .to improve the performance and lower the cost of future space missions." The
potential space tug capabilities of relocation and refueling of satellites-which otherwise will fail
to perform their mission-are certainly "new and innovative space technologies" that come at a
lower cost than the replacement option. Indeed, NASA's Hubble Telescope provides not only a
dramatic precedent for future servicing missions but also an excellent example of a space system
remaining state-of-the-art through a series of servicing missions-at a fraction of the cost of
launching new systems (see Section 2.2.1). By automating a process currently only performed
by astronauts and Shuttle, OOS offer the potential to expand the benefits of servicing enjoyed by
Hubble to many government and commercial satellites.
7.1.2 New National Space Policy
The new U.S. Space Transportation Policy, authorized by President Bush in December 2004 and
released by the White House Office of Science and Technology on January 6, 2005, extends and
clarifies the 1996 Presidential Decision Directive in the area of OOS by explicitly endorsing
space tug technology development (White House Office of Science and Technology Policy,
2005). The new policy emphasizes a technology development program "that dramatically
improves the reliability, responsiveness, and cost of access to, transport through, and return from
space." This transformation of the U.S. space transportation infrastructure is found essential
both to augment "space-based capabilities in a timely manner in the event of increased
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operational needs," and minimize "disruptions due to on-orbit satellite failures, launch failures,
or deliberate actions against U.S. space assets." As a means to these improvements, U.S. Space
Transportation Policy directs a sustained research and development effort that includes
"automated rendezvous docking, and the ability to deploy, service, and retrieve payloads or
spacecraft in Earth orbit."
7.1.3 Policy Challenges
Although OOS technology will likely be developed in accordance with U.S. Space
Transportation Policy, the actual deployment of such a system is uncertain due to the nature of
its potential customers. The primary policy challenge facing implementation of a servicing
system is gaining the trust of satellite operators to fund missions such as lifetime extension or
orbital transfer. This challenge is particularly great in the Air Force, where program managers of
national space assets are traditionally risk-adverse and might hold a short-term outlook of
satellite operations given that the tenure of many program managers is less than two years
(Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, 2003). To overcome this barrier,
it might be necessary to review the incentive structure of Air Force program managers.
Lengthening tours-of-duty of program managers or providing career incentives to program
managers who extend mission life of space assets are possible improvements. Another
alternative is to make mission life extension a requirement for high-value space assets.
All space-faring nations are stakeholders in the development of a OOS system. Foreign nations
might welcome the development of a servicing vehicle as an enabling tool for flexible mission
profiles or might fear the new capability on safety or strategic grounds. The potential for
negative international reaction to a U.S. orbital correction capability is one of the key challenges
facing OOS implementation. What if space tugs are perceived as a space weapon and the U.S.
government faces stiff international resistance? In the eyes of U.S. policymakers, will the
political capital required to gain international acceptance of this capability outweigh the extended
lifetimes of national space assets? During the Cold War, the Soviet Union viewed the Space
Shuttle as a weapon in Low Earth Orbit, capable of docking and manipulating a variety of
sensitive on-orbit assets. In light of these concerns, one strategy to improve international
acceptance of OOS is to describe in detail what the functions of a servicing system are (e.g.,
orbital transfer, lifetime extension) and what they are not (militarization of space). Another
mechanism to increase international acceptance of an OOS system is to offer a notification
protocol whereby mission profiles of servicing vehicles such as space tugs are shared with other
space-faring nations. The issue of bringing transparency to OOS operations is discussed further
in Section 7.2.1.2 On-Orbit Liability and Registration.
7.2 Legal Constraints
Legal constraints for space tug operations can be divided into three categories: customary
international law, U.S. law, and the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).
Since its establishment in 1959, the United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COUPOS) has launched five major international legal instruments that form the bulk of laws
governing space. Other customary international space laws are derived from bilateral arms
control treaties between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. National legal principles relevant to space tug
operations include U.S. criminal law pertaining to interference with the operation of a satellite,
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export control policy which may prevent international OOS, and classification concerns which
may limit the size of OOS markets.
Table 7.1 Relevant International and National Legal Instruments
1967 Article VIII: Provides a state jurisdiction and
Outer Space Treaty control over its registered space objects
Article 11: Holds a state liable for damage caused
by its launched space objects
Liability Convention Article Ill: Determines liability by fault
Article IV: Holds states jointly liable if a collision
of their space objects causes third party damage
1973 Bans harmful interference to the communications
Telecommunication Convention of other states
1975 Requires states to maintain a registry of objects
Registration Convention launched into space
US Criminal Law Makes interference with satellite communications
Title 18, Section 1367 a federal offense
1976 Created ITAR and the United States Munitions
US Arms Export Control Ad List which regards all satellites and most space
systems as munitions subject to export control
7.2.1 International Legal Principles
Three COUPOS treaties-the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1972 Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, and the 1975 Convention on Registration-
contain provisions which may set forth legal constraints for OOS operations. In addition to the
COUPOS treaties, the 1973 International Telecommunication Convention also has implications
for space tug parking orbits and phasing maneuvers.
7.2.1.1 Jurisdiction and Control of Space Objects
According to Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty, a country retains jurisdiction and control
over its registered space objects. Additionally, Article VI provides that states bear international
responsibility for government and private space activities and must supervise and regulate
national activities in space whether conducted by government agencies or non-governmental
entities.
A servicing capability in GEO would enable a variety of missions including the relocation of
functioning space objects and the retrieval or salvage of nonfunctioning space objects. However,
customary international law strictly limits missions of this variety to national space assets.
Peacetime retrieval, alteration of orbit, or any other form of interference with foreign space
objects would be unlawful without prior consent.
The retrieval or removal of nonfunctioning foreign space objects is also banned by customary
international law. Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty clearly holds that state property
remains state property unless relinquished. The case of non-functioning satellites on-orbit is
analogous to the case of sunken ships. The United States and most other countries have
consistently upheld the principle that sunken ships remain the property of the flag state unless
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rights are transferred or explicitly abandoned (where abandonment cannot be implied from the
absence of acts demonstrating interest in such property, even over long periods of time).
Therefore, although a servicing capability such as a space tug near the geostationary belt would
make possible a variety of relocation, retrieval, and salvage missions, customary international
law would limit such operations to strictly national space objects.
7.2.1.2 On-Orbit Liability and Registration
The issue of liability in space has drawn attention since the dawn of the space age. Orbital
transfer vehicles designed to dock with multiple space objects such as space tugs are likely to
attract further attention to this area of international concern. Although the Outer Space Treaty
provides that states bear international responsibility for all national space activities, it does not
provide any mechanism for resolving liability disputes that may arise.
The 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects fills the
void left by the Outer Space Treaty by clearly defining customary international legal principles
in the areas of fault and liability and by establishing a dispute settlement mechanism for damage
caused by collisions in space. Article II of the Liability Convention provides that a launching
state is absolutely liable for damage caused by its space objects in space, and Article III provides
that this liability is determined by fault. In cases where diplomatic negotiations fail, the Liability
Convention enables signatories to request the formation of a Claims Commission to rule on the
issue of fault and to determine the amount of compensation due. However, in the history of the
Liability Convention, a Claims Convention has never been established due to the low frequency
of incidents of damage in space from collisions between spacecraft or with space debris. The
most serious collision in space-the 1996 collision of a French Cerise military satellite with an
Ariane upper stage-involved two French space objects, so the question of international liability
never arose (Schildge, 2003).
Space tug operations would require new interpretations of the Liability Convention and could
serve as the impetus for innovative contractual relationships between space tug operators and
operators of target satellites. A worst-case scenario illuminates why the assignment of fault in
the course of space tug operations may not be a clear decision. Suppose a tug fails to safely
rendezvous with a target satellite and instead crashes into the satellite. Then, suppose debris
from the fractured satellite damages a third-party satellite. Which party is at fault for the third-
party damage, the tug operator or the operator of the fractured satellite that physically caused the
damage?
The Liability Convention holds the launching state responsible for damage caused by its space
objects and offers insight into the case of third-party damage. According to Article IV, in the
event of damage being caused in space to a space object of one launching state by a space object
of another launching state, and of damage thereby being caused to a third state, the first two
states are jointly liable. Furthermore, in cases of joint liability, the burden of compensation for
the damage is divided between the first two states in accordance with the extent to which they
were at fault. Finally, if the extent of the fault of each of these states cannot be established, the
burden of compensation shall be divided equally between them.
The uncertainty associated with liability claims would need to be addressed contractually
between space tug service providers and satellite operator customers prior to space tug
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operations. The Liability Convention is not sufficient in itself to resolve liability. The
Convention has already become outmoded in other areas, such as commercial launch, where
fault is assigned to launching states despite the frequent practice of packaging a payload from
one state inside a launch vehicle of another. Just as liability for multi-party commercial launches
are resolved contractually, so, too, might liability issues be resolved for space tug operations.
The 1975 Convention on Registration of Space Objects requires a state to maintain a registry of
objects it launches into space. Information on each registered object-including date and
location of launch, basic orbital parameters, and the general function of the space object-is to
be provided in timely manner to the United Nations register for full and open access to the
international community.
Current customary international law pertaining to registration and liability does not assign direct
legal constraints to space tugs but may be amended in the future as satellite servicing operations
mature. A significant exemption to the Registration Convention is the lack of a requirement for
states to provide updated orbital properties if space objects move from original orbits as
functioning space tugs certainly would. Although national security space assets currently move
to unreported orbits without issue, the high frequency of phasing maneuvers inherent to space
tugs may prompt calls for eliminating this gap in the Registration Convention. Liability
concerns could drive calls for strict notification requirements of changing space tug orbital
properties. For example, in the case of a space tug operating in undisclosed orbit and
accidentally colliding with another state's space object, the injured party would want accurately
to attribute fault for a liability claim to the offending tug, not be led to believe that orbital debris
is the cause of damage.
7.2.1.3 Noninterference with Communications
The 1973 International Telecommunication Convention holds that all space objects must be
operated so as not to cause harmful interference to the radio services or communications of
others. Traditionally, this interference is linked to issues of limited bandwidth and frequency.
For space tug operations in the highly-populated GEO belt, it is also necessary to avoid physical
blockage of communication beams. Appropriate parking orbits and rendezvous maneuvers for
avoiding communication beams of GEO spacecraft during space tug operations are discussed in
Appendix F - Space Tug Concept-of-Operations.
7.2.2 U.S. National Law
U.S. national law and regulations which may constrain future OOS operations include Title 18,
Section 1367, of U.S. Criminal Law, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations maintained
by the U.S. Department of State, and classification of government spacecraft.
7.2.2.1 U.S. Criminal Law
U.S. criminal law Title 18, Section 1367, pertains to interference with the operation of a satellite.
This statute makes it a federal criminal offense for anyone who, "without the authority of the
satellite operator, intentionally or maliciously interferes with the authorized operation of a
communications or weather satellite or obstructs or hinders any satellite transmission." Title 18,
Section 1367, specifically exempts U.S. government agencies involved in lawfully authorized
investigative, protective, and intelligence activities. For space tug operations in the GEO belt,
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this statute serves to reinforce the international requirement of noninterference with
communications.
7.2.2.2 International Traffic in Arms Regulations
Would ITAR prevent international on-orbit servicing? Fear of export control violations might
deter entry of OOS providers into a global satellite servicing market. The relative scientific
advantage of the United States to other countries is recognized as a critical enabler of U.S.
military capabilities. Space technology in particular has become a vital component of the United
States military. The U.S. military utilizes space for many key aspects of military operations:
communications; navigation; missile warning; weather forecasting; and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance. Satellites are efficient means to collect, transmit, and
distribute information to the warfighter (Fernandez, 2004). Foreign entities employ a variety of
techniques to glean militarily applicable knowledge from the United States. Knowledge transfer
may occur through covert actions as well as overt methods. Whether channeled through illegal
purchases of equipment from third party nations and industrial espionage by foreign agents or
through academic exchanges and open literature, technology transfers can be militarily
significant. Regulations must, therefore, uphold the national security interests of the United
States.
The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 is the legal foundation of United States export control
policy-manifested in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. Recognizing the need for
the United States to control the spread of weapons technologies, the Arms Export Control Act
(i.e., 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1)) grants the Executive Branch the authority to designate items-
comprising the United States Munitions List (USML)-considered defense articles or services.
The USML is administered on behalf of the President by the Department of State's Directorate
of Defense Trade Controls. In principle, ITAR serves as a mechanism by which the U.S.
government may limit the export of technology and information to foreign nations and nationals
who might use those exports against U.S. interests. Examining the USML provides insight into
the scope of exports that are prohibited by ITAR. Divided into 21 categories, the USML
includes everything from firearms and assault weapons to protective personnel equipment and
shelters. Category IV, "Launch Vehicles, Guided Missiles, Ballistic Missiles, Rockets,
Torpedoes, Bombs and Mines," and Category XV, "Spacecraft Systems and Associated
Equipment," are of particular interest to potential OOS providers as they include such items as
ground control stations for telemetry, tracking, and control; radiation-hardened microelectronics;
rockets; all satellites; launch vehicles and their power plants; and all related technical data. The
breadth of the USML leaves room for individual interpretations by enforcement agents within
the State Department and, hence, may cause uncertainty in the minds of those who are engaged
in the increasingly global space industry (Broniatowski, Jordan, Long, Richards, and Weibel,
2005).
In general, ITAR requires a license for the export of military information, technologies, and
equipment to some foreign nations, organizations, and citizens and prohibits outright the transfer
of such technology to others. Projects which employ foreign nationals from any country are
therefore subject to added scrutiny with respect to international arms export restrictions. In order
to export an item that appears on the USML, one must obtain an ITAR export license from the
State Department unless one qualifies for a licensing exemption. As published in the Federal
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Register on March 29, 2002, licensing exemptions for spacecraft systems and associated
equipment may be available to members of the North American Treaty Organization (NATO),
the European Union, the European Space Agency, and major non-NATO allies for fundamental
research (Broniatowski, Jordan, Long, Richards, and Weibel, 2005).
In reviewing the primary documents comprising export control policy, it is not clear if the
sharing of technical information (e.g., satellite bus structure for docking operations) between an
OOS provider of one national and an OOS customer of another nation would be allowed under
ITAR. Empirical evidence suggests it might not be. In April 1998, the Justice Department
began a criminal investigation into whether Loral Space and Communications, Ltd., and Hughes
Electronics Corp. violated export control law during launch accident investigations. Both cases
involve proliferation concerns with the mating of U.S.-built satellites to Chinese launch vehicles.
In 1995, a Long March rocket exploded and destroyed the Hughes-built Apstar-2 satellite. A
year later, another Long March exploded, destroying the Loral-built Intelsat-708 satellite. At the
insistence of insurance companies, the launch accidents were reviewed, during which time U.S.
expertise was allegedly transferred to China that could enhance the guidance and control systems
of its nuclear ballistic missiles.2 In 2002, Loral agreed to a civil settlement of $20 million. In
early 2003 Hughes and Boeing Satellite Systems settled for $32 million (Kan, 2003).
The threat of violating export control policy might deter entry of U.S. OOS providers into a
global satellite servicing market. As observed in Table 7.2 and Figure 7.2, potential customer
satellite operators are distributed globally. Perhaps only the United States possesses enough
satellites to construct a commercially viable servicing model. However, economic analyses of
OOS viability under even the most favorable circumstances-GEO lifetime extension-is
already questionable given the need for compatibility between the provider and customer across
several dimensions including value, technology, and timing. Splicing OOS markets further by
limiting servicing to domestic satellites will not help already fragile business models.3
Table 7.2 Distribution of Active Satellites by Country of Operator
Civil Commercial Military Total
United States 58 265 71 394
Russia 7 26 57 90
China 17 10 8 35
Rest of World 96 128 30 254
2 After suffering satellite launch failures in 1992, 1995, and 1996, China reportedly had 27 consecutive, successful
launches through 2002 (Kan, 2003).
3 Of active GEO communications satellites, 102 will reach their EOL between 2005 and 2016 (Long and Hastings,
2005). However, only 42% are owned/operated by the United States (UCS Satellite Database, 2006).
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Figure 7.2 Distribution of Satellites by Country of Operator
7.2.2.3 Classification
Another concern related to the sensitivity of satellite designs facing OOS providers is the
classification of various government spacecraft. Would classification prevent a country's
military and intelligence spacecraft from using a shared servicing vehicle? Would it be legally
possible for a commercial satellite to use a servicing vehicle that also services classified
government spacecraft? The issue of government-commercial collaboration in space is
addressed from a financing perspective in Section 7.3.
7.3 Financial Challenges
A variety of civil and military programs to verify technologies needed for space tug operations
and on-orbit servicing are in development. While technological breakthroughs are necessary
before OOS becomes a reality, this is only one aspect of the problem. Perhaps the greatest
challenge to implementation of space tug systems is financial. A number of papers have made a
strong business case for OOS (see Section 2.4.2). However, little work has been done in the
areas of financing and insuring OOS operations. After highlighting the themes characterizing the
financial challenges facing OOS, this section reviews candidate financing models for an OOS
provider and analyzes the issue of insuring servicing vehicles.
7.3.1 Economic Themes
In addition to enabling unique missions, on-orbit servicing has been proposed as a tool for
improving the economic efficiency of space systems. However, economic barriers stand in the
way of the development of servicing vehicles themselves. The reason for this is that the OOS
market offered by any one satellite operator is probably not a commercially viable proposition,
thus necessitating an OOS provider to serve multiple satellite customers. Multiple satellite
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customers with unique requirements are a barrier to the commoditization (and affordability) of
serviceability. Five economic themes characterize the set of challenges that must be overcome to
achieve a robust OOS industry: the "chicken and the egg," an embedded paradigm, a collective
action dilemma, problems with market definition, and unstable property rights.
7.3.1.1 "Chicken and the Egg"
The "chicken and the egg" problem constitutes one of the most fundamental hurdles to OOS
implementation. From the customer perspective, satellite design will not change to
accommodate servicing vehicles until they are built and flight-tested. On the provider side,
investments will not be made in OOS technology until a demand exists for OOS-a demand
driven to a large extent by the existence of satellites designed to be serviced. With demand
required to justify the provider's investment and the provider infrastructure required to generate
demand, the "chicken and the egg" problem leads to a circular argument (Joppin, 2004).
Without external forces affecting supply and demand (e.g., government-sponsored proof-of-
concept missions, tax incentives), market forces themselves may not be adequate to foster an
OOS industry.
7.3.1.2 Embedded Paradigm
Another OOS implementation challenge is the embedded paradigm of satellite design. The need
to get satellite manufacturers to accept the concept of OOS is a potential impediment to satellite
servicing. Assuming the economic case has been made for satellite operators to invest in
serviceable spacecraft due to lifecycle cost savings, it is not clear what incentive satellite
manufacturers have to offer serviceable designs. Would the added revenue from marginally
increased price for serviceable spacecraft offset the development costs of new, modular satellite
bus designs? More importantly, if a market shift to serviceable satellites occurs, what are the
implications for satellite demand? Satellite manufacturers will be against OOS if they believe
the ability for satellite operators to perform in-orbit maintenance will only increase satellite
lifetime and not open new business opportunities.
Lessons learned from the automobile industry indicate that OOS may create new business
opportunities for satellite manufacturers. In the automobile industry, substantial revenue comes
from both the initial sale of cars as well as an aftermarket of sales and maintenance services
(Long, 2004). Satellite manufacturers may invest in OOS if they believe they can leverage their
traditional expertise in capturing a potential satellite aftermarket.
7.3.1.3 Collective Action Dilemma
Another economic challenge facing OOS implementation is the question of who pays for the
initial research and development as well as infrastructure. While numerous government and
commercial organizations stand to benefit from OOS when provided at marginal cost, few
organizations can contemplate developing a satellite servicing infrastructure on their own. The
U.S. government is one such organization, and precedents exist for the funding of projects with
both government and commercial benefits (e.g., Intelsat).
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7.3.1.4 Problems with Market Definition
Defining the market to serve is a fundamental problem facing OOS providers. First, potential
target satellites are distributed in numerous orbital zones. Second, different services are
available (i.e., inspect, relocate, restore, augment, assemble). Third, the price charged for
servicing must cover provider costs and also be an attractive value proposition to the target
satellite operator. Fourth, the servicing vehicle must be compatible with the target satellite for
proximity and docking operations. Fifth, time horizons must be aligned such that a servicing
request occurs during the operational life of a servicing vehicle. Sixth, for the case of a U.S.
servicing provider, the scope of the OOS market may need to be limited to U.S. satellites to
prevent export control violations. Seventh, servicing market size may be further reduced due to
classified government spacecraft. A robust OOS business plan must address all seven of these
issues when defining the target market.
7.3.1.5 Unstable Property Rights
The utilization of a common resource (e.g., GEO space tug) by multiple users may bring about a
situation of unstable property rights. In one hypothetical scenario, a servicing vehicle with a
finite set of customers performs two types of missions: scheduled maintenance and on-demand
emergency repairs. If a scheduled maintenance and an on-demand emergency repair are
requested at the same time, what mission should the servicing provider conduct first? What if
two on-demand emergency repairs are requested simultaneously, forcing a servicing provider to
choose which satellite to save?
In another hypothetical scenario, the U.S. government may develop and deploy servicing
vehicles on-orbit as part of a national infrastructure in space. As part of a campaign to boost the
servicing market, the government encourages commercial satellite operators to incorporate less
redundancy in their designs and instead rely on a government OOS capability provided at
marginal cost. One question likely to be asked by commercial industry is what the concept of
operations will be for a government servicing vehicle with competing commercial and
government servicing requests. Given the lessons learned in the wake of the Challenger
accident-when the U.S. government limited use of the Shuttle to the launch of communications
satellites with national security or foreign policy implications (after previously undercutting the
commercial expendable launch vehicle market)-commercial satellite operators may not be
persuaded to rely on a government-provided OOS infrastructure.
Another economic theme falling within the category of unstable property rights is the tragedy of
the commons. A tragedy of the commons occurs when a freely-available shared resource is
overused to the point where it is no longer useful to anyone. Like the high seas, space is a
commons shared by all space-faring nations. Utilization of space deposits orbital debris (e.g.,
dead satellites, spent upper stages, separation devices, bolts, and paint chips). Orbital debris is a
tragedy of the commons problem in that the marginal cost of "littering" in space is nil, yet the
cumulative degradation of the space environment due to debris deposits may hinder space
utilization in the long-term. One possible mission of OOS is orbital debris cleanup. However,
organizing the diverse set of space-faring nations beyond agreeing to voluntary orbital debris
mitigation standards is a challenge. As such, the potential OOS mission of orbital debris cleanup
may be underfunded due to the lack of space environment "ownership."
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7.3.2 Financing Models
Government-commercial cost sharing precedents exist for space assets and other shared
resources. However, it is unclear what type of financing model space tug operations will assume
or how the issue of proprietary development will impact financing. The Commercial Space
Competitiveness Act of 1992 authorized NASA and other agencies to make their facilities
available to private entities. This provides a number of options for ownership, operation, and use
of a satellite servicing system. Four financing models are discussed below.
7.3.2.1 Government Owned and Operated with No Commercial Use
This most restrictive case would entail U.S. government development, ownership, and operation
of an OOS capability with no cost-sharing or use by private industry. An example is the Milstar
satellite communication system. Although the most simplistic financing model with near-term
potential, an all-government system would limit the benefits of space tug operations to civil,
military, and intelligence space systems.
If only owned and operated by the U.S. government, the organizational structure of the OOS
provider is an open question. The servicing provider might be an existing government agency, a
coalition of government agencies, or a new government agency.
7.3.2.2 Government Owned and Operated with Commercial Use
The United States has a history of developing systems for government purposes that end up
being utilized as shared resources. For example, the interstate highway system was constructed
to satisfy a defense policy of moving troops around the country more efficiently.
An example of government ownership and operation in space with commercial use is the
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS). TDRSS is owned by NASA and supports
near real-time communications between low Earth orbit satellites and Earth. Under the
Commercial Space Competitiveness Act of 1992, NASA allows the private firm SpaceData
International (SDI) of the marine seismic industry to operate four underutilized TDRSS satellites
on a time-share basis. SDI provides per-minute payments to NASA for use of the TDRSS
satellites in frequency bands allocated to US government use (Federal Communications
Commission, 2001). Similarly, if the Air Force were to develop a space tug system, it may make
sense to allow commercial use at marginal cost.
A public-private partnership (PPP) is a financing scheme whereby OOS would be funded and
operated through a combination of government and one or more private companies. These
partnerships range from public-oriented arrangements (e.g., public authority in which a public
organization is created to act like a private company, contract-based relationships where
government is able to outsource work) to private sector-oriented arrangements (e.g., buy-build-
operate, build-own-operate). The PPP financing model leverages the ability of the government
to bear risk and supply a market with the ability of industry to provide flexibility and superior
managerial skills (McConnell, 2003).
The PPP financing model is well-suited to OOS implementation due to its ability to provide the
necessary capital base for OOS technology development with the flexibility to allow the
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commercialization of services and products that would not occur with a strictly government OOS
capability.
7.3.2.3 Commercially Owned and Operated for Commercial and Government Use
Commercial ownership and operation of a space system for commercial and government users
(e.g., the Iridium Satellite System) is another financing option for OOS. Currently, Orbital
Recovery Corporation is developing an "orbital tugboat" concept, Spacecraft Life Extension
System (SLES), to supply propulsion, navigation and guidance to maintain a satellite in its
orbital slot for 10+ years (Section 2.2.3). Exploratory commercial ventures such as SLES will
gain credibility as the government invests in a sustained research and development program of
autonomous rendezvous and docking technology.
The private sector in the United States is particularly adept at developing commercially-viable
systems once the government has bridged the gap between fundamental research and deployable
technology by funding high-risk research and development. For example, the origins of the
internet can be traced to the "ARPANET" project of the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency during the Cold War which aimed to create a distributed communications network that
could survive a nuclear strike. Satellite servicing and space tug technology investment, such as
continued funding of DARPA's Orbital Express and SUMO programs, may have equivalent
implications for the satellite industry.
7.3.3 Insuring Servicing Vehicles
The TDRSS-SDI relationship is a good example of a government owned and operated space
system with commercial use. However, the liability issue associated with the government-
commercial sharing of TDRSS bandwidth is not of the same magnitude as the liability issues
associated with a spacecraft approaching and docking with another spacecraft. Sharing excess
bandwidth certainly does not entail the same level of risk as docking two spacecraft. In addition
to the utilization of safe approach maneuvers (e.g., see Zero Closing Speed Guidance in
Appendix F), mitigation of the risk associated with OOS operations can also be accomplished
through financial instruments such as on-orbit insurance.
Space insurance providers are typically large multinational conglomerates with large premium
bases. The space insurance industry is characterized by volatile market conditions. Current
premiums are closely tied to recent returns. In recent years, the space insurance market has
"hardened" after the "soft" market of the late 1990's that featured low premiums and coverage
often extending from launch plus five years of mission life (Federal Aviation Administration,
2002).
Given that it is often difficult for satellite operators to secure reasonable premium for in-orbit
insurance policies for normal operations, obtaining affordable insurance for space tug missions is
a significant challenge. During the assessment process for space mission coverage, underwriters
scrutinize the intended mission profile and conduct detailed reliability analyses of the launch
vehicle and satellite. With an underwriting process that places great weight on past performance,
obtaining reasonable insurance for OOS missions in the near-term may be impossible. As such,
it is critical for the government to support standard-setting and proof-of-concept satellite
servicing missions to provide commercial space tug operators access to insurance.
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7.4 Meeting the Challenges
Challenges exist across political, legal, operational, and financial dimensions for potential on-
orbit servicing providers. However, the financial aspect poses the greatest hurdle.
From the political and legal perspective, the greatest difficulty in rolling out an OOS system will
be overcoming resistance from the international community. Despite the functional intentions of
a servicing provider, having a capability to arbitrarily move space object around on orbit is sure
to generate some objections as the Space Shuttle did during its development. Avenues exist for
mitigating this concern. The U.S. military is adept at summarizing its core functionalities in
language that is readily understood in the international community. For instance, military OOS
operations could be framed in terms of "freedom of space." A commercial space tug provider
might frame its operations in terms of reducing the liability of companies responsible for space
junk.
On the operational side, the technical hurdles that remain in the way of OOS are not
insurmountable. In fact, as has been noted, the major remaining technology developments are
under way. The most significant of these is an arbitrary docking capability. One area that needs
to be studied in more detail is the potential for electromagnetic interference between the
servicing vehicle and the target satellite. Although this will probably not present any major
problems, it warrants further study. A larger problem for an operational servicing system will be
maintaining its capability across changing satellite architectures, which could eventually be very
different than what is in orbit presently.
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Figure 7.3 Challenges and Solutions for On-Orbit Servicing Implementation
The greatest barrier to an OOS system is the financial challenge. Collective action problems
exist in government, and economic viability has not been demonstrated to potential commercial
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servicing providers. Although U.S. Space Transportation Policy endorses on-orbit servicing
technology development, risk-adverse military space program managers are unlikely to pay for
servicing capabilities individually; and the research and development costs, combined with the
risk, appear to be too high for the commercial sector to undertake development on its own.
Innovative financing arrangements between government and industry may be possible once an
operational servicing vehicle exists (e.g., public-private partnership). Initially, however, the
"chicken and the egg" problem-the facts that satellites will not be designed for serviceability
before a servicing vehicle is developed and that no commercial provider will invest in OOS
before a servicing market exists-indicates that the government will need to continue to bear the
brunt of unmanned on-orbit servicing technology development through programs such as Orbital
Express. Overcoming the "chicken and the egg" problem is also achievable technically through
the development of non-intrusive servicing technology that requires no modifications to
currently active satellites (e.g., Spacecraft for Universal Modification of Orbits, GEO lifetime
extension ).
One of the first steps towards overcoming the embedded paradigm of traditional satellite design
is convincing satellite manufacturers that they have incentives to offer serviceable designs. One
of these incentives is a potential commercial satellite aftermarket based upon the automobile
industry model whereby manufacturers generate revenue from an aftermarket of used car sales
and maintenance services.
Given the applications of OOS to enhance space system availability, performance, and
capability, the most likely implementation route for OOS is to satisfy military missions. If OOS
can demonstrate unique capabilities such as the ability quickly to repair failed satellites, perform
upgrades to prevent technological obsolescence, and refuel spacecraft on-orbit to enable
maneuverable satellites, the military utility provided by OOS might allow a strong national
security argument for servicing. Following the Shuttle experience, in which NASA justified
costs with the promise of a commercial market that failed to materialize (as well as the Air Force
experience with the EELV commercial market), attempts to defend OOS as anything more than a
defense program will probably fail. However, if the military does develop a servicing capability,
that capability may be made more cost-effective by recognizing it as part of a national servicing
infrastructure in space and extending its use to civil and commercial sectors.
4 In some cases, GEO retirement missions could extend operational life of spacecraft by as much as four years due to
inaccurate fuel gauges which force operators to be very conservative in the timing of maneuvers to super-
synchronous orbit (McVey, 2004). Typical extensions can be expected to be approximately one year, translating to
roughly $1 OOM in additional transponder revenue for GEO communications spacecraft.
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8 Discussion
This thesis is focused on fostering an understanding of the attributes which characterize the
physical amenability of satellites to OOS. In the previous chapters, a three-step process was
followed to perform serviceability assessments. First, an ordered taxonomy of space systems
was constructed to add structure to the problem and to identify satellite attributes that drive
servicing mission complexity (Chapter 3). Second, a methodology was proposed to assess
serviceability across the four servicing activities of rendezvous, acquire, access, and service
(Chapter 4). This included development of an agent-based model based on orbital transfers in
the GEO belt as well as a framework in which serviceability was decomposed into four elements:
(1) knowledge of target satellite state, (2) scale of servicing activities, (3) precision required, and
(4) temporal constraints. Third, the value of architecture frameworks and systems engineering
modeling languages for conducting serviceability assessments was explored through the
development of a discrete event simulation of the Hubble Space Telescope (Chapter 5). The
technical portion of the thesis concluded with prescriptive technical considerations for designing
serviceable satellites (Chapter 6) followed by a discussion of the political, legal, and financial
challenges facing servicing providers (Chapter 7).
This chapter discusses the implications of the research, related ongoing work at MIT, and
possible extensions of the thesis. In particular, the following questions are addressed:
e What are the contributions and extensions of this thesis?
o What are the implications of this research?
o What related work is currently being conducted at MIT?
o What opportunities exist for future research?
8.1 Implications of Research
This section discusses the applicability, limitations, and unique contributions of the research.
8.1.1 Applicability
The general goal of this research is to address the problems and limitations associated with
traditional design, acquisition, and operation of space systems by proposing and demonstrating
the value of a more flexible approach. In particular, this thesis aims to improve the state of
knowledge regarding on-orbit servicing and the practice of systems engineering as it relates to
system architecture and design. As this work integrates and builds on many previous OOS
studies, it is hoped that this thesis will allow one to rapidly survey the breadth of previous work
done on OOS as well as identify related technical, economic, and social factors.
Although focused on the space systems domain, this work may be extended to other domains. In
this thesis, the serviceability framework has been applied to satellites, yet nothing in this
methodology is unique to space systems or robotic servicing vehicles. Derived from lessons
extracted from the servicing of offshore oil platforms, the serviceability framework may be
applied to assessing the complexity of servicing operations of systems in any environment by
any means (e.g., nuclear reactors, toxic waste clean-up, improvised explosive device detection
and removal in Iraq). While metrics for assessing each of the serviceability parameters are
domain-dependent, the serviceability parameters themselves apply across servicing missions.
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8.1.2 Limitations
The principal limitation of this work was the lack of comprehensive data on satellite bus
characteristics across space system architectures. While a methodology was developed to assess
serviceability across both "orbit serviceability" (i.e., rendezvous activity) and "satellite bus
serviceability" (i.e., acquire, access, and service activities), the availability of data limited the
implementation of the methodology to "orbit serviceability" assessments.
Another limitation of this work is that only one case study (i.e., Hubble Space Telescope) was
conducted to explore the value of architecture frameworks and associated executable models for
dynamic serviceability assessments. On its own, the DoDAF and discrete event simulation of
Hubble does not provide insights into whether Hubble is more or less physically amenable to
servicing than other space systems.
8.1.3 Unique Contributions
Many previous studies have addressed the issue of OOS customer architecture through valuation
studies and point designs of future serviceable space system architectures. Therefore, much of
the content of this thesis is based on existing knowledge (e.g., Sullivan's empirical data on
satellite failures which informs the agent model of OOS in Section 4.2). However, two factors
that make this work unique are: (1) the focus on serviceability for existing satellites and (2)
integration of a wide range of disciplines-from astrodynamics and robotics to architecture
frameworks and systems engineering modeling languages-that breaks the paradigm of tightly-
scoped studies which address only a limited set of OOS issues.
8.2 Ongoing Related Research
This section discusses the relationship between this thesis and ongoing research at MIT by Jason
Bartolomei on screening for real options, Spencer Lewis on functional emergence, Charlotte
Mathieu on distributed spacecraft, Adam Ross on system changeability, and Nirav Shah on
system-of-systems.
8.2.1 Bartolomei - Screening for Real Options
Air Force Captain Jason Bartolomei (ESD Ph.D., expected 2007) is developing an analytical
framework for screening for real options in engineering systems.' Documenting the need to
develop flexible systems in order to improve operational, technical, and programmatic
effectiveness, he is applying real options thinking to weapons acquisitions as a means to "deftly
avoid downside consequences or exploit upside opportunities" (Bartolomei, et al., 2006). On-
orbit servicing is effectively a manifestation of real options for satellites. As such, Bartolomei's
framework might be useful for screening for OOS opportunities.
Captain Bartolomei is employing a two-phase process to capture knowledge about the physical
and non-physical aspects of systems, insight into sources of change, and the ability to examine
the dynamic behavior of a system: (1) create a lifecycle representation of engineering systems
Real options are defined as the right, but not the obligation, to take an action at a predetermined cost at a
predetermined time. These are referred to as 'real options' because they apply to physical (tangible) assets rather
than financial instruments.
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using coupled Design Structure Matrices that includes endogenous interactions across system
views and interactions with system environment and (2) model the evolution of engineering
systems in order to identify opportunities for real options. He is currently constructing an end-
to-end system representation of a mini-air vehicle.
8.2.2 Lewis - Functional Emergence
Spencer Lewis (ESD Ph.D., expected 2007) is investigating what allows or encourages people to
utilize objects for applications beyond their original concepts while other objects remain
unmodified. He hopes to establish a link between functional emergence and a complex system's
architecture. Currently investigating GPS, Lewis is focused on the following research questions.
1) What architectural characteristics encourage functional emergence in complex engineering
systems?
2) What architectural characteristics allow systems to transfer from military sectors into civilian
markets?
3) What are the lifecycle characteristics of complex engineering systems?
OOS might encourage functional emergence in space systems. Furthermore, Lewis's detailed
case study of the 24+ GPS satellites might inform serviceability assessments.
8.2.3 Mathieu - Distributed Spacecraft
Charlotte Mathieu (Master of Science in Technology and Policy, 2006) is analyzing the use of
distributed spacecraft, a network of elements consisting of a free-flying payload supported by a
nearby free-flying infrastructure. As a means to improve the flexibility of traditional monolithic
spacecraft, the motivation driving spacecraft fractionation is very similar to the rationale for
OOS.
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Figure 8.1 Spacecraft Fractionation (Mathieu and Weigel, 2005)
To assess fractionation, Mathieu has developed utility functions characterizing customer
preferences and coupled these with models consisting of spacecraft design parameter such as
subsystem fractionation level and the number of infrastructure modules. Subsystems considered
"fractionable" are communications, control and data handling, power, attitude determination and
control, and propulsion. Mathieu has found that fractionation makes sense when non-traditional
attributes-maintainability, scalability, flexibility, and responsiveness-are valued highly
(Mathieu and Weigel, 2005).
8.2.4 Ross - System Changeability
Adam Ross's doctoral dissertation (ESD Ph.D., 2006) is focused on the management of
unarticulated stakeholder value (i.e., derived needs which emerge from the system in operation).
Unarticulated needs include those that are not explicitly communicated because the stakeholder
has forgotten them, or does not know them yet, or cannot express them in words. Ross
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highlights problems with the optimization approach to system design, noting that changing
objective functions and operational environments mean that systems will not necessarily remain
"best" over time. In fact, recent research suggests that highly optimized designs are fragile to
changing objectives and contexts (Carlson and Doyle, 2000).
As a representation of system modification, Ross introduces transition paths as a mechanism for
capturing the time and cost of system change. Traditional designers focused on enumerating
static system tradespaces might also include considerations for system change by creating
transition mechanisms. As an example, Ross discusses how this framework might be applied to
an OOS problem:
Consider a system design for a satellite in low earth orbit whose orbit must be changed, for whatever
reason, but whose fuel must remain at pre-orbit change levels. Possible transition rules include: 1) burning
on-board fuel to maneuver to a new orbit, followed by an on-orbit refuelability modification, and on-orbit
refueling to bring the on-board fuel back to pre-burn levels, 2) adding the refuelability modification prior to
launch, burning the on-board fuel to maneuver to a new orbit, followed by on-orbit refueling to bring the
on-board fuel back to pre-burn levels, 3) using a space tug to grab the satellite, move it to the new orbit, and
release, 4) purchase a new satellite that is inserted into the correct new orbit. The following two figures
[Table 8.1, Figure 8.2] show how these four path mechanisms result in different costs for having a system
change from the same state 1 to state 2.
Table 8.1 Sample Transition Paths for Perigee Lowering (Ross, 2006)
Paths
Goal DV Mechanism A Cost Type Example
Chanae "Doints"
erigee Delta V Gx Adjacent O-G
Delta V Add Refuelability Jx Augmented G+J
elta V Refuel Ex Distant J4E
elta Add Refuelability J'x Augmented O4J'
erigee Delta V G'x Distant J'4G'
elta V Refuel Ex Distant G'+E
erigee Add Tug Dx Augmented 0D
erigee Use Tug Hx Distant D+H
DV rese Purchase new lx Adjcent 0+
_________system-
Table 8.1 and Figure 8.2 depict the application of transition paths to perigee lowering. In
particular, Figure 8.2 illustrates the path dependency of architecture transitions with a horizontal
axis of change in cost and a vertical axis of utility.
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Figure 8.2 Sample Transition Paths for Perigee Lowering (Ross, 2006)
8.2.5 Shah - Systems-of-Systems
Nirav Shah's research (Aeronautics and Astronautics Ph.D., expected 2007) is focused on
systems-of-systems, collections of systems which work together for a common purpose and
exhibit operational and managerial independence. Given that space capabilities are often
provided by systems-of-systems (e.g., SBIRS), Shah's work informs analysis of many potential
OOS customers. Furthermore, architecting principles that enable systems-of-systems (e.g.,
modularity, loose couples) are applicable to serviceable spacecraft design.
8.3 Ideas for Future Research
This section proposes five research projects for extending this research: investigate redundancy
trades in the design of future spacecraft, extend the agent-based servicing model of orbital
transfers, populate the serviceability framework, analyze the tradespace of servicing provider
architectures, and explore serviceability as a case study in emergent behavior of complex
systems.
8.3.1 Investigate Spacecraft Redundancy Trades
Future work is needed to explore the trade between redundant, highly reliable space systems
(current paradigm), and lower cost, less redundant systems that utilize an OOS system to achieve
similar reliability. Lowering mission costs has been offered as a motivation for OOS such that
operators may choose to rely on servicing as a means to incorporate less redundancy into
spacecraft. Other proposals involve reducing upfront costs by designing satellites for shorter
lives and delaying the decision either to allocate funds for servicing or to abandon at a later date.
Although these justifications make intuitive sense, a rigorous analysis of the costs to incorporate
varying levels of redundancy in spacecraft would be a valuable contribution to OOS research.
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8.3.2 Extend Agent Model of Satellite Servicing
Although the focus of the agent-based model of OOS in Chapter 4 is on serviceability
assessments of target satellites, the model is readily adapted to the design of concept-of-
operations for servicing vehicles. With OOS is treated as a multi-variable optimization problem
between minimizing AV expenditures and transfer time, the model might be extended to parking
orbit selection, servicing architecture tradeoffs (e.g., number of servicing vehicles, whether to
include on-orbit supply depots), and analyzing servicing cost as a function of response time.
Further work might also incorporate innovative servicer-serviced relationships. For example,
Tsiotras and de Nailly (2005) have explored a decentralized, peer-to-peer refueling approach in
which there is no a priori designated refueling satellite. Instead, all satellites in the constellation
can assume the role of the refueling spacecraft.
8.3.3 Populate Serviceability Framework
Future work might build on this thesis by fully populating the serviceability framework
(developed in Chapter 4) with data from all operational satellites. While the UCS Satellite
Database was a good source for data on the orbital elements of satellites, it did not provide
enough technical data on the satellite bus for utilizing all of the serviceability metrics (Table
4.6). Satellite data on bus composition might be derived from integrating databases such as
those in Table 8.2. Detailed case studies might further validate the serviceability metrics.
Table 8.2 Satellite Databases (Sullivan, 2001)
Source Start Records Fields
Aerospace Source Book 1984 672 23
Celestrak Satellite Catalog 1957 5,383 7
Hibbard 1976 125 14
Hughes 1963 195 11
Intelsat 1980 30 15
Isakowtiz 1965 2,967 21
Jonathan's Space Report 1957 6,407 11
Mission Spacecraft Library 1957 5,107 19
NSSDC Master Catalog 1957 5,604 16
PanAmSat 1985 22 17
Satellite Today Database 1980 247 8
AGI Spacecraft Digest 1960 595 24
The Satellite Encyclopedia 1957 2,043 64
8.3.4 Analyze Provider Architecture Tradespace
The focus of this thesis was on the architecture of the supply side of on-orbit servicing. To fully
understand the on-orbit servicing marketplace, this analysis needs to be coupled with economic
valuation studies and modeling of the provider architecture tradespace. As a rapid and scalable
conceptual design process that applies decision theory to model and simulation-based design,
Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration (MATE) (Ross, 2003) is a strong candidate for the
concept generation and selection of commercially-viable on-orbit servicing architectures.
Guiding research questions for the proposed OOS provider architecture study are:
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1) What on-orbit servicing architecture maximizes the provider's profit?
a. From the provider's perspective, what is the best way to divide up the market? What
attributes characterize each market segment?
b. What design variable vector(s) represent the most profitable architecture for each
market segment?
2) How might MATE be employed to manage a dynamic OOS tradespace?
a. What are the costs and benefits of designing for extensibility and market uncertainty?
b. What is the expansion path for an OOS provider? In what order should an OOS
provider reach out to the different market segments?
3) What value can MATE add to the staged deployment of systems with multiple stakeholders?
a. How do you merge preferences of multiple stakeholders into system requirements?
Implementing the MATE approach to system design involves three steps. First, Multi-Attribute
Utility Theory is used to aggregate stakeholder preferences (attributes) into a single utility
function. Second, a design vector is input to parametric models that enumerate a tradespace of
design solutions. Third, the utility function is used to assess the tradespace such that a pareto-
efficient set of designs may be selected for more rigorous analysis.
One of the principal challenges in architecting an OOS system is the diverse set of customers
such a system would need to target for economic viability. The potential OOS market is divided
by satellite operators with various risk tolerances, by nation, and by user type (e.g., civil,
commercial, military). One approach to this problem would be to divide up the serviceable
satellite market into multiple market segments, identify the attributes that characterize each
market segment, and then use MATE to select OOS designs that represent profitable business
model for each market segment. (Appendix E provides MATLAB code developed to perform a
MATE analysis on a space tug design vector). A more complete method might employ the latter
approach as a first step towards the development of a "product family" of servicing vehicles that
leverages common platforms and technology to tap the entire servicing market.
Table 8.3 Proposed MATE Design Vectors
Design Vector I Proximity Inspector a free-floating vehicle or attached surveillance instrument which
characterizes a space object without physical contact
a vehicle designed to rendezvous and dock with a space object; make an
Design Vector 2 Space Tug assessment of its current position, orientation, and operational status; and
then either stabilize the object in its current orbit or move the object to a
new location with subsequent release
Design Vector 3 Pre-Planned Servicer a vehicle that is able to improve the state of target satellites that has been
designed for servicing
Design Vector 4 All-Purpose Servicer a vehicle that is able to improve the state of target satellites, regardless of
whether they have been designed for servicing
While a family of servicing vehicles would involve evaluation of multiple design vectors (e.g.,
Table 8.3) across a suite of OOS functions (decomposed by separate multi-attribute utility
functions), past MATE studies have involved system design with one design vector for specific
missions. As such, one contribution of this provider architecture study would be an extension of
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the MATE methodology to system design across multiple design vectors and utility functions
(Figure 8.3).
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(Design Vector 1) Utility(Relocate)
(Design Vector Utility(Restore)
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Figure 8.3 MATE with Multiple Design Vectors and Utility Functions
One of the issues this proposed study might address is how uncertainty is managed in the design
process. Understanding the costs and benefits of designing for extensibility would help the OOS
provider plot the expansion path for evolving system capabilities and tapping an increasing
number of market segments. Ongoing research focused on dynamic tradespaces (Ross, 2006)
provides insights into how MATE can add value to the development of systems that strategically
investigate expansion path strategies (e.g., evolutionary acquisition, P31, spiral development)
during preliminary design.
8.3.5 Study Serviceability as a Case Study in Emergent System Behavior
Emergent behavior involves the discovery of new uses for systems following operational
deployment. A fundamental property of complex systems, emergent behavior may result from
nonlinear interactivity during the process of self-organization or from macro-level patterns
arising in systems of interacting agents. Emergence is neither predictable nor deductible from
individual components. As such, emergent behavior must be analyzed with a global system
perspective. Emergent behavior is of interest to systems engineers because such behavior is
often unexpected and nontrivial. However, its inherent properties pose a challenge to system
engineers as traditional "divide and conquer" approaches do not apply.
Future research is proposed to investigate the on-orbit serviceability of existing space systems as
a case study in functional emergence. Given that most satellites were not designed for servicing,
serviceability represents an emergent property of satellites. The following steps comprise one
possible methodology for this research: (1) identify the architectural elements in satellites which
foster serviceability, (2) investigate other systems for emergent behavior, tracing emergence to
architectural characteristics, (3) generalize the results to classes of emergent behavior in
engineering systems, and (4) calculate the costs and benefits associated with emergent
capabilities. Other case studies candidates include the Air and Space Operations Center
Weapons System, the Theater Battle Management Core System, GPS, and the B-52
Stratofortress.
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The emphasis during the case studies of the first phase would be to identify emergent properties,
emergent functions, and the architectural elements that aid emergence. The second phase would
consist of small-scale studies including agent-based modeling for studying emergence in
dynamic situations and design structure matrices for understanding the static structure that might
give rise to emergent behavior. Other fields of study have well established tools for
understanding and exploiting local emergent behavior. For example, conventional physics
employs thermodynamics and statistical mechanics to study the pressure and temperature of gas.
A central goal of research on emergence is to explore and develop methodologies which may
offer analogous insights into emergent behavior in complex engineering systems.
By defining and modeling the elements of systems architecture that enable emergent behavior,
designers of complex engineering systems will be better equipped to understand the implications
of building-in latent capability, exploit emergent functionality, and evaluate system properties
such as robustness, adaptability, and flexibility. Aided with tools to understand emergence,
designers will be free to build emergent functionality into future systems. In particular, the
military may exploit complex system behavior for a variety of applications including data fusion
in large arrays of micro-sensors, optimizing performance of networks under overload conditions,
and implementing social behavior of collaborating robots. Understanding how to architect a
priori for different classes of emergence will also enable design of future systems capable of
adapting to new missions and operational environments. Both flexibility and robustness will be
measurable as functions of emergence in beyond-equilibrium conditions. More generally,
understanding of emergent phenomena will minimize uncertainty in the process of complex
systems engineering.
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9 Conclusions
This chapter returns to the research questions identified in Chapter 1 and draws general
conclusions regarding the future of OOS.
9.1 Guiding Questions
The guiding questions discussed in the Problem Statement (Section 1.2) are revisited here:
1) In what areas might original contributions be made to the study of OOS?
2) How might a taxonomy of space systems for serviceability be constructed?
3) What is the amenability of existing satellites to OOS?
4) How can architecture frameworks inform dynamic serviceability assessments?
5) What are the "architectural principles" for developing serviceable spacecraft?
6) What are the non-technical challenges facing OOS implementation?
In what areas might original contributions be made to the study of OOS?
In reviewing contemporary government, industry, and academic studies, it was found that much
OOS work has been done on servicing provider architecture and some on customer valuation.
However, little work was found on the satellite architecture of the customer. Furthermore, the
work that does exist on serviceable spacecraft was found to focus on implementing design
changes in future satellites. Although understanding the amenability of different orbits to OOS
and the degree of complexity associated with servicing various satellite bus designs is a
necessary precursor to evaluating servicing missions, no studies were found that address these
questions for existing satellites. The central goal of this thesis was to build on previous OOS
studies by developing and implementing a framework to assess the serviceability of spacecraft
currently in orbit around the Earth. The first step taken towards this goal was to add structure to
the problem through the construction of a taxonomy for space systems and servicing activities.
How might a taxonomy of space systems for serviceability be constructed?
Three sets of definitions form the taxonomy used to structure this thesis. First, five generic
servicing functions were defined in the functional domain-inspect, relocate, restore, augment,
and assemble-to characterize the scope of potential OOS missions. Second, servicing missions
were decomposed by four unique activities-rendezvous, acquire, access, and service-which
define the phases of an OOS operation. Third, five elements of satellites architecture were
deemed relevant to serviceability: (1) mission area, (2) orbital elements, (3) attitude control
system, (4) bus structure, and (5) payload configuration. Attributes of the fourth element, bus
structure, were decomposed further into attributes of bus shape and size, solar array
configuration, antenna placement, and launch vehicle mating interface. With a servicing
taxonomy in place, the thesis turned to the question of serviceability assessments of existing
satellites.
What is the amenability of existing satellites to OOS?
A two-step methodology was followed to determine the amenability of existing satellites to
OOS: (1) "orbit serviceability" assessments through the development of an agent model of OOS
based on orbital transfers and (2) "satellite bus serviceability" assessments as a function of
162
servicing mission complexity. The first step assesses amenability for the rendezvous servicing
activity while the second step considers amenability across all four servicing activities.
For orbit serviceability assessments, target satellites and servicing vehicles are modeled as
agents, and OOS is treated as a multi-variable optimization problem with the principal trade of
minimizing both AV expenditures and transfer time. Applied to the GEO belt with satellite
failure behavior based on empirical data (Sullivan, 2005), it was found that AV expenditures for
servicing missions varies across orbital slots as a function of the proximity and concentration of
other target satellites (e.g., satellites in GSO above North America were found to be
approximately 25% less expensive in terms of fuel than satellites above the Pacific). A
sensitivity analysis was performed on the assumed servicing provider architecture to validate the
relative performance of orbital slots in terms of the AV serviceability metric (see figure below).
In contrast to LEO satellites, for which the high propulsive cost of maneuvering severely limits
the number of target satellites which may be serviced, it was found that the "orbit serviceability"
of GEO satellites is high. With approximately 25 servicing opportunities in GEO each year, an
OOS architecture consisting of four servicing vehicles parked in GEO is able to maneuver to
virtually all satellites requiring servicing over the course of a decade.
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Turning to the question of satellite bus serviceability, it was proposed that servicing mission
complexity may be decomposed into four elements: information available on the state of the
target satellite (knowledge), size of the servicing tasks to be performed (scale), accuracy
requirements or permitted tolerances of servicing tasks (precision), and temporal constraints on
the servicing mission (timing). It was further proposed that each of these elements of complexity
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applies to each servicing activity (i.e., rendezvous, acquire, access, and service). As such,
sixteen serviceability parameters were proposed, and a combination of quantitative and
qualitative metrics were identified to assess of the performance of satellite bus attributes for each
serviceability parameter (see table below). Notional serviceability functions for each of the five
generic servicing functions were then proposed from subsets of the sixteen serviceability metrics.
Metrics for Serviceability Assessments
Label Parameter Names Metric for Satellite Servicing Unit
K1 Rendezvous knowledge position/attitude telemetry binary (yes/no)
K2 Acquire knowledge bus type binary (yes/no)
K3 Access knowledge structure and composition (evolved) Likert scale
K4 Service knowledge telemetry points monitored number
S1 Rendezvous scale delta-v m/s
S2 Acquire scale principal moments of inertia kg-m2
S3 Access scale distance between docking and service zones m
S4 Service scale unique servicing tasks number
P1 Rendezvous precision mission area discrete categories
P2 Acquire precision angular misalignment tolerance degree
P3 Access precision service zone integration Likert scale
P4 Service precision component integration Likert scale
T1 Rendezvous timing phasing and transfer duration time
T2 Acquire timing window of opportunity time
T3 Access timing permitted satellite downtime time
T4 Service timing projected failures, value-added duration time
In contrast to "orbit serviceability" assessments, which were performed across all operational
GEO satellites, serviceability assessments at the satellite bus level were not performed for large
numbers of spacecraft simultaneously due to the lack of comprehensive data on detailed satellite
bus attributes. Therefore, a case study methodology for analyzing satellite bus attributes was
deemed more appropriate. To add structure to the analysis of individual spacecraft, system
architecture frameworks (e.g., DoDAF, MoDAF) were turned to as candidate tools for assisting
in serviceability assessments.
How can architecture frameworks inform dynamic serviceability
assessments?
It was found that, while architecture frameworks bring structure to describing complex systems,
the three views of the Department of Defense Architecture Framework alone are insufficient for
characterizing the dynamic behavior inherent in a satellite servicing architecture. Static DoDAF
work products in the Systems View do not include enough technical detail of relevant satellite
attributes (e.g., health status of gyroscopes, reaction wheels, and fine-guidance sensors).
However, when such work products are constructed using a system engineering modeling tool
such as CORE, it is possible to build executable models that may be used for quantitative
evaluation of system behavior over time.
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Over the course of building DoDAF work products and a servicing model of the Hubble Space
Telescope, lessons emerged how the DoDAF and systems engineering modeling tools may be
applied to dynamic serviceability assessments at the satellite bus level. The process of
constructing the static DoDAF work products and building an executable model enabled rapid
understanding of the structure and operation of the larger Hubble system (i.e., Orbiting
Observatory, Space Telescope Operations Control Center, and Space Telescope Science
Institute). Although the model of Hubble (on its own) did not provide insights into whether
Hubble is more or less physically amenable to servicing than other space systems, other space
systems can rapidly be incorporated into the same overall servicing architecture to allow for
relative serviceability assessments.
Having conducted static and dynamic serviceability assessments for both orbital zones and
satellite buses, the next question addressed in the thesis seeks to inform the design of future
satellites.
What are the "architectural principles" for developing serviceable
spacecraft?
In considering how an OOS requirement might affect the design of future serviceable satellites,
twelve "architectural principles" were identified across four general categories: maximize
knowledge of the target satellite, manage the scale of servicing activities, minimize the precision
required of servicing activities, and minimize temporal constraints.
Architectural Heuristics for Designing Serviceable Spacecraft
Maximize knowledge of target satellite
* Incorporate extensive fault detection, isolation,
and diagnostic capabilities
* Enforce configuration control during
manufacturing, assembly, and pre-launch
operations
* Limit structural deformation from launch,
radiation, and thermal cycling
Manage scale of servicing activities
" Consider the proximity of other potential OOS
targets in orbit selection
" Collocate electrical interfaces, fluid transfer
modules, and ORU storage bays with docking ports
* Use common components
* Design electrical, thermal, and attitude control
subsystems with margin for loads of additional
payload modules
Minimize precision of servicing activities Minimize temporal constraints
* Design "safe modes" of satellite operation to e Compile empirical data on component degradation to
mitigate thruster plume impingement enable scheduled servicing
" Control servicing interfaces tightly * Allow for temporary outsourcing of functions to
" Substitute highly-integrated designs with modular, shield end-users from operational downtime
loosely-coupled configurations
The final research question broadens the scope
associated with OOS.
of the thesis to include non-technical issues
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What are the challenges facing OOS implementation?
OOS challenges exist across technical, political, and financial dimensions. Critical technology
areas, including autonomous rendezvous and capture, control algorithms and software, and
robotic operations, have not yet been flight-tested. Politically, the deployment of OOS systems
may give rise to international resistance (e.g., concerns regarding the militarization of space).
Customary international laws may constrain the operational flexibility of servicing providers
while U.S. regulations such as ITAR may limit servicing to domestic markets.
The greatest hurdles to OOS implementation fall into the general categories of financing and
economics. Collective action problems exist in government for funding OOS, and economic
viability has not been demonstrated to potential commercial servicing providers. Although U.S.
Space Transportation Policy endorses on-orbit servicing technology development, risk-adverse
military space program managers are unlikely to pay for servicing capabilities individually; and
the research and development costs, combined with the risk, appear to be too high for the
commercial sector to undertake development on its own. Innovative financing arrangements
between government and industry may be possible once an operational servicing vehicle exists
(e.g., public-private partnership). Initially, however, the "chicken and egg" problem-the facts
that satellites will not be designed for serviceability before a servicing vehicle is developed and
that no commercial provider will invest in OOS before a servicing market exists-indicates that
the government will need to continue to bear the brunt of unmanned on-orbit servicing
technology development through such programs as Orbital Express.
In addition to government sponsorship of proof-of-concept missions, several strategies were
proposed to overcome OOS implementation challenges. The best technical solution identified to
overcoming the "chicken and egg" problem is for servicing providers to initially target low-risk,
non-intrusive servicing missions which do not require modifications to the existing fleet of
satellites. For example, staged deployment of a GEO "space tugging" capability for retirement
missions-extending transponder life of communications satellites by approximately a year
(generating an extra ~$100M revenue) by allowing them run out of propellant in their
operational slots-would only require external grappling with legacy interfaces. Furthermore,
given that target satellites are at EOL, operators may be more willing to utilize an OOS system
having already achieved returns on investments.
Overcoming embedded paradigms in government and addressing stakeholder concerns in
industry were also discussed. Given the current state of government acquisitions and the notion
that the government "self-insures," it is unlikely that program offices will opt to pay for an OOS
capability. Acquisitions officials do not want to be perceived as allowing for the option of
failure, and "R&D non-essentials" are frequently the first elements in an acquisitions budget to
be phased out. Therefore, decisions to incorporate OOS capabilities into government space
programs will require stakeholder buy-in at levels above system program offices. This requires
that OOS is endorsed not just as a technology development program in national space policy but
also potentially added as a requirement in future programs (e.g., Space Radar). Another step
towards overcoming the embedded paradigm of traditional spacecraft design is providing
incentives to satellite manufacturers to offer serviceable designs (e.g., commercial satellite
aftermarket).
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9.2 General Conclusions
The U.S. experience with the Space Shuttle demonstrated that on-orbit servicing by humans is
technically possible (e.g., Solar Maximum repair, Intelsat 603 rescue) though economically
infeasible. NASA's human servicing architecture failed to deliver on the promise of a high-
frequency (60 times a year), low-cost (less than $20 million) OOS capability. As a means to
bring the benefits of OOS to space systems beyond flagship programs such as Hubble and ISS,
robotic servicing is promising. Having explored the serviceability of existing space system
architectures to robotic vehicles, five general conclusions are offered:
Robotic on-orbit servicing is technically feasible but requires further technology
development before it may be considered an operational capability.
Several robotic systems with minimal capabilities have been successfully flight-tested, including
the AFRL series of XSS microsatellites and NASA's AERCam. Future military systems are in
development by DARPA as well as the commercial SLES by ConeXpress. Although technology
successes for robotic OOS far outnumber failures, more hardware must be flight-qualified before
robotic servicing technology can be considered an operational capability. Critical technologies
requiring further maturation include (1) control algorithms and software for autonomous
rendezvous and docking and (2) robotic operations for internal manipulation of satellite
components.
Many existing satellites are amenable to inspection, relocation, and attitude stabilization
missions.
On-orbit servicing missions that are possible with the current generation of satellites include
inspection, relocation, and restore missions that are limited to interaction with external
interfaces. While the returns for inspection missions are relatively low, rescuing satellites
stranded by upper stage failures, restoring attitude control for tumbling satellites through external
stationkeeping, and reconfiguring constellations to meet emergent commercial markets and
threat environments are higher-value OOS applications. Retirement missions for
communications satellites constitute an intermediate-value OOS mission with opportunities for
multiple missions in GEO.
Marginal costs to modify future satellites for refueling and component change-out missions
are low.
More lucrative servicing missions are possible with value-added modifications to the internal
components of satellites. Although the subsystem modules of existing satellites are electrically
integrated into the satellite architecture with connectors requiring human-in-the-loop assembly,
the modular bus interface utilized in modern spacecraft design (allowing for the concurrent
development of subsystems) is a step towards modularity at the component level. Furthermore,
empirical evidence from DARPA's Orbital Express technology development program suggests
that the mass penalties for docking and refueling interfaces on target satellites are relatively low
(i.e., 32 kg and 50 kg, respectively).
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With the existing value proposition of communications satellites, regular servicing missions
do not make sense.
The commercial viability of robotic OOS is an open question. Lucrative missions seem to
require either dedicated servicing vehicles (e.g., rescue, attitude stabilization) or modifications to
the current fleet of operational satellites. Customer valuation research suggests that servicing
providers should focus on medium volatility markets, low-risk servicing missions, and satellite
components incorporating fast-evolving technologies. However, one of the most lucrative
markets identified (i.e., GEO lifetime extension) is poised to shrink due to the shift of GEO
communications satellites to electric propulsion.
In analyzing the physical amenability of satellites to OOS, it was found that the current
generation of spacecraft is simply too reliable to ensure a steady revenue stream for potential
OOS providers. Grounded in empirical data of annual servicing opportunities, the agent model
of OOS applied to GEO found that servicing provider utilization could have increased by an
order of magnitude without stressing the utilization factor of four servicing vehicles. Given the
current inaccessibility of space systems, no trade has been performed between redundant, highly
reliable satellites (current paradigm), and lower cost, less redundant satellites that utilize OOS to
achieve similar reliability.
The development of a servicing infrastructure in space is dependent on whether new value
propositions are incorporated into the operation of satellites.
In the short-term, the most promising OOS opportunities fall into the "space tugging" category.
Two OOS markets particularly attractive across technical and economic dimensions are: (1) low-
risk efficiency improvements for large numbers of satellites in zones characterized by friendly
orbital dynamics (e.g., GEO retirement missions) and (2) rescue of individual spacecraft that
have failed at BOL (e.g., orbital re-boosts due to failed upper stages and deployment assistance).
Space tugs may also be employed to enable new, highly-valued capabilities in future
constellations (e.g., extremely low-altitude orbits for Space Radar).
Looking ahead, development of an OOS infrastructure will be driven by changes in the existing
paradigm of the acquisition and operation of space systems. On-orbit servicing relaxes the
constraint of inaccessibility during operational life and opens up the tradespace for less
redundant satellite designs. Most importantly, the responsiveness offered by OOS provides
flexibility to capitalize on emergent opportunities and robustness to mitigate risks, better
equipping the space industry to deliver value in changing contexts.
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Glossary
all-purpose servicer
access
acquire
architecting
architecture
architecture framework
assemble
augment
engineering system
inspect
a vehicle that is able to improve the state of target satellites, regardless
of whether they have been designed for servicing; incorporates the
functionality of space tugs and pre-planned servicers in a vehicle that
also is able to repair faulty spacecraft components and conduct
assembly operations
servicing activity involving the deployment of servicing tools from
stowed position to area of interest of target; OOS activity involves the
positioning of the servicer tools next to the satellite components to be
serviced
servicing activity involving the transfer of a servicing vehicle from the
target vicinity to the holding of the target; OOS activity involves the
docking of a servicing vehicle to a target satellite
process of conducting system development with a focus on interfaces
and associated operational, technical, and environmental contexts
integrated description of the operations, components, and technical
standards of system; consists of a functional decomposition (from
originating requirements) in the behavioral domain and an allocation
of functions to components in the physical domain, all occurring
within an environmental context
tools for managing complexity by structuring data in a common
language and format, consisting of views tailored to the perspectives
of different stakeholders (e.g., designer, user)
on-orbit servicing function in which modules are mated
on-orbit servicing function in which the capability of a satellite is
increased
a technologically-enabled system characterized by non-trivial (i.e.,
requiring design changes in the technical system) feedback from a
heterogeneous stakeholder set
on-orbit servicing function in which a space object is visually
observed from an attached position or a remote surveillance vehicle
modularity
on-orbit servicing
consisting of modules with tightly controlled interfaces
the process of improving a space-based capability through a
combination of in-orbit activities which may include inspection;
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pre-planned servicer
proximity inspector
restore
relocate
rendezvous
service
serviceability
space tug
target satellite
rendezvous and docking; and value-added modifications to a
satellite's position, orientation, and operational status
a vehicle that is able to improve the state of target satellites that has
been designed for servicing; incorporates most of the functionality of
space tugs (with arbitrary docking capability being a key exception) in
a vehicle that is also capable of fluid transfer and change-out of orbital
replacement units
a free-floating vehicle or attached surveillance instrument which
characterizes a space object without physical contact
on-orbit servicing function in which a satellite is returned to a
previous state (or brought to an intended state)
on-orbit servicing function in which the orbit of a space object is
modified
servicing activity involving the movement of servicing vehicle from
starting position to target vicinity; OOS activity involves the
positioning of the servicer for relative navigation with lidar, radar, or
cameras
value-added servicing activity involving the operation of deployed
servicer components for system improvement; OOS activity involving
the repair, replacement, upgrade, addition, and/or removal of satellite
components
cooperativeness of a technical system to in-situ, value-added
modifications
a vehicle designed to rendezvous and dock with a space object; make
an assessment of its current position, orientation, and operational
status; and then either stabilize the object in its current orbit or move
the object to a new location with subsequent release
spacecraft upon which servicing activities are to be performed
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Appendix A. Agent-Based Model of Satellite Servicing
This appendix documents portions of the MATLAB code developed with Nirav Shah for the
agent-based model of OOS in the GEO belt. Results of the multi-objective optimization problem
(i.e., target satellite availability, AV expenditure per servicing mission) are included in Chapter
4.
OOSim
numTrials = 1000;
drawDashboard = 0;
if drawDashboard
figure (1) ;
figure (2) ;
end;
totalDV = zeros(numTrials,1);
numTics = zeros(numTrials,1);
loadstatenames;
OmegaAltIncUCS = OmegaAltInc;
mkdir ( ['monte-' num2str (numTrials, ' 04d')]);
monteResultsDir = ['monte-' num2str(numTrials, 04d') filesep];
save ( 'UCSGEODATA' , 'OmegaAlt InoUCS' ) ;
diary([monteResultsDir 'monte-OOS-' num2str(numTrials,' 04d') '-Trials-
di ary. txt'])
diary on;
for monte = 1:numTrials
clear time satellite servicer ticket;
[satellite, servicer, ticket] = initialization;
numSats = length(satellite.ID);
numServ = length(servicer.ID);
Dtime = 60;
Tstop = 10*365*24*60;
timeV = 0:Dtime:Tstop;
numTsteps = length(timeV);
numOperSat = zeros(1,numTsteps,'uintl6');
numOpenTickets = zeros (1,numTsteps, 'uint32');
for i = 1:numTsteps
time = timeV(i);
[satellite,ticket]=satelliteupdate(time,satellite,ticket);
[servicer,ticket,satellite]=servicer update(time,servicer,satellite,ticket);
numOperSat(i) = sum(satellite.state == satOPERATING);
numOpenTickets(i) = ticket.numTickets - sum(ticket.state ==
ticCLOSED);
ifT- e,3* 6C) me == Tstop
dip[' rintf('5.3g',time/(6024*30
ofickes:'srf( d',ticet.nmTicket,
e -sed: ' numstr(sum( [S.bytes ))]);
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mmplar (stli -.so, ones(1nuat),'b')
hodon;
dea = fis-tlte.state = satDOWN ;
if ~s m t ,dd st l n -L-eaias k-,,
mmplar (tlite. Slt ( dat) , ones (1, ength (IdadSas rS , 'k '
rrTr-L' r t~ i k r 41 ~
eend
save(~~~ imneeutle ( 'Rime 'numS-trc.- (tim (60*24*30 ) )4
serPARKED a ruint8 (0);
serTRANSIT uint8(10);
serSERVICING =uint8 (20);
serOUTOFGAS =uint8 (30);
serCAPTUREMODE =uint8(11);
serRETURNMODE =uint8(12);
satOPEPATING =uint8 (0);
satDOWN = uint8 () ;
ticINQUEUE = uint8(0);
ticPROCESSING = uint8(1);
ticCLOSED = uint8(2);
ticNONE = uint8(99);
initialization
saction( [satellite,servicer, ticket] initialization
loadstatenames;
servicer.numServicers = 4;
fo~r i = 1:servicer.numServicers
servicer.ID(i) = uint6(i);
servicer.parkAlt(i) = 35786;
servicer.incl(i) 0; Ddij
servicer.state(i) serPARKED;
servicer.DVavailable(i) UE7.7;
servicer.slot(i) = (i-) t2*pi/servicer.numServicers;
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end;
load('UCSGEODATA','OmegaAltIncUCS');
satellite.numSatellites = length(OmegaAltIncUCS);
for ptrSat = 1:satellite.numSatellites;
satellite.ID(ptrSat) = uintl6(ptrSat);
satellite.incl(ptrSat) = 0; 0m-aAltInc CS (ptrSat, 3
satellite.alt(ptrSat) = 35786; rmgaltiCS'ptrt,2);
satellite.slot (ptrSat) = OmegaAltIncUCS(ptrSat,1);
satellite.downTime(ptrSat) = 0;
satellite.state (ptrSat) = satOPERATING;
satellite.NORADID(ptrSat) = OmegaAltIncUCS(ptrSat,4);
satellite.DVexpended(ptrSat) = 0;
e nd;
ticket.numTickets = intl6(0);
ticket.state = ticNONE;
L at -. c
l ( r t
I K - = a ttude insntr ()
= inol Inat in 3insC ntr (e = 'peatig'
satelliteupdate
function [satellite,ticket]=satelliteupdate(time,satellite,ticket)
load state names;
probRefuel = 20;
probORU = 4.4;
probRepair = 3.8;
probGEORelocate = 13;
probDeploy = .3;
UC'S Database (2t
numGEOSats = 345;
numSats = 773;
numServiceRequests = (numGEOSats/numSats)*(probRefuel + probORU +...
probRepair + probDeploy) + probGEORelocate; aer--age in p
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numUrgentRequests = (numGEOSats/numSats)*(probDeploy + probRepair) +
probGEORelocate*(.5);
probUrgent = numUrgentRequests/numServiceRequests;
probService = numServiceRequests/(365*24*numGEOSats);
opSet = find(satellite.state == satOPERATING);
servInd = find(rand(1,length(opSet)) < probService);
for i = opSet(servInd) I:nmrSats
if rand(1) <probUrgent
satellite.state(i) = satDOWN;
ticket=generate ticket(time,satellite,i,ticket);
else
ticket=generateticket(time,satellite,i,ticket);
end;
en rd;
- -r-
downSet = find(satellite.state == satDOWN);
if -isempty(downSet)
satellite.downTime(downSet) = satellite.downTime(downSet) + 1;
eni;
generateticket
funti ticket=generate ticket(time,satellite,satID,ticket)
loadstatenames;
ticINQUEUE = uint8(0);
ptr = ticket.numTickets;
ptr = ptr + 1;
ticket.requestTime(ptr) = time;
ticket.satelliteID(ptr) = satID;
swit ch satellite. state (satID)
case satDOWN
ticket.urgent(ptr) = 1;
case satOPERATING
ticket.urgent(ptr) = 0;
end;
ticket.state(ptr) = ticINQUEUE;
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ticket.timeToService(ptr) = 24*60;
ticket.ID(ptr) = ptr;
ticket.numTickets = ptr;
servicer update
function
[servicer,ticket,satellite]=servicer_update(time,servicer,satellite,ticket)
numServicers = length(servicer.ID);
serPARKED = uint8(0);
serTRANSIT = uint8(10);
serSERVICING = uint8(20);
serOUTOFGAS = uint8(30);
serCAPTUREMODE = uint8(ll);
serRETURNMODE = uint8(12);
satOPERATING = uint8(0);
satDOWN = uint8(1);
ticINQUEUE = uint8(0);
ticPROCESSING = uint8(1);
ticCLOSED = uint8 (2);
ticNONE = uint8(99);
for i = randperm(numServicers)
swiLch servicer.state(i)
case serPARKED
availTickets = find(ticket.state == ticINQUEUE)
if -isempty(availTickets)
serviceableTickets =
ticketscanservice (servicer, i, satellite,ticket,availTicket
if -isempty(serviceableTickets)
ticketToGrab = serviceableTickets(1);
[ticket,servicer] =
grabticket (time,ticket,ticketToGrab,servicer,i, satellite);
end;
s);
case serTRANSIT
if time>servicer.transitDone(i)
ticketBeingServiced = servicer.currTicketID(i);
satelliteBeingServiced =
ticket.satelliteID(ticketBeingServiced);
case serCAPT'IREMIODE
servicer.slot(i) =
satellite.slot(satelliteBeingServiced);
servicer.state(i) = serSERVICING;
sricer i).totalDV = ervicer(i) .totalD +-.
rasirt(saell teBeing rvi-z ced.incl -
satellie~eingervice.alt) +-.
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;
a s rRETURMOE
DViranit(saellteein2eviced. incl -
sateli-e-BeingSeric ed.in .
S, ... p kservir(.parzkAlt,...
satelliteeing7ervced. alt)!
v- , - P PEE
end;
case- serSERVICING
i f time>servicer. servicingDone (i)
ticketBeingServed = servicer.currTicketID(i);
[ticket,servicer,satellite] =
releaseticket(time,ticket,ticketBeingServed,servicer,i,satellite);
servicer.DVavailable(i) < DV proximity
servicer.state(i) = serOUTOFGAS;
end;
end;
end;
tickets can service
funcition serviceableTickets =
ticketscanservice(servicer,servicerUsed,satellite,ticket,availTicket)
serPARKED = uint8(0);
serTRANSIT = uint8(10);
serSERVICING = uint8(20);
serOUTOFGAS = uint8(30);
serCAPTUREMODE = uint8(11);
serRETURNMODE = uint8(12);
satOPERATING = uint8(0);
satDOWN = uint8(1);
ticINQUEUE = uint8(0);
ticPROCESSING = uint8(l);
ticCLOSED = uint8(2);
ticNONE = uint8(99);
serviceableTickets =
serviceableTicketsDV =
for ticketBeingChecked = availTicket
targetSatID = ticket.satelliteID(ticketBeingChecked);
DVcost = 1000*ones(1,servicer.numServicers);
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slottgt = satellite.slot(targetSatID);
alt = satellite.alt(targetSatID);
if ticket.urgent(ticketBeingChecked)
k = 5;
else
k = 5;
end;
for j=1:servicer.numServicers
slot int = servicer.slot(j);
if servicer.state(j) == serPARKED
[transitTime,transitDV] = timedvphaseslot(slotint,
slottgt,alt,k);
if servicer.DVavailable(j) > transitDV + DV proximity
DVcost(j) = transitDV + DV proximity;
end;
end;
end;
[minDV,minDVCI] = min(DVcost);
if minDV ~ 1000
if servicerUsed == minDVCI
serviceableTickets = [serviceableTickets ticketBeingChecked];
serviceableTicketsDV = [serviceableTicketsDV DVcost(minDVCI)];
[ans,I] = sort(serviceableTicketsDV);
serviceableTickets = serviceableTickets(I);
end;
end;
end;
timedvphaseslot
function [Tphase,dv] = time dvphase_slot(slot int,slottgt,alt,k)
Re=6378.13649;
Mu=398600.5;
Ptgt = 2*pi*sqrt((alt+Re)^3/Mu);
if abs(slotint-slottgt) > pi
deltaslot = 2*pi - abs(slottgt-slot int);
if slottgt < slot int
deltaslot = -deltaslot;
e nd;
else
delta-slot = slotint-slot tgt;
end;
sig o ir phasin
(mans ing p a
( -s mo7vng retLrograd
[Tphase,dv,aphase] = circCoplanerPhasing(alt+Re,deltaslot,k);
if aphase < alt+Re
while 2*aphase - (alt+Re) < Re + 1000
k = k+1;
[Tphase,dv,aphase] = circCoplanerPhasing(alt+Re,deltaslot,k);
end;
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end;
Tphase = Tphase / 60;
de o hasing rbit
k :20;
[Tpha sed a 7 ph-a Se] cicoln
rr
, la-mbda = , : .1 :1;
fori =1: engh (vambda)'C
a
i J, m ] = in
lilA. ~TK~
= Tp s (/
-plv (minD minT ' . 'JkeIyboard
circCoplanerPhasing
funcLi on- [Tphase,dv,aphase] = circCoplanerPhasing(atgt,dphase, k)
Re=6378.13649; km fro SM§f
Mu=398600.5;
ktgt = k; kint = k;
wtgt = sqrt(Mu./atgt.^3);
Tphase = (2*pi*ktgt+dphase)./wtgt;
if Tphase < 0
disp(' ** negative Tphase
keyboard;
erd;
aphase = (Mu*(Tphase./(2*pi
dv = 2*abs(sqrt(2*Mu./atgt
*kint)).^2).^(1/3);
- Mu./aphase) - sqrt(Mu./atgt));
DV_proximity
function out = DVproximity
out = 50/1000;
grabticket
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*T ae Ptgt;
/mnrThs
Phas ing (al + , del-- J- 1t a-slot -, k, ;
end;
mi 4V(
miT i
T
function [ticket,servicer] =
grab-ticket (time, ticket, ticketToGrab, servicer, assignedServicer, satellite)
loadstatenames;
chaF-n ge th ,e ti-cket s ate s
ticket. state (ticketToGrab) = ticPROCESSING;
ticket. servicerID (ticketToGrab) = assignedServicer;
ticket.grabTime(ticketToGrab) = time;
servicer.currTicketID(assignedServicer) = ticketToGrab;
cmue an ecr tra nsi S time:
slot int = servicer.slot(assignedServicer);
slottgt = satellite.slot(ticket.satelliteID(ticketToGrab));
servicer. state (assignedServicer) = serTRANSIT;
servicer.transitMode (assignedServicer) = serCAPTUREMODE;
if ticket.urgent(ticketToGrab)
k = 5;
else
k = 5;
end;
[transitTime,transitDV] = time dv phase slot(slot int, slot tgt,
satellite.alt(ticket.satelliteID(ticketToGrab)),k); tui-e hman r na lt1i,
servicer.transitDone (assignedServicer) = time + transitTime;
servicer.servicingDone(assignedServicer) =
servicer.transitDone(assignedServicer) + ticket.timeToService(ticketToGrab);
ticket. DVcost (ticketToGrab) = transitDV + DV proximity;
release-ticket
funct ion [ticket, servicer, satellite] =
releaseticket(time,ticket,ticketBeingServed,servicer,assignedServicer,satell
ite)
load state names;
ticket(ticketBeingServed) .state = ticCLOSED;
ticket(ticketBeingServed) .closeTime = time;
if ticket(ticketBeingServed).urgent
satellite(ticket(ticketBeingServed).satelliteID).state = satOPERATING;
end;
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altfi = erice (ssine~ericr).park~lt;
sevier(ssigeevcr) . state =rserTRANSIT;
erir n Sr =ime + transitTime;
servicer(assignedServicer) .DVavailable =
servicer(assignedlServicer) .DVavailable - ticket (ticketBeingServed) .DVcost;
e reor r epnd f r
satellite (ticket (ticketBeingServed) .satelliteID) .DVexpended =..
satellite (ticket (ticketBeingServed) .satelliteID) .DVexpendied +
ticket (ticketBeingServed) .DVcost;
servicer (assignedServicer) .state = serPARKED;
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Appendix B. Architecture Framework Work Products
This appendix includes additional CORE diagrams and DoDAF work product constructed for the
Hubble Space Telescope as well as an EEFBD tracing the activities in a proposed robotic
Hubble servicing mission for Hubble. This appendix concludes with two operational view work
products for a space tug architecture.
Hubble Systems Interface Description
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Systems Interface Description (SV-1) identifies the systems nodes that support operational
nodes. Detailed SV-1 work products may be used for specifying requirements and for
interoperability assessments. The SV-1 DoDAF representation identified 42 system components
of Hubble. Decomposition ranged across five levels.
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Hubble Operational Activity Model (OV-5) - N2 Representation
Develop target set
Uplink telemetry commands
Convert sunlight into electricity
Manage power and link budget
Protect electronics from space environment
Measure orientation to two guide stars
Measure orientation to the sun
Measure position relative to Earth's magnetic field
Measure the attitude rate motion
Align spacecraft for observations
Protect Hubble's optics
Filter light entering Hubble's optics
Observe characteristics of celestial bodies
Observe the physical conditions existing in and between astronomical objects
Downlink scientific and engineering data
Determine the history and evolution of the universe
Determine whether the laws of nature are universal in the space-time continuum
Distribute science products
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10.
11.
12.
13.
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16.
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18.
Enhanced Functional Flow
Block Diagram of Hubble
Robotic Servicing Mission
This alternative EEFBD
representation of a hypothetical
Hubble robotic servicing mission
was developed by Rich Fink at
NASA Goddard Space Flight
Center. It was received shortly
after completing the CORE
servicing simulation. System
behaviors are represented using
sequential, parallel, repetitive, and
decision logic.
195
Space Tug High Level Operational Concept Graphic
High Level Operational Concept Graphic (OV-1) depicts the space tug's interaction with its
environment as well as with external systems
Space Tug Operational Node Connectivity Description
Operational Node Connectivity Description (OV-2) tracks the need to exchange information
across nodes. This includes internal operational nodes as well as external nodes. OV-2 does not
depict the connectivity between nodes.
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Appendix C. Hubble Servicing Simulation - Space Shuttle
Using CORE's discrete event simulator, the dynamic performance and functional behavior of
Hubble was analyzed. The simulator outputs a timeline of functional activation, execution, and
duration. Wait states, resource inventory history, and queuing triggers (items waiting to be
processed by functions) are all depicted. Colored duration bars are used to represent different
types of events. Grey specifies the amount of resources available, teal indicates the execution of
a function, yellow indicates that a function is enabled but waiting for a trigger, and magenta
indicates that a function is enabled but waiting for resources. Given the probabilistic outcomes
of any given simulation, a Monte Carlo analysis was performed with 25 simulation runs to
characterize Shuttle performance.
Hubble Servicing Simulation - Space Shuttle Run #1
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Hubble Servicing Simulation - Space Shuttle Run #2
Hubble Servicing Simulation - Space Shuttle Run #3
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Hubble Servicing Simulation - Space Shuttle Run #5
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Appendix D. Hubble Servicing Simulation - Robotic Vehicle
Using CORE's discrete event simulator, the dynamic performance and functional behavior of
Hubble was analyzed. The simulator outputs a timeline of functional activation, execution, and
duration. Wait states, resource inventory history, and queuing triggers (items waiting to be
processed by functions) are all depicted. Colored duration bars are used to represent different
types of events. Grey specifies the amount of resources available, teal indicates the execution of
a function, yellow indicates that a function is enabled but waiting for a trigger, and magenta
indicates that a function is enabled but waiting for resources. Given the probabilistic outcomes
of any given simulation, a monte carlo analysis was performed with 25 simulation runs to
characterize robotic vehicle performance.
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Appendix E. Space Tug Tradespace
This appendix includes MATLAB code used to perform a Multi-Attribute Tradespace Analysis
for the design of a space tug servicing vehicle. Utility functions are based on assumptions
discussed in "Understanding the Orbital Transfer Vehicle Tradespace," (McManus and
Schuman, 2003).
NtIame: SpaeTug_ MSacMn
i Dscrpton:Ths funtn calls allftIe files in thr e corrc re
e :Ma ards
D at-e: 5/14/05
inputs: none
Contats] co st -Cot tratesp
function DV] = SpaceTug_rate;Main
clear all
close all
call Space Tug function
[Constants] = OOSConstants;
[SpaceTug_DV] = SpaceTug_-Enumerate_-DV(Constants);
[SpaceTugDV] = SpaceTugPayloadMass(SpaceTugDV);
[SpaceTugDV] = SpaceTugResponseTime(SpaceTugDV);
[SpaceTugDV] = Calc Delta_V(SpaceTugDV, Constants);
[SpaceTugDV] = CalcWeightedUtility(SpaceTugDV);
[SpaceTugDV] = CalcCost(SpaceTugDV, Constants);
figure
for i=l:size(SpaceTugDV,2);
plot(SpaceTug DV(i).Cost, SpaceTugDV(i).Utility,'o')
axis([0, 4000, 0, 1])
title('Space Tug Tradespa-e')
xlabel('Cost (S M)')
ylabel('LUtility (dimensionle-ss ')
hold on
end
escrit : s c enumeras the design vector V fr te
ugu
Auho : Mattm Richrds
Date: 5/14/05
Inputs: none-
function [SpaceTug_DV] = SpaceTugEnumerate_DV(Constants)
clear SpaeTug Dv
for Capability = {'Low' 'Medium' 'High' 'Extreme'};
for PropulsionType = {'storable bi' 'cryogenic' 'nuclear' 'electric'};
for PropellantMass = [30 100 300 600 1200 3000 10000 300003;
ipafut dsign
SpaceTugDV(i)
SpaceTugDV(i)
SpaceTugDV(i)
i=i+1;
Par aeterS
.Capability = Capability;
.Propulsion Type = Propulsion Type;
.PropellantMass = Propellant Mass;
SpaceTugDV
SpaceTugDV
SpaceTugDV
SpaceTugDV
SpaceTugDV
SpaceTug PayloadMass(SpaceTugDV)
SpaceTug ResponseTime(SpaceTugDV)
CalcDelta_V(SpaceTugDV, Constants)
Calc WeightedUtility(SpaceTugDV)
CalcCost(SpaceTugDV, Constants)
-- '-- - - - - - -~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- -
uinction[SpaceTugDV] = SpaceTugPayloadMass(SpaceTugDV)
for i=l:size(SpaceTugDV,2);
if strcmp(SpaceTugDV(i).Capability, 'Low'
SpaceTugDV(i) .Payload Mass = 300; >kg
End
if strcmp(SpaceTugDV(i).Capability,
SpaceTugDV(i).PayloadMass = 1000;
nd
if strcmp(SpaceTugDV(i).Capability,
SpaceTugDV(i).PayloadMass = 3000;
enrd
if strcmp(SpaceTugDV(i).Capability,
SpaceTug_DV(i).PayloadMass = 5000;
'High');
Skg;
' Extrieme-') ;
akg;I
an d
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end
end
end
NaMe: Spaceug Respons eTm
Description: This function assigns response time
Author :Mat- Richards
Date: 15
nputs: Proplsi on Type
Outputs: -p-onseTime
function[SpaceTugDV] = SpaceTugResponseTime(SpaceTugDV)
for i=l:size(SpaceTug_DV,2);
if strcmp(SpaceTugDV(i).PropulsionType,
SpaceTugDV(i).ResponseTime = 'fast';
end
if strcmp(SpaceTugDV(i).PropulsionType,
SpaceTugDV(i) .ResponseTime = 'fast';
end
if strcmp(SpaceTugDV(i) .PropulsionType,
SpaceTugDV(i) .ResponseTime = 'fast';
end
if strcmp(SpaceTugDV(i).PropulsionType,
SpaceTugDV(i).ResponseTime = 'slow';
en d
'storable bi');
'cryogenic'');
n ulear' ) ;
'electric');
Name: CaoDelI_
cit'Sc I fo -
Autho :-atRcad
function [SpaceTugDV] = Calc_DeltaV(SpaceTugDV, Constants)
for i=l:size(SpaceTug_DV,2);
if strcmp(SpaceTug DV(i).PropulsionType, 'storable bi');
SpaceTugDV(i).Mass_PropsysBase = Constants.Basestorablebi;
SpaceTugDV(i).MassPropsys_Fraction = Constants.Fractionstorable bi;
SpaceTugDV(i).Isp = Constants.Ispstorablebi;
end
if strcmp(SpaceTugDV(i).Propulsion Type, 'cryogenic');
SpaceTugDV(i).MassPropsysBase = Constants.Base cryogenic;
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end
SpaceTugDV(i).MassPropsys Fraction = Constants.Fractioncryogenic;
SpaceTugDV(i).Isp = Constants.Ispcryogenic;
end
if strcmp(SpaceTugDV(i).Propulsion_Type, 'nuclear');
SpaceTugDV(i).MassPropsysBase = Constants.Basenuclear;
SpaceTug DV(i).Mass Propsys Fraction = Constants.Fraction nuclear;
SpaceTugDV(i).Isp = Constants.Ispnuclear;
end
if strcmp(SpaceTugDV(i).Propulsion_Type, 'electric');
SpaceTugDV(i).MassPropsysBase = Constants.Baseelectric;
SpaceTugDV(i).Mass_Propsys Fraction = Constants.Fraction electric;
SpaceTugDV(i).Isp = Constants.Ispelectric;
end
SpaceTugDV(i).Mass Propsys = SpaceTugDV(i).MassPropsysBase +
SpaceTugDV(i).MassPropsysFraction * SpaceTugDV(i).PropellantMass;
SpaceTugDV(i).MassBus = SpaceTugDV(i).MassPropsys +
Constants.Fraction payload * SpaceTugDV(i).PayloadMass;
SpaceTugDV(i).MassDry = SpaceTugDV(i).MassBus +
SpaceTugDV(i).PayloadMass;
SpaceTugDV(i).MassWet = SpaceTugDV(i).MassDry +
SpaceTugDV(i).PropellantMass;
SpaceTugDV(i).DeltaV = Constants.g * SpaceTugDV(i).Isp *
log(SpaceTugDV(i).MassWet / SpaceTugDV(i).MassDry);
end
T S j
function [SpaceTugDV] = CalcWeightedUtility(SpaceTugDV)
for i=l:size(SpaceTugDV,2);
ca cuae utltyfrdetj
If SpaceTug DV(i).Delta V < 12000;
Delta V = [0,4200,8400,12000];
Utility_DeltaV = [0,.68,.9,1];
SpaceTugDV(i).UtilityDeltaV = interpl(DeltaV, UtilityDeltaV,
SpaceTugDV(i).DeltaV, 'linear');
eind
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if SpaceTugDV(i).DeltaV >= 12000;
SpaceTugDV(i).UtilityDeltaV = 1;
end
c:alculate utilt for;- capabilt
if strcmp(SpaceTugDV(i).Capability, 'Low');
SpaceTugDV(i).UtilityCapability = .3;
end
if strcmp(SpaceTugDV(i).Capability, 'Medium');
SpaceTugDV(i).UtilityCapability = .6;
end
if strcmp(SpaceTugDV(i) .Capability, 'Hiqi');
SpaceTugDV(i).UtilityCapability = .9;
end
if strcmp(SpaceTugDV(i).Capability, 'Extreme');
SpaceTugDV(i).UtilityCapability = 1;
end
if strcmp(SpaceTugDV(i).PropulsionType,
SpaceTugDV(i) .UtilityResponseTime = 1;
end
if strcmp(SpaceTugDV(i).PropulsionType,
SpaceTugDV(i).UtilityResponseTime = 1;
e n d
if strcmp (SpaceTugDV(i) .PropulsionType,
SpaceTugDV(i).UtilityResponseTime = 1;
end
if strcmp(SpaceTug DV(i).PropulsionType,
SpaceTugDV(i).UtilityResponseTime = 0;
end
'ryogenic');
nuc-lear');
'e ec r ') ;
WeightedDeltaV(i) = .6 .* SpaceTugDV(i).UtilityDeltaV;
WeightedCapability(i) = .3 .* SpaceTugDV(i).UtilityCapability;
Weighted ResponseTime(i) = .1 .* SpaceTugDV(i).UtilityResponseTime;
SpaceTugDV(i).Utility = WeightedDeltaV(i) + WeightedCapability(i) +
WeightedResponse_Time(i);
end
Name: Calc Cost
Description: This f o calclates cost f th e sn M
Athr Mat Rcr
Date: s/19/
Output: space tgdeineco
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funlction [SpaceTugDV] = CalcCost(SpaceTugDV, Constants)
for i=l:size(SpaceTugDV,2);
SpaceTugDV(i).Cost = (SpaceTug_DV(i).MassDry * Constants.CostDry +
SpaceTugDV(i).MassWet * Constants.Cost Wet)/1000000;
end
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Appendix F. Space Tug Concept-of-Operations
How might the social constructs identified in Chapter 7 (i.e., policy, law, economics) drive the
design of a concept of operations for a servicing vehicle? This section addresses this question
with the development of a concept of operations for a space tug in geosynchronous orbit,
including parking orbit selection and approach strategies, with emphasis placed on safety and
reliability. Given that one of the most likely OOS provider architectures is that of a GEO space
tug (due to the large number of potential targets and favorable orbital dynamics in that orbit), a
GEO space tug concept guides the discussion in this appendix and is used as an illustration of the
challenges facing OOS implementation.
This section addresses issues associated with the operation of a GEO space tug with a focus on
parking orbit selection and target spacecraft rendezvous strategies. Assumptions implicit in the
GEO space tug concept are briefly discussed as well. The most important considerations
throughout all phases of space tug operation-or any OOS operation-are safety and reliability.
It is imperative that tug operations not damage or otherwise interfere with the function of the
target spacecraft or any other nearby spacecraft. This follows, for one, from the issue of liability
discussed in Chapter 7. Additionally, program managers for major military space programs have
identified reliability as the primary operational concern for space tugs. Other considerations in
space tug operations include fuel efficiency and timeliness. These are secondary to safety and
reliability. Typically, timeliness will be a low priority, so fuel efficiency will be the primary
driver of tug operations after safety. It is conceivable, however, that an urgent mission might
utilize a faster rendezvous strategy, albeit with a higher fuel consumption than would otherwise
be necessary.
Assumptions
The concept contains two assumptions. First, the tug will execute multiple missions over its
design lifetime. That is, from a parking orbit near the geostationary belt, it will rendezvous and
dock with a target satellite, carry out the required maneuvers, and return to its parking orbit until
it is needed again. Second, it is assumed that the tug will have the capability to dock with an
arbitrary target spacecraft.
Parking Orbit
The figure on the next page shows all unclassified space objects in geosynchronous or near-
geosynchronous orbits as of January 10, 2005, according to element sets available from Air
Force Space Command. Parking a space tug in a geostationary slot seems out of the question
given the high commercial and military value of these slots. However, as the figure indicates,
unused regions of the geostationary belt do exist where a space tug "parking space" could be
located.2 A slightly inclined geosynchronous orbit can be ruled out as a parking orbit by the
expensive maneuvers that would be required to reach target spacecraft in the geostationary belt.
1 This appendix is based on a paper entitled "Assessing the Challenges to a Geosynchronous Space Tug System"
(Richards, Springmann, and McVey, 2005).
2 While there is space in GEO to accommodate many satellites with little risk of collision, radio frequency
interference and its bandwidth limit parking spot spacing to two degrees (Wertz and Larson, et al., 1999).
Furthermore, space tugs would communicate little compared to direct broadcast satellites.
option for space tug parking orbits might be equatorial orbits near geosynchronous
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The view in (a) is from above the north pole. The positive y-axis points toward 00 longitude and the positive z-axis in
points toward the north pole. The axes have units of Earth radii.
Geosynchronous Space Objects, 10 January 2005
The altitude bounds on potential equatorial parking orbits (shown on the next page) are
established by the United States Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices. The
upper limit on disposal orbit apogee between MEO and GEO is an altitude of 35,300 km, and the
lower limit on disposal orbit perigee above GEO is 36,100 km. Furthermore, it may be prudent
to exclude orbital altitudes between approximately 50 km below and 50 km above the
geostationary altitude because the probability of collision, while still low, is significantly higher
at these altitudes due to variance in the actual orbital altitudes of geosynchronous satellites.
Estimates of collision probabilities according to altitude were calculated using the Poisson
distribution and principles of the kinetic theory of gases based on research conducted by the
Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Commercial Space Transportation Licensing and
Safety Division (FAA Office of Commercial Space Transportation Licensing and Safety
Division, 1992). A ten year tug lifetime was assumed.
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Velocity change (AV) requirements for stationkeeping are approximately constant over the range
of parking orbit altitudes. However, the AV and time requirements to reach geosynchronous
altitude do vary over this range. The AV requirement varies between 1.8 m/s and 16.6 m/s
depending on the altitude change necessary. Propulsion choice (i.e., chemical vs. electric)
affects the time requirements for transfer from parking to geosynchronous orbit, although the
AV's between chemical and electric propulsion are nearly equal since the kinetic inefficiency of
a continuous thrust transfer is low for small changes in altitude near geosynchronous orbits. The
time required for transfer via electric propulsion can range to as high as 180 days, depending on
the acceleration produced by the engine, while the transfer time via chemical propulsion is
approximately 12 hours over the range of possible parking orbit altitudes.
The advantage of low thrust electric propulsion systems with specific impulses exceeding 1,000
seconds is a combination of reduced tug mass and increased AV capability. On the other hand,
because of the slow, spiraling trajectory followed when changing altitude, the tug would orbit
repeatedly at altitudes where the probability of collision is heightened slightly. In addition, the
power requirement for electric propulsion systems, ranging from 0.5 kW up to 4.5 kW, is much
higher than for chemical propulsion (Wertz and Larson, et al., 1999). It should be noted that
even if a space tug were equipped with electric propulsion for all or part of the transfer between
its parking orbit and the target orbit, chemical thrusters would still be required for maneuvers in
close proximity to the target spacecraft. The use of electric propulsion to reach the vicinity of
the target spacecraft would also restrict the responsiveness of a space tug. Although rendezvous
times in geosynchronous orbit are on the order of days, not hours, it may be desirable to assure a
shorter response time than is achievable using electric propulsion.
A final issue relevant to the tug parking orbit is the potential for interference with other
geosynchronous spacecraft. Two types of interference could result from space tug operations.
The first is communications interference. The Federal Communications Commission and
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International Telecommunication Union licensing processes are intended to mitigate
communications interference between communications satellites in geostationary orbits, but it is
unclear how these processes would apply to a spacecraft constantly moving near the
geostationary belt. However, given the number communications satellites already operating in
the geostationary belt and the relatively low communications requirements of a space tug, it is
unlikely that communications interference would be a major issue. The second type of
interference is electromagnetic interference (EMI). The potential for electromagnetic
incompatibility between a tug and target has not been fully explored.
Approaching Target Spacecraft
The position of a satellite at geosynchronous altitude can be determined from the ground to
within 24 km in the along-track direction, 17 km in the cross-track direction, and 2.6 km in range
(Settelmeyer, 1997). Therefore, a tug could conceivably navigate to within a few kilometers of
the target satellite on its own. Realistically, this distance will be larger, for example due to the
propagation of small thrusting errors. Performing the transfer from parking orbit to target orbit
under ground supervision should help reduce such errors and assure that the tug can be brought
reliably to within radar range of its targets as well as ease autonomous navigation requirements.
Once the target is acquired by on-board radar or other long-range sensors, rendezvous maneuvers
can commence.
Space rendezvous is a complex but well understood procedure. Fehse (2003) provides one
introduction to automated rendezvous in space and discusses the major drivers of approach
strategy (Fehse, 2003). It is impossible to devise a detailed rendezvous sequence here since
target- and time-specific information would be required. Given the necessary emphasis on the
safety of the target spacecraft, passive trajectory safety should heavily influence planning. A
longer-term look at trajectory safety must take into account disturbance forces. The most
prominent trajectory disturbances at geosynchronous altitude are due to solar radiation pressure
and, at close range, thruster plume impingement. Thruster plume impingement is also a concern
in terms of direct damage to the target spacecraft. Solar radiation pressure is relatively easy to
model. To analyze fully the effects of thruster plume impingement, much more detailed
modeling reflecting the geometry of both the tug and target as well as the nature of thruster
plumes is needed. This is beyond the scope of this section.
A method of final approach that is advantageous in terms of safety and fuel consumption, based
on Zero Closing Speed (ZCS) guidance, has been developed by Bell (2003). This type of
approach consists of a series of small "hops" toward the target, either along V-bar (aligned with
the velocity of the target spacecraft) or R-bar (aligned with the nadir from the target spacecraft)
(see figure on the next page). Simulations performed on hardware at the Naval Research
Laboratory (NRL) Spacecraft Robotics Engineering and Controls Lab have validated this method
of final approach (Bell, 2003). The direction of final approach (e.g., +/- V-bar, +/- R-bar)
depends on the state of the target satellite. For an attitude-stable but non-operational target
satellite, the direction of final approach can simply be chosen according to the location of the
most convenient docking area on the target spacecraft. Operational targets could require that the
tug dock from a specific direction to maintain a certain attitude. For instance, if the target were a
communications satellite, it may require an approach from above in order to maintain a nadir-
pointing orientation. In the case of uncooperative or tumbling targets, approach and docking
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could prove exceedingly difficult. Proximity operations for two close orbiting satellites are
further addressed by the Clohessy-Wiltshire or Hill's equations (see Section 4.1.5).
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Zero Closing Speed Guidance
Automated rendezvous and docking has already been demonstrated in LEO by the Japanese
ETS-VII mission (Kawano, 2001). Another demonstration is planned later this year with
DARPA's Orbital Express (see Section 2.3 for other U.S. technology demonstrations). The state
of the art in relative navigation lies in relative GPS and sensors such as the Advanced Video
Guidance Sensor (Polites, 1999; and Wertz and Bell, 2003). However, these technologies are not
entirely suitable for use by a space tug as it is conceived in this section. At geosynchronous
altitude, the use of relative GPS is not possible. Additionally, the space tug cannot assume that
the target satellite is cooperative. The advances in autonomous navigation technology that will
enable a space tug to rendezvous and dock with an arbitrary target in geosynchronous orbit are
under development but not yet flight-proven. A flight demonstration of the ability to reliably
deal with uncooperative targets will be a critical milestone on the way to an operational space
tug.
Future Servicing Architectures
There are implicit assumptions in this section that a space tug system would consist of a single
spacecraft and that its targets would be single spacecraft such as Intelsat or Milstar satellites.
These assumptions permit this analysis to concentrate on issues associated with the tug parking
orbit and rendezvous with the target spacecraft. Other potential space tug architectures, such as
those involving multiple tugs or on-orbit fueling stations, are not considered. Looking forward,
technological advances could radically alter the architecture of target spacecraft, which would in
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turn affect tug operations. For instance, future concepts for geostationary communications
satellites include tethered or formation flying satellite clusters and even swarms of up to 100,000
pico-satellites (Pelton, 2003). In the case of tethered or formation flying spacecraft, the problem
of tugging would be compounded by the dynamics of tethers and the need to move multiple
modules. For clusters of very small satellites, orbit determination at geosynchronous altitudes
could become a problem.
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